Reconstituted pathos: time and loss in the dramatic works of Samuel Beckett by Chiang, Hui Ling Michelle
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconstituted Pathos: Time and Loss in the Dramatic Works of Samuel Beckett 
 
 
 
 
 
Hui Ling Michelle Chiang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Leeds 
 
School of English 
 
September 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit 
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.  
 
This copy is supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
© 2014 The University of Leeds and Hui Ling Michelle Chiang  
 
The right of Hui Ling Michelle Chiang to be identified as Author of this work has been 
asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I wish to thank the School of English at the University of Leeds for the Bonamy Dobrée 
Scholarship that made my doctoral journey in Leeds possible.  
  
My gratitude also goes to Emeritus Professor Shirley Chew for offering me a position as 
the editorial assistant of Moving Worlds: A Journal of Transcultural Writings. I am 
particularly grateful for the financial support and job experience that this position has 
contributed to my postgraduate experience in Leeds.   
  
A big thank you also goes to Dr Neil Murphy, for his unwavering support, guidance and 
encouragement when I did not dare to dream.  
 
I am greatly indebted to Dr Mark Taylor-Batty for his patience, support and guidance 
throughout the writing of this thesis. I looked forward to each supervisory meeting with 
you because your meticulous reading of my drafts and constructive feedback assured me 
that I am not alone in this journey.  
 
I would also like to thank friends and colleagues both far and near for believing in me. 
Special mention goes to the following people who made living so many miles away 
from home bearable: Alejandra Ortiz, Gustavo Carvajal, Christine Chettle, Shu-shiun 
Ku, Hui-fang Liu, Hui-ru Kuo, Michelle Wang and Esther Wang. 
 
To my parents, Teck Fung Chiang and Gek Huay Peggy Koh, I do not think anyone in 
this world can love me as much as you do. Thank you for your faith in me. 
  
Finally, to my partner, Jia Haur Wong: your encouragement and understanding are my 
constant source of strength. Thank you for waiting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis looks at Samuel Beckett’s Film and selections of his dramatic works for 
radio, theatre and television to demonstrate the processes in which an intuition of loss 
may be invoked in the audience. More specifically, interrogating the dominant attitude 
in Beckett studies that Beckett's works are intellectually demanding of the audience, I 
maintain in the dissertation that his drama may appeal more to the audience members' 
intuition than their intellect. Following this trajectory, I posit that the frustration 
experienced by an audience member could be caused by an intuition of loss that is 
triggered by the plays’ reconstitution of her habitual framework of understanding. Key 
texts that influenced the definitions of ‘habit’, ‘intuition’, and ‘time’ in this research are 
Henri Bergson’s Time and Freewill and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  
 In this dissertation, I illustrate that the radio plays thematically appropriate the 
regard for radio as a ‘blind’ medium to highlight the audience’s entrapment in their 
habitual way of knowing. Further, Film is analysed as reconstituting the audience 
member’s habit body to an ecstatic being that is temporarily freed from stratified limits. 
Whereas Beckett scholars tend to attribute static interminability to Beckettian time 
because of the pervasiveness of ineffectual repetition depicted in his stage plays, I argue 
that Beckett’s conception of time may be dual: an incarcerating habitual continuum and 
a potentially liberating durée. Following that, I analyse how the television plays 
establish the intuition of loss as seemingly subject-less because the characters and the 
audience’s reliance on the habitual way of knowing has rendered them amnesiacs who 
cannot remember what they have lost, except that they have lost. In considering the 
intersection of Beckett’s dramatic works with the concept of habit, this thesis maps out 
the process in which each medium could have been exploited by Beckett to reconstitute 
the audience’s habitual framework of understanding to an intuitive experience of his 
works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT III 
ABSTRACT IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS V 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF HABIT 6 
1.2 PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 9 
1.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT 13 
1.4 CHAPTERS SUMMARY 16 
CHAPTER 2 THE INTUITION OF LOSS IN BECKETT’S RADIO PLAYS 22 
2.1 INTUITING LOSS IN THE AUDIENCE’S MIND-SPACE 24 
2.2 BLIND FAITH 39 
2.3 FROM THE PERIPHERY TO AN INTUITIVE CENTRE 55 
CHAPTER 3 FILM AND THE SPECTATOR’S ECSTATIC BECOMING 71 
3.1 THE INFLUENCE OF SERGEI EISENSTEIN 73 
3.2 FROM HABIT BODY TO ECSTATIC BEING 82 
3.3 TO HAVE DONE WITH THE JUDGEMENT OF ‘GOD’ 100 
CHAPTER 4 TIME OUT FROM THE WORLD: RESPITE IN BECKETT’S STAGE 
PLAYS 123 
4.1 STRATIFIED ORGANISM AND KANTIAN TIME 125 
4.2 OUTSIDE OF TIME 140 
4.3  RESPITE 157 
CHAPTER 5 THE DISENGAGING BECKETTIAN TELEVISION AUDIENCE AND 
THE MONUMENT TO LOSS 173 
5.1 THE DISENGAGING BECKETTIAN AUDIENCE 174 
5.2 THE AESTHETIC OF LOSS AND THE AUDIENCE’S COLLECTIVE AMNESIA 197 
5.3 EMPATHY 212 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 232 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 232 
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PLANS 236 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 242 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘To be always what I am - and so changed from 
what I was.’  
— Samuel Beckett, Happy Days 
 
Within the anglophone context of Samuel Beckett studies, considerations of audience 
reception often acknowledge mixed attitudes towards his early works but neglect to 
examine the fact that, despite growing appreciation for Beckett’s drama since Waiting 
for Godot was first performed, there will always be frustrated members of the audience 
who consider Beckett’s plays ‘boring, irritating and incomprehensible’.1 Such a 
negative perspective is likely triggered by the playwright’s deliberate frustrations of 
audience expectations, and could lead certain viewers to jump to the conclusion that the 
depiction of meaninglessness must mean that the works are meaningless. However, 
Simon Critchley rejects the view that Beckett’s works are meaningless because of the 
performance of meaninglessness. Instead, he postulates that meaninglessness ‘need[s] to 
be conceptually communicated’.2  
 As such, following Theodor Adorno’s view that Beckett’s plays ‘are absurd not 
because of the absence of meaning  then they would be irrelevant  but because they 
debate meaning’, Critchley emphasises Beckett’s works as intellectually demanding in 
their resistance to offering audiences an easily discernible or familiar narrative form, so 
as to articulate ‘meaninglessness as an achievement of the ordinary without the rose-
tinted glasses of redemption, an acknowledgement of the finiteness of the finite and the 
limitedness of the human condition’.3 Similarly, in Linda Ben-Zvi’s interpretation of 
                                                                
1
 S. E. Gontarski, ‘The Business of Being Beckett: Beckett’s Reception in the USA’, in The International 
Reception of Samuel Beckett, ed. by Mark Nixon and Matthew Feldman (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 
24-39 (p. 26). 
2
 Simon Critchley, Very Little... Almost Nothing (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 151. 
3
 Ibid., p. 180.  
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Beckett’s television plays, she asserts that Beckett foregrounded ‘the apparatus of the 
medium [as message] by revealing its trappings, conventions, and artifice’ in order that 
the viewers are shown ‘the inherent instability of all mechanical reproduction’ and 
‘[forced] to confront its power and seduction’.4 By postulating that Beckett’s television 
drama exposes to the viewer the medium as a manipulative artifice that conceals ‘the 
mess’ that is the human condition, Ben-Zvi, like Critchley, emphasises that Beckettian 
television drama stimulates the viewers’ intellect by leading them to confront the 
weaknesses of the medium and their susceptibility to its manipulation. However, such 
emphases on the role of the viewer’s intellect to rigorously interrogate Beckett’s 
expression of our limited condition, often overlook the intuitive effect that Beckett’s 
film and plays invoke in his audiences even before an intellectually derived overall 
conclusion could be drawn about his drama. The sense of frustration experienced by 
some of his audiences is a good starting point to examine this intuitive effect.  
 Jonathan Bignell’s Beckett on Screen: The Television Plays offers an informed 
report on the history of Beckett’s film and television plays’ negative reception, yet his 
perspective that Beckett’s works are ‘both pedagogical and paedocritic’ continues to 
align his analysis with the existing regard in Beckett criticism for unfavourable 
reception to be considered as merely a side effect of Beckett’s ‘educational’ delineation 
of failure and resistance.
5
 Although Bignell’s view follows Ben-Zvi’s perspective that 
Beckett’s works are trying to teach the audience how to see (and as a result overlooks 
the intuitive effect that the Beckettian drama could evoke in the audience members prior 
to their intellectual arrival at a neat and coherent conclusion about his works), I applaud 
the motivation of the book to introduce Beckett’s works to a broader audience and 
                                                                
4
 Linda Ben-Zvi, ‘Beckett, McLuhan, and Television: The Medium, the Message, and “the Mess”’, in 
Beckett at 100: Revolving It All, ed. by Linda Ben-Zvi and Angela Moorjani (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 271-84 (p. 280-1).  
5
 Jonathan Bignell, Beckett on Screen: The Television Plays (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2009), p.159. 
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readership. However, it is this that Chris Ackerley takes issue with, arguing that 
Bignell’s attempt to ‘invigorate the study of Beckett’s television plays and introduce 
them to a broader audience and readership [...] seems an improbable outcome; more 
realistic perhaps, is the hope that the small following Beckett’s television drama 
currently commands will be invigorated by his findings.’6 Tellingly, his attitude seems 
to suggest that Beckett studies should be content with our ‘small following’ and fails to 
appreciate the possibility that Beckett’s venture into other media might have been 
motivated by an artistic obligation to articulate an everyman experience to an everyman 
audience, instead of merely to appeal to intellectuals. This dissertation maintains that 
not only might Beckett’s drama have been thus motivated but that they also possess the 
capacity to articulate this everyman experience. This dissertation is my attempt to 
uncover this artistic articulation as the film and plays’ invocation of the audience’s 
often-neglected intuition. I observe that the audience’s intuition plays a large part in the 
experience of Beckett’s drama, yet it suffers from having been buried under the many 
sophisticated interpretations of Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre. 
 As such, the invocation of the intuitive effect by Beckettian drama, specifically 
apparent in the form of an everyman audience’s frustration with his works, is the main 
subject of this dissertation. Whereas Bignell’s emphasis is on the pedagogical value of 
Beckett’s works in relation to the audience, this thesis foregrounds the intuitive effect 
provoked in the audience by Beckett’s drama prior to their drawing of any definitive 
overall conclusions about his works. Following this trajectory, by placing an audience’s 
intellectual engagement with his plays at the background of this dissertation, I postulate 
that the negative reception of Beckett’s dramatic works presents an opportunity for the 
analysis of the intuitive aspect of audience experience. As part of the interpretive 
                                                                
6
 Chris Ackerley, ‘Beckett on Screen: The Television Plays (review)’, Modern Drama, 54.3 (2011), 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_drama/v054/54.3.ackerley.pdf> [accessed 15 May 2014], 383-5 (p. 
384). 
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approach that will be employed in this thesis, I will survey instances of the negative 
reception of Beckett’s drama within existing scholarship and also draw on my personal 
encounters with his works as an audience member. 
 In this dissertation, Film and selected plays for radio, stage and television will be 
examined to consider whether their reminder of the fragmentary condition in his 
audiences could cause the negative experience of Beckett’s dramatic works. I 
hypothesise that an audience member’s frustration with Beckett’s film and plays could 
be a manifestation of an intuition of loss that is triggered by this reminder of 
fragmentation. To many such audiences, this intuition of loss is ineffable because our 
condition of intrinsic fragmentation has been concealed and forgotten under the layers 
upon layers of habits that society has constructed and piled upon us in order that we 
may go on assuming that an organised and coherent narrative of life is the only reality 
of life. Thus, I postulate that the audience members’ habitual ways of thinking are 
formed in Time and the shedding of these habits while experiencing a Beckettian play 
entails an intuition of Loss, which may be the root of their frustration.    
 Two of the key writings that inform my understanding of a temporally organised 
lived reality are Henri Bergson’s Time and Freewill and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason.
7
 The tension between the two philosophers’ conceptions of Time is of 
particular significance to my understanding of the human intuition that is veiled under 
the veneer of habitual systems. Bergson intimated that if not for habits, humans will be 
consumed by the intellect’s desire to self-destruct.8 As such, habits are formed 
according to a spurious but necessary concept of successive time that is evenly divided 
                                                                
7
 Henri Bergson, Time and Freewill: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. by F. L. 
Pogson, 3rd edn (London: G. Allen, 1913); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by J. M. D. 
Meiklejohn (New York: Prometheus Books, 1990). 
8
 Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley 
Brereton (London: Macmillan and Co, 1935) 
<http://www.archive.org/details/twosourcesofmora033499mbp>[accessed 14 Jan 2014], p. 98. 
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into hours, minutes and seconds which social life is organised around.
9
 However, 
responding directly to Kant’s conception of Time as a successive continuum, Bergson 
maintained that time is in reality intuitively experienced as fluid duration (durée) and 
suggested that articulating an intuitive experience is difficult but that the task of the 
artist is to express it.
10
  Whereas scholars such as Steven Connor, Stephen Barker, 
Anthony Uhlmann and S. E. Gontarski have examined Beckett’s works in relation to 
Bergson’s philosophy, as far as I am aware, the representation of the intuitive durée as a 
possible escape route for the Beckettian characters from a successive external time 
continuum has not been considered.
11
 Thus, habit and successive time are inextricably 
tied together in this dissertation as a governing structure of Beckett’s dramatic 
landscape as well as the audience’s extradiegetic world. A sense of loss invariably 
ensues as the audience member experiences a paradoxical disjunction between an 
intuitive pity for the characters’ desire to escape this organised continuum and her 
persistently frustrated habitual frames of understanding that are employed to 
comprehend the ‘point’ of Beckett’s depiction of the characters’ failure to escape.   
 As such, the terms ‘reconstituted pathos’ in the title refer to the process of how 
Beckett’s plays do not appeal to the audience’s emotions in order to direct them to a 
specific judgement, but that they activate an intuitive core in the audience members, and 
as a consequence temporarily restore them to an intuitive awareness of their 
fragmentation. This reconstitution is conceived as temporary because I posit that 
Beckett’s works are not pedagogically functional in that context and that the audience 
                                                                
9
  Time and Freewill, p. 127. 
10
 The Two Sources, p. 217. 
11
 Stephen Connor, ‘Slow Going’, Critical Beckett Conference, University of Birmingham, 26 September 
1998 <http://www.stevenconnor.com/slow.htm> [accessed 13 June 2014]; Stephen Barker, ‘Qu’est-ce 
que c’est d’après in Beckettian time’, in Beckett after Beckett, ed. by S. E. Gontarski and Anthony 
Uhlmann (Tallahassee: Florida University Press, 2006), pp. 98-115; Anthony Uhlmann. Beckett and the 
Philosophical Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); S. E. Gontarski, ‘Recovering 
Beckett’s Bergsonism’, in Beckett at 100: Revolving it all, ed. by Linda Ben-Zvi and Angela Moorjani 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 93-106. 
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would continue to lean on their habitual frames of understanding the organised reality 
around them the moment the plays end. Jacques Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’ is employed in 
this research, particularly in relation to the analysis of Film, to understand our intrinsic 
but forgotten state of fragmentation, whereas Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
concepts of ‘deterritorialization’ and the ‘body without organs’ are adopted to shed 
more light on the spectatorial process of reconstitution. Effectively, the audience 
members’ intuitive experience of their intrinsic fragmentation in relation to each 
specific medium is examined in each chapter as a process of reconstitution. In Beckett 
criticism, fragmentation has been largely explored in relation to characterisation and this 
will be extrapolated in the following chapters to include the audience members as 
fragmented subjects.  
 The plays in this thesis are arranged by medium in the order of radio, film, stage 
and television. Each chapter focuses on one medium so as to explore how each medium 
might have been employed by Beckett to invoke the spectatorial process of 
reconstitution. Although the arrangement of the chapters does not follow a 
chronological order, the plays within each chapter are examined by taking into account 
some of the key cultural developments of the time the plays were written and first 
performed or broadcast in English. Crucially, the dissertation examines the subject of 
reconstitution through an interpretive approach by considering the intersection of the 
concept of habit with the philosophical and psychological contexts in which the film 
and plays were produced.  
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF HABIT 
 Beckett had it that ‘Habit is a ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. Breathing 
is habit. Life is habit. Or rather life is a succession of habits, since the individual is a 
succession of individuals; the world being a projection of the individual’s consciousness 
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[...], the pact must be continually renewed, the letter of safe-conduct brought up to 
date.’12  As it is evident in the quotation, even before Beckett began writing drama, his 
concept of habit is that it permeates every aspect of lived reality as a necessity, yet he 
seems also to be aware that there is something mechanically oppressive about it. The 
successive structure of habits that governs a projected world also implies that 
consciousness is also structured successively as a result of habit. In effect, his assertion 
that there is a ‘pact’ between habit and life that needs to be continually renewed 
suggests that this partnership could be a contrivance. 
 In Ulrika Maude’s ‘Beckett and the Laws of Habit’, she compares Felix 
Ravaisson’s concept of habit with Beckett’s portrayal of habit. She surmises that early 
Beckett’s negative perspective on the subject, which was expressed in Proust, might 
have been influenced by his readings of Bergson and Marcel Proust, but that late 
Beckett seems to view habit in a slightly more affirmative light since in his late drama 
‘residual subjectivity emerges and is tenuously articulated through acts of habit.’13 She 
suggests that like Ravaisson who asserted that the repetition of habit affords an 
automatic grace, Beckett demanded of his actors ‘the graceful gesture and posture of 
habitual mechanical action and enunciation’ so that a ‘sense of self’ could emerge out of 
it.
14
 I agree with Maude’s observation that a Beckettian character’s ‘sense of self’ could 
emerge through the performance of a habitual routine, but these do not only occur in his 
late works and I find it difficult to agree with her conclusion that habit thus ‘constitute[s] 
a tenuous, fraught, and primitive ontology, which is the most, perhaps, that we can hope 
                                                                
12
 Samuel Beckett, Proust, in The Grove Centenary Edition: Poems, Short Fiction, and Criticism of 
Samuel Beckett, ed. by Paul Auster, Vol. 4, 1st edn. (New York: Grove Press, 2006), pp. 511-554 (p. 515). 
13
 Ulrika Maude, ‘Beckett and the Laws of Habit’, Modernism/modernity, 18.4 (November 2011) 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modernism-modernity/v018/18.4.maude.html> [accessed 24 Jul 2014], 
814-21 (p. 820). 
14
 Ibid. 
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for.’15 It is problematic to regard Beckett as depicting the habitual state of being as the 
most that we can hope for insofar as we agree that his works articulate habit as already 
an entrapment that could be the root of his characters’ wretchedness. We cannot ‘hope 
for’ a condition of being that we are already trapped in. In my perspective, habit is not 
dramatised to accentuate the glimpses of ‘a residual subjectivity’ of the characters. 
Instead, habit is staged so that it may be exposed as the condition that veils the 
characters’ intuitive subjectivity, which remains trapped under it. As such, I maintain 
throughout this dissertation that habit is depicted in Beckettian drama as a necessary but 
entrapping veil that dulls the senses to the intuition, and the glimpses of the characters’ 
‘residual subjectivity’ that occasionally escape the veil are dramatised to activate the 
audience’s intuition of this veiled condition.  
 The concept that habit is a trap in this dissertation leans heavily on Bergson’s 
philosophy on Time and Intuition, which shortly will be introduced in the next section 
1.2 Philosophical Context. It should suffice for the purpose of this section to understand 
that Bergson asserted that habit dictates that we ‘[imprison] the whole of reality in a 
network prepared in advance’.16 This ‘network’ constitutes the conceptual framework 
by which one understands the world around us (and in the context of this dissertation, 
the conceptual framework by which an audience member unavailingly tries to 
understand Beckettian drama). For the practical purpose of living, the organised 
network is more preferable to the intuitive flux, which is the unbridled state of our being, 
because of the former’s clear system of relations.17 Thus, Beckett’s recognition of the 
necessity of habit, as I have quoted in the first paragraph of this section, follows 
Bergson’s recognition of its necessity, but more significant is their shared negative 
                                                                
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by T. E. Hulme (London: Macmillan and Co Limited, 
1913), pp. 1-79 (p. 71). 
17
 Ibid. 
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regard for habit by envisioning it as a trap. Habit is examined in this dissertation as a 
mechanically organised structure that is inextricably tied to time and language in 
Beckett’s dramatic works. As such, I observe that this structuring habit is destabilised in 
Beckettian drama in order that the characters and the audience could momentarily be 
put back in touch with the intuitive ‘centre’ of self, where ‘a continuous flux’ of reality 
is governed ‘by intuition and not by simple analysis’.18  
1.2 PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
To a large extent, the Bergsonian conception of Time and Intuition influenced 
the trajectory of this dissertation. Michael R. Kelly points out in his introduction to 
Bergson and Phenomenology that ‘If phenomenologists did not ignore Bergson, they 
derided his contributions to [the] perennial philosophical problems of life because they 
found in his vitalism either a thoroughgoing materialism or an unrealistically optimistic 
spiritualism.’19 Nevertheless, the influence of his concept of durée extends from Martin 
Heidegger’s ecstatic temporality of Dasein to Gilles Deleuze’s three syntheses of time. 
Indeed, Kelly points out that Deleuze’s re-introduction of Bergson to contemporary 
philosophy through Bergsonism, results in Bergsonists’ presentation of Bergson as a 
philosopher who advocated ‘flux in the most profound sense’ rather than ‘vitalism or 
bland spiritualism’.20 Following Manfred Milz who identified Bergsonian influence in 
Beckett’s early theoretical writings and fiction from 1929 to 1936, Graley Herren’s 
Samuel Beckett’s plays on Film and Television and Colin Gardner’s Beckett, Deleuze 
and the Televisual Event are two works that, despite the latter’s focus on Deleuze’s 
philosophy, point to the centrality of Bergson’s philosophy in the understanding of 
                                                                
18
 Ibid., p. 9. 
19
 Michael R. Kelly, ‘Introduction: Bergson’s Phenomenological Reception: the Spirit of a Dialogue of 
Self-Resistance’, in Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. by Michael R. Kelly (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), p. 5. 
20
 Ibid. 
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Beckett’s drama.21 Moreover, Gontarski helpfully points out that although Bergson’s 
“mystical certainty” had little resonance with Beckett’s works, ‘it is decidedly opposed 
to teleology, or what Bergson calls “mechanism”’, which I agree might have been a 
position shared by Beckett if we take into account the latter’s disparagement of habits 
and routines in his oeuvre as ineffectual, yet inescapable.
22
   
For instance, Bergson’s doubt in the mechanical clock that has been so 
instrumental to the scientific understanding of time in relation to human life contributed 
to his interrogation of the extent by which reality can be defined by teleological systems. 
Interestingly, Beckett’s naming of Georges Pelorson’s one-act burlesque of Pierre 
Corneille’s seventeenth-century four act play Le Cid after Charlie Chaplin’s film The 
Kid, could imply that Beckett saw a parallel between Pelorson’s reconfiguration of 
Corneille’s play with an emphasis on the fluidity of Time, and Chaplin’s portrayal of 
how the governing system of the depicted world in the film The Kid is sustained at the 
expense of the Tramp and the child’s desire to stay together. Both works seem to 
articulate a disjunction between constructed systems that are imposed on lived reality 
and a subjectively experienced reality.   
James Knowlson describes Beckett’s part in the play Le Kid as Don Diègue and 
his idea to ‘bring an alarm clock on stage with him’ to interrupt Don Diègue’s famous 
monologue and wake up the silent figure who controls the hands of a large clock that 
was set against the backdrop of the stage: 
[H]e knelt down, placed the clock very carefully on the floor and was 
midway when the alarm went off infuriating him and waking up the man 
                                                                
21
 See Manfred Milz, ‘Echoes of Bergsonian Vitalism in Beckett’s Early Works’, in Borderless Beckett/ 
Beckett sans frontières, ed. by Minako Okamuro, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, 19 (Tokyo: Rodopi, 
2006), pp. 143-154 (p. 1), Graley Herren, Samuel Beckett’s Plays on Film and Television (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 13, and Colin Gardner, Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event: 
Peephole Art (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 16. 
22
 Gontarski, p. 98. 
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on the ladder. This combined with the speeded-up movements of the 
hands of the big clock, forced him to go faster and faster until he built up 
a wild, crazy momentum, producing a torrent of sound that has been 
aptly compared with the effect of Lucky’s extravagant monologue in 
Waiting for Godot.
23
 
Although Pelorson might have had a greater part to play in designing this sequence of 
actions, Beckett’s involvement in this particular section of the performance might have 
served to form his conception of Time as a creatively manipulatable subject onstage. 
Further, his equation of the play ‘as a blend of Corneille and Bergson, because of the 
importance given to time’ further attests to his awareness of Bergson’s doubt in 
mechanical time and valorisation of an intuitive experience of la durée, which he 
asserted was more qualitatively accurate to describe time as it is experienced 
subjectively.
24
 As Gontarski has it, Beckett’s ‘study of Bergson, if only for his 
preparation for teaching his Trinity students, remained with him as a ghost, an 
afterimage that informed much of his work for the remainder of his career’.25 Partly as a 
response to Gontarski’s suggestion that ‘the depth of Beckett’s debt to Bergsonism 
needs to be reserved for a fuller study’, a significant portion of this thesis, specifically 
Chapters 2 and 4, are devoted to answering the questions: could there be an intuitive 
experience of Beckett’s plays that occurs prior to a discursively drawn conclusion about 
his drama? And if there is, how do Beckett's works invoke this intuitive experience in 
the audience members? Crucially, the definition of the audience’s intuitive experience 
of Beckett’s plays in Chapter 2 will inform the rest of the dissertation’s employment of 
                                                                
23
 James Knowlson, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
1996), p. 124. 
24
 Quoted in ibid. 
25
 Gontarski, p. 104. 
12 
 
the terms as an experiential process that occurs within the audience member prior to an 
intellectual drawing of an overall conclusion about each dramatic work.       
In addition to Deleuze’s attraction and attention to Beckett’s works, Connor 
describes Deleuze as ‘that most loyal of Bergsonians’ while Kelly attributes to Deleuze 
the revival of the otherwise underappreciated philosopher.
26
 As such, Deleuze’s 
philosophy of perpetual motion and the interminable process of becoming are also 
examined in this dissertation, specifically in Chapter 3, in relation to the audience 
member’s intuitive experience of loss as they view the Beckettian film and plays. It is 
noteworthy that whereas Gardner subordinates Beckett’s works to Deleuze’s philosophy, 
this dissertation focuses on Beckett’s drama and his audience, and employs Deleuze’s 
perspective as one of the many lenses through which to understand the audience 
member’s viewing experience of the Beckettian drama. Specifically, Deleuze and 
Guattari's concepts of ‘deterritorialisation’ and the ‘body without organs’ (derived from 
Antonin Artaud’s play To Have Done with the Judgement of God) are of particular 
significance in the context of my analysis of Beckett’s Film in Chapter 3, to describe the 
spectator’s experiential process of becoming an ecstatic ‘body without organs’ as she 
views Beckett’s film. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit-body is employed in Chapter 4 to 
explain the experiential process of transcorporeality between the characters in Beckett’s 
plays, the actors and the audience members. The concept of the habit-body has been 
specifically acknowledged by Merleau-Ponty’s critics as very likely influenced by 
Bergson’s observation that ‘habit is formed by the repetition of effort’, which through 
each repetition effects an understanding of ‘a new detail which had passed unperceived’ 
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and thereby appeals to the intelligence to learn the movement.
 27
 As such, if Bergson’s 
philosophy is not at the foreground of a chapter’s analysis in this dissertation, it is worth 
noting that his work’s influence as a predecessor to the philosophical concepts that I 
will employ in the subsequent chapters colours the lens from which these concepts are 
understood in relation to Beckett’s works. Further, it is noteworthy that the reading of 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodiedness in Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre is not new in 
Beckett criticism. Beckett scholars such as Stanton B. Garner Jr., Anna McMullan, 
Ulrika Maude and more recently Trish McTighe have recognised Beckett’s privileging 
of perceptual consciousness over intellectual consciousness by drawing a relation 
between Beckett’s dramatic representation of the body and Merleau-Ponty’s 
foregrounding of embodiedness, thereby persuasively identifying this as a common 
tenet in their works.
28
 However, the concept of the habit-body, which has been largely 
explored with an emphasis on characterisation in Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre, is more 
specifically explored in this dissertation in terms of its relation to the audience 
member’s intuitive experience of disjunction while viewing or listening to a Beckettian 
drama.    
1.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
This disjunction is also investigated through the lens of social psychology in 
relation to psychoanalysis. For example, Wilfred Bion’s concept of O and Solomon E. 
                                                                
27
 See Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, ‘Kinesthetic memory: Further critical reflections and constructive 
analyses’ in Body, Memory, Metaphor and Movement, ed. by Sabine C. Koch et al. (Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2012), pp.43- 72 (p. 57 n 8), and Gary Gutting, ‘Bergson 
and Merleau-Ponty on Experience and Science’, in Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. by Michael R. Kelly 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 63-77; Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by N. M. 
Paul and W. S. Palmer, 1912 Macmillan edn. (New York: Dover Publications, 2004), pp. 137-8. 
28
 See Stanton B. Garner Jr., ‘“Still Living Flesh”: Beckett, Merleau-Ponty, and the Phenomenological 
Body’, Theatre Journal, 45.4 (December 1993) < http://www.jstor.org/stable/3209015> [accessed 15 
June 2014], 443-60; Anna McMullan, Theatre on Trial (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); Ulrika 
Maude, “‘Material of a Strictly Peculiar Order’: Beckett, Merleau-Ponty and Perception”, Beckett and 
Phenomenology, ed. by Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman (London and New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2009); Trish McTighe, The Haptic Aesthetic in Samuel Beckett’s Drama 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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Asch’s influential 1956 social group experiment are employed in Chapter 3 to explore 
the resistance of Beckett’s works to social conformity and the effect of this resistance to 
the viewing experiences of the audience. Bion’s influence on Beckett has been explored 
in Beckett criticism, most recently in Ian Miller and Kay Souter’s Beckett and Bion: The 
(Im)patient Voice in Psychotherapy and Literature.  
Miller asserts that Bion’s invitation to Beckett to have dinner and to attend C. J. 
Jung’s lecture was an incongruence in their analyst-analysand relationship, which can 
be explained ‘as an activity attempting to continue psychotherapy in the face of Bion’s 
inability to articulate as yet unformulated experience and Beckett’s increasing desire for 
termination.’29 That is, Miller is suggesting that Bion’s ‘heroic boundary violation’ may 
be understood as his awareness that he ‘lacked the conceptual tools’ to remedy an 
impasse felt by Beckett, but that he would not abandon ‘his erratic and gifted patient’.30 
As such, Miller goes on to assert that ‘the patient is clearly left with a sense that the 
therapist is not afraid to stay with him, and, above all, with a profound sense of what 
real mutuality might feel like.’31 Despite the lack of concrete evidence to prove that 
Bion’s invitation was indeed thus motivated, Miller's conjecture is refreshing. 
Facilitated by this perspective of mutuality between the therapist and the patient, Miller 
and Souter’s reading of Beckett’s literary form as an innovative employment of free 
association accompanies an interpretation of Bion’s therapy sessions with Beckett as 
influential in Bion’s theoretical work. Nevertheless, this ‘profound sense of real 
mutuality’ does not conclusively explain Beckett’s eventual termination of his sessions 
with Bion and their lack of contact after the therapy ended.  
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 Ian Miller and Kay Souter, Beckett and Bion: The (Im)Patient Voice in Psychotherapy and Literature 
(London: Karnac Books Ltd, 2013), p. 91. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
15 
 
By considering Bion’s attention to the interactive processes of groups from the 
1940s which resulted in the publication of Experiences in Groups and his concept of O 
in Transformations as an absolute inner truth that can be a unifying experience should 
the analysand arrive at the experience with the help of the analyst, I hypothesise that 
Beckett might have terminated his sessions with Bion because of, in addition to the 
relapse of panic attacks, his doubt in the kind of potentially fruitful ‘mutuality’ that is 
postulated later in Bion’s career and by Miller and Souter in their book.   
Further, derived from group psychology research, the concept of conformity is 
also presented in this thesis in the form of consumer culture and explored in terms of the 
deviation of Beckett’s dramatic works from the form and content that were familiar to 
most mid-twentieth century television and film audiences. This deviation from what is 
deemed standard by the majority extends to the interpretation of his characters’ depicted 
psychosis and the audience’s consequent experience of a frustrating disjunction. 
 Abnormal psychology is a branch of psychology which studies behaviours that 
go against what the individual’s society deems are standard and as a consequence result 
in causing the subject and/or others significant harm or discomfort. Although the term 
‘abnormal’ is rarely stated in analyses of psychosis in Beckett’s characters, the 
underlying nature of these ailments is conceived as a deviation from the norm. 
Schizophrenia, dissociative identity disorder, Cotard’s and Capgra’s syndromes are just 
a handful of the many forms of disorders that have been examined in relation to the 
Beckettian characters in Beckett criticism.
32
 In this dissertation, by positing that the 
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audience member is reminded of their forgotten state of fragmentation as they are 
experiencing Beckett’s plays, I propose to examine the Beckettian audience as 
metaphorically afflicted by a mass amnesia that is reminiscent of Prosopagnosia 
symptoms (also known as face blindness). I posit that our intrinsic state of 
fragmentation is forgotten as a result of the layers upon layers of habit that we subscribe 
to and are imposed on us by constructed systems that structure and govern our societies; 
Beckett’s drama gestures towards this amnesia by dramatising a deviation from the 
audience members’ habitual expectation of a familiar and coherent narrative in theatre, 
radio, television and film.
33
 As such, ‘abnormal’ is interpreted as resistance to the 
audience member’s habitual expectations. Consequently, I postulate that the result of 
Beckett’s dramatic works’ representation of resistance is a reconstitution of his 
audience’s pathos from pity for the Beckettian characters’ predicaments to an intuitive 
empathy.      
1.4 CHAPTERS SUMMARY 
Through the consideration of the intersection between the concept of habit and 
the philosophical and psychological contexts outlined above, this research aims to 
contribute to the understanding of the often acknowledged but seldom articulated 
frustration experienced by Beckett’s audiences, as a process of reconstitution. The 
continued success and spread of Godot performances in Europe, the United States of 
America and Asia, as well as Ireland’s embrace in recent years and active promotion of 
Beckett as an Irish writer, have prompted Beckett scholars to focus more on the 
increasing acceptance of Beckett’s works rather than on the less accepting attitudes of 
                                                                
33
 At this point, it is worth noting that the focus of this dissertation is on the entrapping structure of habit 
instead of the complex mechanisms of habit formation that have been studied by theorists such as 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and political theorist Yannis Stavrakakis. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s concept 
of the habitus and Stavrakakis’s work on the relation between consumerist behaviour and capitalism will 
be touched upon briefly in Chapters 2 and 5, respectively. 
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some audiences who are unfamiliar with his works and reputation. However, these 
audiences’ experience of a similar sense of frustration that affected the audience 
members who attended the first Godot performances suggest that Beckett’s drama 
possess an intrinsic power to frustrate. The increasing popularity of Godot with 
mainstream audiences, evident in the recent performances of the play at Broadway by 
Hollywood actors Ian McKellen and Patrick Stewart under the direction of Sean 
Mathias, could imply either that the sensibilities of contemporary audiences are more 
attuned to the condition of fragmentation represented in Beckett’s drama, or that the 
valorisation of ‘difference’ and ‘uniqueness’ in what some deem to be the postmodern 
era of mass culture has rendered the ‘absurd’ in Beckett ‘mainstream’. In any case, the 
increasing acceptance of Beckett’s works renders it more crucial than ever to address 
the persistent frustration that continues to plague certain members of the audience, 
including uninitiated students and non-specialised audiences, instead of dismissing this 
frustration as a lack of intellectual engagement. 
 In ‘Chapter 2 The Intuition of Loss in Beckett’s Radio Plays’, the listeners’ 
intuition of loss is defined in relation to Beckett’s depiction of ‘blindness’ in his radio 
plays. This blindness is specifically explored as ‘blind faith’ in the various narrative 
systems that form the basis upon which a listener’s subjective framework of 
understanding the lived reality around her is constructed. The early Western Christian 
narrative will be employed in this chapter as an apparatus to examine how the flux of 
reality is concealed and how Beckett’s radio drama triggers the audience member’s 
memory of it to invoke the intuition of loss. The radio plays that will be examined in 
this chapter are from the CD collection Samuel Beckett: Works for Radio- The Original 
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Broadcasts.
34
 Once held as a blind medium, I agree with Tim Crook that radio is 
essentially an audio-visual medium. As such, I postulate that the acoustics of a radio 
play supports the imaginative spectacle in the audience’s mind’s eye and as such 
effectively allows for the coincidence between the audience and the characters of the 
radio play to result in the Bergsonian intuition ‘by which one places oneself within an 
object’.35 More specific to this analysis is that the listener is placed within the play as 
much as the play is placed within her as she listens to the radio play. Consequently, in 
the context of Beckett’s radio plays, I posit that the depicted blindness of the Beckettian 
characters is transposed to the listener as she intuits her entrapment in grand narratives 
that instead of accurately represent lived reality, repeatedly distorts it.    
 ‘Chapter 3 Film and the Spectator’s Ecstatic Becoming’ continues to expand the 
definition of the Beckettian audience’s intuition of loss by exploring how Beckett’s film 
diverges from mainstream cinema and challenges the audience member’s established 
conceptual framework. In particular, if Beckett had attempted to follow Sergei 
Eisenstein’s ‘pathos construction’ in Film, it is examined in this chapter as an 
unsuccessful enterprise.  Eisenstein defined the ecstatic effect elicited by pathos 
construction as the viewer’s experience of ‘being beside oneself’ as she is transported 
from conscious conceptualisation to a ‘pure’ feeling. I observe that although Beckett’s 
film does not execute the process of pathos construction effectively, the attempt 
nevertheless resulted in the evocation of an ‘ecstatic’ spectatorial experience that is 
unique to Beckett. I hypothesise that this Beckettian ecstatic spectatorial experience 
temporarily frees the audience from their bondage to their existing habitual frame. In 
order to understand this unique spectatorial freedom, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
Becoming will be employed to interpret the film in parallel with the audience member’s 
                                                                
34
 Samuel Beckett: Works for Radio - The Original Broadcasts (British Library Publishing Division, 2006) 
[on CD].  
35
 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6. 
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reconstitution from a parochial conceptual framework that is characterised by stratified 
limits to an intuition of reality as an assemblage of possibilities. 
 In ‘Chapter 4 Time out from the World: Respite in Beckett’s Stage Plays’, Time 
is examined as dual in the plays. As stated above, Bergson’s opposition to Kant’s 
sequential time continuum is brought to bear on my analysis of Beckett’s dual depiction 
of time in the stage plays as an external time continuum and an internal duration. The 
audience is implicated in that the external time continuum presented onstage by the 
theatre actor’s bodily presence extends to the extradiegetic world offstage and governs 
the spectators’ compulsion for narrative closure. Here, I critique and extend Michael 
David Fox’s assertion that the audience’s empathy with the Beckettian characters is in 
fact empathy with the actors’ suffering body by maintaining that during storytelling, a 
character is abstracted from the actor’s body in the audience’s mind as a spectre of a 
lived life with an unclear and unreliable history, whereas the body of the actor continues 
to anchor the perception of the audience to the embodied present of the character in the 
external time continuum. When the audience’s compulsion for narrative closure is 
challenged by the anachronical stories that constitute the unreliable spectre of the 
characters’ lived history, they experience the disjunction between the external time and 
a fluid duration. I posit that a sense of loss is intuited as a result. More importantly, I 
maintain that this temporal disjunction which is effected by the unfamiliarity of the 
anachronical stories that are told by the actors/characters is precisely that which would 
afford the characters brief moments of respite, and conversely deprive the members of 
the audience of their expected narrative closure.  
 In ‘Chapter 5: The Disengaging Beckettian Television Audience and the 
Monument to Loss’, I explore how Beckett’s television plays erect a monument to loss 
by leading the ‘disengaging spectator’ towards an intuitive experience as she gradually 
gives up trying to find an easily discernible ‘point’ in his plays. The ‘disengaging 
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spectator’ refers to the home viewer who desires to disengage from Beckett’s teleplays, 
not because they are unable or unwilling to appreciate Beckett’s works, but because the 
desire to disengage is an intuitive response to the television plays’ evocation of a 
forgotten, and therefore, seemingly subject-less sense of loss. As such, I posit that the 
monument to loss that is set up in these plays could be a site of remembrance to invoke 
the often-neglected intuition. The main teleplays that are examined in the chapter are 
from BBC 2’s Lively Arts Series that aired in Britain on 17 April 1977, and Eh, Joe?, 
which was broadcast on 4 July 1966.       
 What this research attempts to articulate therefore is the audience member’s 
intuitive experience of Beckett’s dramatic works. Although the findings of this 
dissertation are largely based on the anglophone audience’s reception of Beckett’s film 
and plays, I maintain that the intuitive effect of Beckett’s works is universal. This 
perspective is in large part influenced by my pre-university experience of Beckett’s 
stage and television plays in Singapore. Even prior to reading what critics thought about 
his works, I found the text of Waiting for Godot strangely moving despite not being able 
to understand many cultural expressions that are specific to the West, which I later 
learnt are biblical allusions and intertextual references to writers like Marcel Proust, 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Dante Alighieri.  
 While channel surfing one night, I recall being struck by the black and white 
image of two identical old men sitting next to each other, one reading and one knocking 
on the table. I remember feeling moved by the helplessness of the repeated knocks that 
begged to no avail for the reader to continue reading from the book. I only realised what 
I just saw was a Beckett play when the credits rolled. Although, the original play was 
written as a stage play and would no doubt have had a different effect on the viewer 
when performed onstage as opposed to being presented on screen, Charles Sturridge’s 
2002 film adaptation of Ohio Impromptu induced me to question how a viewer can be 
21 
 
so moved by what she does not understand. A few years later, I went to see a 
performance of Not I at the Drama Centre in Singapore as an undergraduate. I did not 
read the text before seeing the play and therefore much of Mouth’s lines eluded me. 
Nonetheless, by the end of the play I was overwhelmed with an inexplicable sense of 
pity, which surfaced again when I experienced Walter Asmus’s Not I at the Royal Court 
Theatre in January of this year, almost nine years since I first saw the play in Singapore. 
In my mind, there is little doubt that Beckett’s works appeal to the audience’s intuition 
more than the intellect, yet the audience member’s intuitive experience of Beckett’s 
works is rarely considered at length in Beckett criticism, specifically in terms of the 
audience’s inclination to disengage from his plays. As such, this dissertation is an 
original contribution to Beckett scholarship in its in-depth exploration of how Beckett’s 
film and plays may invoke an intuitive experience in the audience. Ultimately, what I 
hope to illustrate here is the process of experiencing Beckett’s dramatic works 
intuitively, which would result in the audience’s reconstitution from a securely coherent 
framework of understanding the external world around them to a destabilisingly 
heightened experience of a simple but often-neglected intuition of loss. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE INTUITION OF LOSS IN BECKETT’S RADIO PLAYS 
 
The interrogation of issues of loss is nothing new in Samuel Beckett studies. Its 
discussion in Beckett criticism has been mediated by, just to name a few, the departed 
mother, the fragmentation of language and ideas of faith in his oeuvre. However, the 
focus of this chapter is to investigate how his radio plays draw the audience’s attention 
to her inherent but often neglected intuition of loss.
1
 
Amongst the earliest critics of Beckett’s works, Hugh Kenner pointed out that 
‘[b]ehind work after work of Beckett’s we are to sense a loss, somewhere in the past, of 
a power to love’.2 In Mary Bryden’s Samuel Beckett and the Idea of God she examined  
‘the hypothesised God who emerges from Beckett’s texts [as] one who is both cursed 
for his perverse absence and cursed for his surveillant presence’ and her work 
concluded by aligning Beckett’s oeuvre to the apophatic tradition, which indicates a loss 
of faith in organised religion.
3
 While scholars such as Adam Piette view Beckettian loss 
in terms of ‘bereavement’, Dan Gunn, in his introduction to the second volume of 
Beckett’s letters, specifically draws the readers’ attention to how the artist’s deceased 
mother’s ‘eyes, the mourning, the loss, the gain, infancy and great old age’ draws a map 
of ‘the literary space that [Beckett] is going to make his own […]’.4  The interrogation 
of faith by negation, the lost power to love, and bereavement are a few of many forms 
of loss that are perceived by critics as having their roots in the author’s deeply personal 
preoccupations. The existential aspect of these cogitations is often discursively derived 
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in Beckett criticism, but these are rarely explicitly articulated as relatable to the 
everyman audience of Beckett’s drama. 
I understand that one of the many difficulties of positing an everyman’s 
reception is the geographic, cultural and language specific origins of the publication and 
broadcast of Beckett’s works. To explore his allusions to Christianity, for instance, 
would demand a culturally specific analysis of his work and its effects on a group of 
audiences who would be familiar with the biblical narrative. However, since the radio 
plays were at first only broadcast to a European audience, they were broadly addressing 
the same habitus across a single field of the plays’ production. By ‘habitus’, I am 
referring to Pierre Bourdieu’s systems of dispositions and structures that ‘generate and 
organize practices and representations’ without a ‘conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them’.5 Thus, the religious 
references that articulate loss retain their integrity and metaphoric potency regardless of 
one’s specific subscription, and are ‘universal’ in so far as they are enacted within the 
habitus in which these plays are produced. Following this trajectory, I postulate in the 
chapter that Beckett’s radio drama critiques the habitual constructs that his audiences 
are predisposed to employ in their understanding of the world around them, in order to 
bring the inherent intuition of loss to the forefront of the everyman audience’s 
consciousness.  
With the above in mind, the first section of this chapter offers an examination of 
the simplistic truism that radio ‘is a blind medium’ by asserting that the relationship 
between radio and the audience is an internally audio-visual one.
6
 I postulate that the 
Beckettian radio dramas All That Fall (1957) and Rough for Radio II (1976) 
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thematically appropriate this ‘blindness’ instead in their allusions to the Christian 
narrative so as to activate an audience member’s intuition of loss through the concept of 
‘blind faith’. The final part of this chapter investigates how a similar intuition of loss is 
invoked by the non-culturally specific depictions of blindness in Embers (1959), Words 
and Music (1962) and Cascando (1964). Radio is a particularly suitable medium to 
explore the form of Beckettian doubt in constructed narratives that his characters (and 
audience) are depicted as blindly subscribing to. Invariably concealed under dogmatic 
systems of relations, the everyman’s intuition of loss is regarded in this chapter as being 
excavated by the radio plays so that the audience member may be reconstituted to her 
intrinsically intuitive centre.  
To reiterate, through the portrayal of ‘blind faith’ in constructed narratives, 
Beckett’s radio plays are conceived in this chapter as eliciting an intuitive feeling of loss 
in his audience, which as opposed to the totalizing and confining systems of relations 
depicted, could effectively be a less oppressive and perhaps more compelling 
experience of our existence.  
2.1 INTUITING LOSS IN THE AUDIENCE’S MIND-SPACE 
The intuition is understood in Bergsonian terms as ‘a simple act’ of the mind 
that is inherent in each of us.
7
 In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Henri Bergson 
asserted that the difference between analysis and intuition is that the former is a 
positioning of the self outside of the object whereas the latter is a placing of oneself 
within the object.
8
 He stated further that intuition is ‘the kind of intellectual sympathy 
by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in 
                                                                
7
 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by T. E. Hulme (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 
1949), p. 24. 
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it and consequently inexpressible’.9 As David Scott also explains, ‘by immediate 
intuition’, Bergson was referring to ‘the act of knowledge [which] coincides with the 
generating act of reality’.10 Bergson’s example on how a character’s ‘adventures’ in a 
novel ‘are related to’ or coincide with the reader is useful in explaining how the concept 
of intuition is applied in this chapter to the audiences of Beckett’s radio drama.11  
Stating that a character’s ‘description, history and analysis’ would not help the 
reader to achieve ‘the simple and indivisible feeling which I should experience if I were 
able for an instant to identify with the person of the hero himself’, Bergson seems to 
have suggested that intuition is a sympathetic coincidence between a character and a 
reader that cannot be directly represented by description, history and analysis of a 
character since symbolic representation alone does not get to ‘his essence’ of being a 
‘person himself’.12 Although a character is not a person, and as such would seem there 
is no essence in the character, I interpret, with reference to Anthony Uhlmann’s 
explication of the Bergsonian ‘intuition’ in relation to the ‘image’, that the ‘essence’ of 
a character refers to the ‘secondary image’ of a character that is intuited by the reader 
based on the original intuition of the author, ‘but does not fully succeed in reproducing 
or expressing that [original] intuition’.13 In the creation of this secondary image, the 
reader would have to be placed ‘within’ the character itself to effect a coincidence ‘for 
an instant’ to experience ‘the simple and indivisible feeling’ of intuition. The radio play 
occupies the audience’s consciousness quite differently from the way a novel would 
unfold in the reader’s mind. As opposed to a single character in a novel presented in the 
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example above, the voices of the characters and the ambient noises of a radio play are 
more concrete than those that are described in written text.  
As a sum of these concrete sounds and the audience’s imaginative spectacle, the 
fictional world of a radio drama is constituted in its entirety acoustically around and 
visually within the audience. This does not then mean that the audience member would 
identify with a specific character by virtue of the play being enacted within her, but that 
the overall effects invoked by the radio drama would directly coincide with the audience 
within her consciousness. In the context of this chapter’s analysis, it follows then that 
the moment in which a radio play evokes the audience member’s ‘intellectual 
sympathy’, could effectively be the ‘instant’ of intuitive coincidence between the play 
and the listener.
14
 This moment is presented below as the instant when the audience 
intuits loss. 
Whereas the sense of futility that is often attributed to Beckett’s oeuvre suggests 
an existential pointlessness, the intuition of loss is an anxiety-ridden awareness that 
outside of a dogmatic system of relations that governs our daily lives is flux and 
uncertainty. ‘Loss’ is therefore twofold in that it refers to the loss of these incarcerating 
restrictions as well as the loss of bearings. Intuiting these through Beckett’s radio drama 
is therefore an induced awareness that the uncertainty of reality is in fact veiled by 
closed-systems of grand narratives which the everyman readily subscribes to. This 
awareness consequently leads to a loss of bearings as the listener’s habitual framework 
of understanding proves inadequate to completely grasp the Beckettian narrative. 
Following this trajectory, as opposed to a closed-system of passive listening, the 
destabilised listener’s experience of Beckett’s radio drama is regarded in this chapter as 
an active process of listening and visualisation.  
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Given that the audience’s experience has traditionally been taken for granted as 
passively led by the events depicted in a work, I propose an alternative approach that 
would entail examining the audience-play relationship from the perspective of the 
audience’s ecstatic performance. By ecstatic, I follow Drew Leder’s definition of 
‘ecstasis’ as the conscious experience of attending to events that are occurring outside 
of one’s body.15 In this state of ecstasis, the body recedes into the background of one’s 
consciousness and the events that occur through the radio broadcast would occupy the 
foreground of the audience’s consciousness or ‘mind’s eye’. One becomes actively 
involved in a performance by investing her attention and imagination in the radio drama 
and, as a result of her participation, becomes partially responsible for the creation of an 
imaginative spectacle. Therefore, as opposed to passive audience experience, an 
examination of ecstatic performance involves regarding the audience’s imagination as a 
key component of the dramatic spectacle. If Beckett’s radio plays are indeed, as I am 
postulating, expressions of doubt in closed-systems, the artist would logically expect 
and anticipate an audience’s active involvement in his works. 
Leder observes that ‘[w]hile driving, I may turn on the radio and soon find 
myself singing along [as] [...] the eyes, hands and feet so central to driving play a 
background role relative to listening to music.’16 Similarly, as one listens attentively to a 
radio play, the body’s interaction with its immediate surrounding that remains visible 
may recede to a background of automatic responses as the mind becomes flooded with 
images conjured by the sounds and words of the play. When comparing the radio play 
to the stage play, it is not difficult to notice that one of the main distinguishing 
differences between them is an absence in the radio play of any substantial physical 
visuals afforded by a stage and its actors. But this is not necessarily a lack that would in 
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anyway render radio a blind medium and reduce the audience’s participation in the 
work. Instead, almost as if she is engaged in an interior monologue, the mind of a 
listener may play the roles of both the audience and the characters in her mind’s eye in 
order to supplement the absence of external visuals.  
As Leder has it:  
 When engaged in inner monologue, even my hands and mouth, my eyes 
 and ears, drop out of immediate employment. The sensorimotor organs 
 that were used in speaking or reading are now placed in background 
 disappearance with the rest of the body. I can think while sitting 
 perfectly motionless, no corporeal activity whatsoever apparent to myself 
 or to another. It seems as if the thinker makes no use of a body.
17
  
By ‘drop[ping] out of immediate employment’, Leder is referring to a reduced 
consciousness of our interaction with the immediate physical environment as we engage 
with our inner monologue. In addition, the act of ‘speaking or reading’ joins in the 
overall physical recession from consciousness as thoughts in the mind take centre stage 
at the foreground of one’s consciousness. I posit that listening to a radio play is similar 
to turning one’s attention to one’s interior monologue except that the unfamiliar 
dialogues of the characters would conjure foreign images that rely on the imagination of 
the listener for their creation in this conceptual space. As such, more so than the 
reception of prescribed images on the physical stage or screen, the recession into the 
mind and hence the audience’s withdrawal into self is more total and could potentially 
render the listener’s engagement with a radio play stronger than with other media 
employed by Beckett in his dramatic oeuvre.  
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 The conceptual space of the audience’s mind where the radio plays are being 
enacted is also referred to as the mind-space in this chapter. Steven Connor observes 
that ‘[i]n processing radio space as mind-space, we make it possible to believe in the 
priority of the latter –– to believe, in other words, that radio has the power it does 
because it happens to resemble the interior auditory dramas we all already 
experience’.18 However, taking as an example Beckett’s insistence that All That Fall is a 
radio play ‘for voices, not bodies… which depends on the whole thing’s coming out of 
the dark’, Connor contends that ‘[i]t is in radio that Beckett seems to have found the 
possibility of writing without ground’.19 In the following, he asserts further that the 
characters in the radio play seem to emerge out of nothing, and this perspective is worth 
quoting at length: 
Characters in All That Fall surge out of nowhere or rather, perhaps, arise 
in their words, entering the sound space of the play with no 
announcement and vacating it just as abruptly. Existence in sound is the 
only existence possible. And yet, the comic overstatement of certain 
sounds, like the “exaggerated station sounds. Falling signals. Bells. 
Whistles. Crescendo of train whistle approaching” which mark the 
passage of the up mail in All That Fall also suggests a desperate need to 
convince, as though sound itself, even in this medium in which sound is 
everything, could never be enough.
20
 
In his analysis, Connor seems to separate the auditory emergence of drama and its 
auditory reception as two disparate components, when they are, in my opinion, 
indivisible complements of the listening process.  
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In other words, his postulation that Beckett’s emphasis is on the medium’s 
capacity to render sounds as emerging from ‘nothing and nowhere’ so much so that 
‘[e]xistence in sound is the only existence possible’ seems to have taken apart sounds 
and the imagery they invoke instead of regarding them as being necessarily constituted 
in a process of conversion from sound to imaginative spectacle in the audience’s mind-
space. The ‘desperate need to convince’ and the ultimate inadequacy of sound to 
convince as observed in All That Fall by Connor himself particularly contradict his 
postulation since the need to convince highlights the medium’s and the playwright’s 
central concern with the radio drama’s appeal to the audience’s visual substantiation of 
its sounds in her mind’s eye.  As such, regardless of its persuasiveness, the images 
conjured by a piece of radio drama and the audience’s imagination must first and 
foremost be presented as figure upon the audience’s mind as ground. I maintain that it is 
only after the mental imagery emerge in the mind that an audience is able to experience 
and judge the intended effects of the piece  in the context of Connor’s essay, the 
extent in which sound is convincing to the audience. Moreover, Connor’s subsequent 
observation that ‘[r]aising bulk upward costs huge and extravagantly audible effort, 
whether it is Mrs Rooney being shoved into the seat of Mr. Slocum’s van or her 
purgatorial toilings up the Matterhorn of the station steps’, overlooks the ‘raising’ and 
‘shoving’ as principally images of actions in the mind’s eye that are derived from the 
sounds in the play.  
More specifically, Ulrika Maude rightly observes in All That Fall that  
Beckett’s almost obsessive insistence on corporeal sounds in the play, 
rendered in the text as directions such as ‘Sobbing’, ‘Breathing hard’, 
and ‘Sounds of handkerchief loudly applied’, not only goes against a 
philosophical tradition that has aimed to obscure all signs of the voice’s 
31 
 
origin in the body; it together with the repeated references to different 
forms of perception, contributes to the creation of an embodied character 
in the absence of a body and a space.
21
 
Citing Clas Zilliacus’s early observation on Beckett’s employment of radio as a medium 
which ‘expressions are aural, temporal, nonspatial and uncorporeal’, Maude’s central 
challenge is directed at this regard for radio as a blind medium.
22
 In the quotation above, 
her emphasis is on Beckett’s utilisation of bodily sounds to effect embodiment in the 
mind of the listener, in the absence of a visually perceptible actor and set. Thus, sound 
and the corporeality it could conjure in the audience’s mind space clearly indicate 
listening to a radio drama as an indivisible process of auditory reception and 
visualisation. 
Indeed, in Tim Crook’s influential Radio Drama Theory and Practice he 
pointedly began the eighth chapter ‘Radio drama is not a blind medium’ by stating that, 
I think there is something inherently depressing about the human inclination to establish 
the concept of hierarchy [of the senses] in any context.
23
 He maintained that radio 
drama is not a blind medium and that ‘[e]ven though the BBC exhorted people listening 
to the first play written for radio (The Comedy of Danger, 1924) to turn out the lights, 
the reality of listening for most people is communication while seeing and doing 
something else.’24 Like Leder’s concept that while reading, the act of seeing words on a 
page recedes to the background of a reader’s consciousness and the images conjured in 
the mind occupy the foreground, the seeing referred to by Crook in this quotation is 
twofold; it is simultaneously external and internal. The immediate environment may 
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continue to be physically visible to the listener, but the mind’s eye is turned inwards, 
into mental visualisation. According to Crook, there are two ways by which people 
listen: elliptical and parabolic. 
On one hand, elliptical listening entails listening to a radio drama in a ‘blacked 
out environment’, being ‘fully engaged and without physical interruption by light, 
sound and movement’ as well as residing in an acoustic space that is ‘specifically 
arranged to appreciate the full potential of [a] programme maker’s sound design’.25 This 
is the kind of listening condition which the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
first encouraged listeners to subject themselves to, and may be regarded by some as the 
ideal condition in which to listen to any radio play.  On the other hand, parabolic 
listening referred to by Crook as ‘the reality for most people’ entails listening to a radio 
drama while being ‘mobile and active’.26 The listener is ‘partly engaged’ with the 
‘imaginative spectacle’, and Crook likens this to the state of ‘day dreaming’ because 
priority may be given ‘to the process of cognitive and physical interaction with the 
outside world’.27  The acoustic space in which this listener resides is therefore a space 
where sounds in the environment compete for the listener’s attention.28 In both types of 
listening, the imaginative spectacle may differ in quality depending on the level of 
concentration of the listener, but it continues to be a visual constituent of the listener’s 
mind-space. Realistically, as with other radio drama, Beckett’s radio plays would 
depend on such a constitution in his listener’s mind-space too. So how are Beckett’s 
works unique?  
 In Junko Matoba’s explication of Beckett’s stage plays, she draws a relation 
between the darkened areas in the plays to the function of Yohaku. Yohaku refers to the 
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blank spaces of Japanese monochrome paintings known as ‘Sumi-e (or Suibokuga)’.29 
Observing that the Yohaku aims ‘at the effect the painting has on the viewer’, and that 
‘in the Zen sense, the ultimate function of the Yohaku is for the viewer to participate in 
the “creation” of the universe [in the painting]’, Matoba is suggesting that Beckett 
might have expected his spectator to participate in a creative process.
30
 In other words, 
if the darkened areas in the stage plays are likened to the Yohaku, Matoba posits that 
Beckett might be inviting his audience to contribute their imagination to these works. 
She goes on to cite Daisetu Suzuki, ‘“Zen  or, more broadly speaking, religion  is 
to cast off all one thinks he possesses, even life, and to get back to the ultimate state of 
being [...]” to awaken to enlightenment and to knowledge. Thus, to be selfless, is to give 
up the will, even not to will to become will-less.’31 Juxtaposing this quotation with 
Beckett’s conception of ‘will’ as ‘a servant of intelligence and habit’ in Proust, Matoba 
seems to be suggesting that Beckett’s stage plays challenge the viewers to shed their 
habitual conditioning by inviting them to participate in the visualisation of the darkened 
areas in his works, instead of passively watch the images prescribed to them onstage.
32
 
Transposing this to the context of the radio plays, the lack of physical visual 
representation effectively creates the blank canvas on which the listener is able to create 
images according to the sounds and words that they hear. Xerxes Mehta’s comment that 
the darkness in Beckett’s theatre is ‘a form of sense deprivation’ is even more 
provocative when we consider a more physical visual sense deprivation in radio.
33
 The 
absence of an immediate visual representation of a radio play effectively relies on the 
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space in the listener’s mind’s eye for the generation of an interior drama. Like the 
Yohaku in a Sumi-e, the absence of immediate visual representation in a radio play 
depends on the listener’s participation through her imagination for the play to be 
enacted. Of course, this is true for most radio plays, but the uniqueness of Beckett’s 
works lies in the extremely limited extent by which the images invoked in the 
conceptual space would serve to reveal a complete narrative. In other words, regardless 
of how vivid the images are conjured by the audience from the sounds and speeches of 
Beckett’s radio drama, his works remain enigmatic because of their resistance to 
completion.  Julie Campbell also observed in her examination of the difficulties of 
listening to Embers that the ‘veiled elements’ of the radio play ‘encourages the listener 
to enter into a strange, dark and inexplicable place - the interior- to circumvent the 
habitual and discover/uncover the hidden and the strange’.34 As such, I postulate that 
Beckett’s radio plays do not provide the listener with any opportunity to enact 
completion in her mind-space because his images are not merely representative, they 
provoke the mind into creating a gap-filled interior drama so as to reflect a reality that 
resists any pretention to be containable within the system of a closed-narrative.  
To illustrate how the listener supplements the absent visuals by playing the role 
of the audience and taking up the roles of the characters as she imagines them in her 
mind, let us consider the radio play All That Fall (1957).
35
 The sound of Mrs Rooney’s 
‘dragging feet’, the faint music of ‘Death and the Maiden’ and her first words, ‘Poor 
woman’ set up a bleak mood at the beginning of the play from which the listener is able 
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to launch an imagination from a grim soundscape to a dismal landscape.
36
 In fact, as 
attested by Everett C. Frost, this visualisation begins in the very process of producing 
the radio play itself, ‘Although the audience does not need ever to have seen it to 
appreciate the plays, All That Fall, Cascando and Embers are minutely rooted in the 
Irish landscape and it helped me to envision it in directing them.’37 
 Beckett’s assertion about the play being ‘specifically a radio play, or rather a 
radio text, for voices, not bodies’ can be interpreted as a resistance to a physical 
enactment on a stage of Mrs Rooney’s journey to and from the station because the play 
is primarily an assemblage of Mrs Rooney’s mental landscape through the sounds that 
she hears and the thoughts in her head. Conceived of as such, the most appropriate 
space for the play to unfold is in the mind of the audience. Although the images in the 
mind’s eye of a parabolic listener are indistinct, as indicated by Crook, and can be 
likened to the distant memory of a portrait in which she is unable to remember the exact 
details that reside in the background of the main subject, such indistinctness may 
contribute to the audience’s immersion in the radio play. This is because the mind 
works constantly throughout the play to imagine the vague details of Mrs Rooney’s 
mental landscape as they are uncovered when she encounters characters along the way 
to the station. Mrs Rooney’s mental landscape thus expands in the mind of the listener 
at each encounter as the characters she meets reveal something about themselves when 
they speak with her. 
 Brian McHale attributes ontological worlds within a world to works that depict 
multiple narrative levels where, taking as an example Douglas R. Hofstadter’s story 
about ‘Achilles and the Tortoise [who] distract themselves from a tense predicament by 
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reading a story in which two characters called Achilles and the Tortoise enter an Escher 
print, in which they read a story in which two characters called Achilles and the 
Tortoise are lost in a labyrinth’, the primary narrative forms the ‘primary world, or 
diegesis’ and each additional narrative forms the ‘hypodiegetic world’.38 In All That 
Fall, there are always two narrative levels: the primary narrative and the unfulfilled 
potential of the hypodiegetic. 
 The unfulfilled potential of the hypodiegetic is represented by the potential 
‘depth’ that is created when each encounter between Mrs Rooney and a character is met 
with an exchange of information that introduces but never quite reveals the backstory of 
each character and their relationship with her. Thus, the exchanges expand the listener’s 
imagination of Mrs Rooney’s mental landscape but do not allow the listener to 
transcend the primary narrative in order to penetrate its additional narrative level, which 
resides within the primary one only as a potential to the audience.  
 With Christy, for instance, when Mrs Rooney asks after his wife and daughter 
the response is that they are doing neither better nor worse. With Mr Tyler, we learnt 
that he has a daughter who can no longer bear children and with Mr Slocum, we know 
that his mother is ‘fairly comfortable’ as she is ‘[kept] out of pain’.39 The family 
members brought up in the conversations are never described in detail although the 
surface description of them intriguingly connotes a bleak story to which the listener has 
no access despite being privy to most thoughts in Mrs Rooney’s head. Further, from 
their exchanges, the listener would notice that the sexual tension between Mrs Rooney 
and these men is palpable and this again connotes possible backstories of romantic 
entanglements in their youth that are never quite spelt out in the text. 
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 Joseph S. O’Leary also notes that ‘it is as if the characters are building towards 
an overwhelming question à la Prufrock, but the question never gets asked’.40 O’Leary 
is referring to T. S. Eliot’s poem The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock in which the 
titular persona keeps postponing an ‘overwhelming question’ which never gets asked. 
Such a build-up presents the listener with the static potential of delving into the 
mindscape of Mrs Rooney and, as a result, going beyond the primary narrative level. 
Nonetheless, it remains an unrealised potential because the listener continues to be 
anchored in an assembling process of Mrs Rooney’s mind at the level of the primary 
narrative. As such, the images generated in the primary diegesis are not merely 
incomplete representations, they provoke the listener into doubting that the diegetic 
world that is emerging in her mind would eventually be fully revealed by the radio play. 
Despite being an actively listening and visualizing participant of the radio play, the seed 
of Beckettian doubt is sowed in the listener by virtue of her denied access to the implied 
hypodiegesis. Thus, it is indeed difficult to imagine how such static potential-driven 
depth in the listener’s mind-space can be effectively achieved if this radio play was 
adapted to theatre.  
Effectively, I observe that the moment of doubt that occurs when the audience’s 
desire to learn more about the hypodiegesis is unsatisfied, is also the moment when the 
audience intuits loss. As established at the beginning of this section, ‘loss’ in this 
chapter is regarded as an anxiety-ridden awareness that outside of a dogmatic system of 
relations that governs our daily lives is flux and uncertainty. In the context of this 
section, the intuition of loss induced in the audience by All that Fall can generally (for 
now) be interpreted as an awareness that this radio play does not seem to offer a 
conventional close-ended narrative of a typical radio drama by which a listener can 
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identify clear perspectives of its characters and from there construct a definite 
understanding of the characters and their predicaments.  However, in addition to being 
invoked by the unsatisfying hypodiegesis in All That Fall, in the next section, I explain 
how the play’s representation of Miss Fitt’s blind faith in the closed Christian narrative 
contributes more specifically to this intuition of loss.  
As I have been positing from the beginning of this chapter, radio is not a blind 
medium. A radio drama cannot be blindly enacted in so far as it has an active audience 
that participates in the creation of images in her mind-space while she listens to the 
sounds that the radio play is programmed to produce. Consequently, Beckett’s radio 
plays’ gesture towards the concept of blind faith in grand narratives will be elaborated 
further in the next section as precisely suggesting that the radio as a medium is not blind 
as long as it is capable of visually representing such blindness to the mind’s eye of the 
audience. 
To demonstrate this, I observe that the indistinctness of the images conjured by 
the gap-filled diegesis of the radio play in the audience’s mind-space mirrors the 
dreamlike quality of the audience’s intuitive perspective. I postulate that this intuitive 
perspective is the usually neglected centre of the self that is hidden under a more 
distinct and peripheral parochial gaze. The indistinctness that characterises the 
perspective of the central intuition could represent our reality’s inherent nature of flux 
and uncertainty. As Bergson observed, habit dictates that we ‘[imprison] the whole of 
reality in a network prepared in advance’.41 As such, I aver that this ‘network’ 
constitutes the peripheral gaze and is usually preferable to the perspective of an intuitive 
flux because of the former’s clear system of relations. As we shall soon see, in All That 
Fall, by depriving the audience of access to the hypodiegesis which is potentially 
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constituted by a system of clear relations, the audience is effectively induced to take up 
their positions in their intuitive centre from which to witness the blindness of 
parochiality.  
In the following section, the peripheral gaze, the central intuition concealed under it 
and their relations with the concept of blind faith will be elaborated through an analysis 
of the Christian narrative as one of the major systems of relations that are subjected to 
doubt in Beckett’s works.  
2.2 BLIND FAITH  
Whenever the subject of religion arises as one considers Beckett’s drama, the 
comparisons between a Christian God and the invisible but palpable power that 
seemingly lurks in the background of Beckett’s enigmatic oeuvre become indispensable 
given the artist’s Protestant childhood, self-confessed fascination with the King James 
Bible and extensive allusions to St Augustine and Bishop Berkeley in his works. While 
all three factors have contributed to the perspective that the implicitly questionable 
Godhead in Beckett’s works is inextricably related to the Christian God, I notice that 
Augustine and Berkeley’s shared disapproval of ‘salvation by merit’ might have 
informed Beckettian doubt too but this specific commonality seems to be largely 
unexplored.  
In accord with Beckett’s comment that Christianity is ‘a mythology with which 
[he was] perfectly familiar [...]’, this section will proceed to regard the biblical narrative 
from a literary instead of a theological perspective.
42
 As such, the belief that salvation 
can only be attained through Grace and faith in an omnipotent and potentially selective 
God instead of by merit is an interesting aspect of early Western Christian thought 
                                                                
42
 Quoted in Kristin Morrison, ‘Neglected Biblical Allusions in Beckett’s Plays: “Mother Pegg” Once 
More’, in Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives, ed. by Morris Beja, S. E. Gontarski and Pierre Astier 
(Ohio State: Ohio State University Press, 1983), pp. 91-8 (p. 93). 
40 
 
which we could employ as an apparatus to examine how a parochially concealed 
intuition of loss is invoked in the audience in the following radio plays.  
In this section, I hypothesise that the audience’s intuition of loss is invoked in 
the portrayal of a limited metanarrative in All That Fall and Rough for Radio II through 
an allusion to the abovementioned aspect of the Christian narrative. The term 
‘metanarrative’ was coined by Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that ‘the postmodern’ 
could be defined as ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’.43 According to Brendan 
Sweetman, Lyotard’s definition could be a reference to the postmodernist belief that ‘no 
particular worldview can claim to have the truth because meanings which are 
constitutive of a worldview cannot be known to be true objectively. This is because 
there is no objective knowledge’.44 Sweetman added that a close equivalent to the term 
‘metanarratives’ is therefore the term ‘worldviews’.45  As such, I understand 
‘metanarrative’ to mean a grand narrative that claims to be the legitimate and 
universally applicable truth about the world. The decision to use the term to describe the 
Christian narrative in this section is informed by the attitude of ‘incredulity’ it connotes. 
This is particularly relevant to my postulation that the radio plays could evoke a 
revelatory intuition of loss in the audience, which the subjugating and rigid system of 
concepts perpetuated by authoritative interpreters of the bible invariably conceal.  
It is my understanding that the belief in God always already assumes the 
temporality of one’s lived reality. Religious doctrines are therefore often applied by 
believers to the world as a guiding lens that would help them to understand and interact 
with the world around them. Inherent in the compulsion to submit to the metanarrative 
of a greater power may be a fear of the unknowable life after death and, perhaps more 
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importantly, the logical preference for an idyllic infinitude in the event that the afterlife 
is eternal. Religions may therefore be regarded as born out of and sustained by a rather 
pragmatic preference for an empyrean transcendental infinitude for certain people. 
Nonetheless, this pragmatism almost always demands a sacrifice; that is, its laws would 
require one’s adherence to a specific way of living, and as a consequence, this might 
restrict one to a mode of thought that would render her resistant to the dynamic flux of 
an otherwise intuitively apprehensible reality. 
Nevertheless, when Beckett responded to Charles Juliet’s question on whether 
he was ‘able to rid himself of the influence of religion’ by stating that he was able to do 
so in his ‘external behaviour, no doubt…But as for the rest…’, his response indicated 
that the influence of religion is not reducible to a binary opposition of adherence and 
renouncement of its doctrines.
46
 As explained in the beginning of this chapter, 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ can be defined as the systems of structures and dispositions 
produced by social conditions that determine practices and representations.
47
 The 
conflict between the ‘rest’ of Beckett and his ‘external behaviour’ situates him in a 
habitus in which expunging the predisposed compulsion to believe despite an awareness 
of its limitations is difficult.  
After a brief introduction of the contentious issues of salvation by merit or grace 
in the Christian narrative, I will demonstrate how the potentially aleatory nature of 
God’s grace is depicted in Rough for Radio II and All that Fall to evoke in an audience 
an intuitive sense of loss. To reiterate, as far as these two plays are concerned in the 
context of this analysis, the Christian narrative, as it is perpetuated by interpreters of the 
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bible, is regarded as a fable that could have aided Beckett’s conception of an intuition of 
loss. 
I would like to begin my analysis by pointing out that the name of one of 
Christianity’s earliest known traditions connotes ‘universality’. The word ‘catholic’ 
comes from the Greek adjective καθολικός, which means ‘general’ or ‘universal’. What 
is significant about the ‘universal’ Christian narrative is not its assumption of an 
appellation that touted it to be the true religion that governs the universe; instead, it is its 
paradoxical connotation of universal inclusiveness and historical persecution of 
‘heretics’ that is interesting in the context of this section.        
Claiming that the bible offered the true account of the world, early Western 
Christian doctrines overtly excluded those who did not share the same ideas and 
regarded those people as heretics. Rather paradoxically, St Augustine of Hippo, whose 
Confessions deeply fascinated Beckett, was ‘in favour of coercion in religion’ but did 
not believe in universal salvation.
48
 Although made more explicit in his anti-Pelagian 
writings and in The City of God, his belief in God’s exclusive selectivity was implied 
throughout Confessions in which he iterated his belief that ‘If he is able to resist 
[temptations], it is because of God’s grace and not of any strength of his own’.49 This is 
tied to his idea that grace is ‘God’s gift’, and by ‘gift’ he was pointedly indicating that 
grace could be given or withheld by God regardless of a person’s conduct. Since God’s 
grace is required for salvation, Augustine’s belief in God’s selectivity effectively 
renders him an opponent of universal salvation.   
Further, in an effort to challenge the beliefs of the Pelagians who advocated 
complete freewill and that God metes out grace to the free man by merit, Augustine 
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maintained in the chapter ‘The Grace of God is Not Given According to Merit, But 
Itself Makes All Good Desert’ that: 
Thus, it is necessary for a man that he should be not only justified when 
unrighteous by the grace of God --- that is, be changed from unholiness 
to righteousness--- when he is requited with good for his evil; but that, 
even after he has become justified by faith, grace should accompany him 
on his way, and he should lean upon it, lest he fall.
50
 
The chapter concluded with Jesus’ words to his disciples. ‘Without me you can do 
nothing’ (John 15.15).51 In the quotation above, Augustine was asserting that man is 
incapable of righting his own mistakes and it is only by the grace of God that he can be 
made ‘righteous’ again.  In line with this view, I interpret the quotation to mean that 
salvation is only available to God’s selected group of people and even if one chooses to 
repent his sins through ‘faith’, he can do nothing without God’s grace. I infer from this 
that the choices people make in life are therefore potentially futile because leading a 
meritorious life alone would not guarantee their salvation.  
Despite the depiction of God in the Christian narrative as the benevolent creator 
of the universe and as the father of the son whom He had sent to bear the sins of the 
world, it is intriguing that the perspective of one of its most revered saints can be 
interpreted as maintaining that this God is decidedly selective. It is possible that the 
absurdity, in the potential exclusion of a meritable person from the gates of heaven 
simply because he was not chosen by divine grace, did not escape Beckett. To illustrate 
Beckett’s awareness of the absurdity in this aleatory aspect of Augustinian thought, I 
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would like to briefly invoke Waiting for Godot, before I analyse Beckett’s radio plays 
further. 
A well-worn example of a biblical allusion in his dramatic works is the story 
about the thieves in Waiting for Godot. Vladimir questions why people are inclined to 
believe in one out of the ‘four Evangelists’ present at Christ’s crucifixion when he is the 
‘only one who speaks of a thief being saved’.52 This refers to Luke’s account of the two 
thieves who were crucified along with Jesus. In this version, one of them was damned 
while the other was saved. What Vladimir seems to be suggesting in his question is that, 
for want of more consistent testimony between the Gospels, both thieves could have 
been damned. Mary Bryden posits that Vladimir’s question is a ‘false dilemma’ since 
two out of the remaining three, Mark and John, did in fact describe two men who were 
crucified with Jesus in their Gospels and that none of them ‘contradicted’ Luke’s 
account.
53
 She maintains that the ‘Gospel writers’ could have ‘simply’ decided that ‘the 
event’ did not have to be included in their writing.54 Further, to explain why people are 
more inclined to subscribe to Luke’s account, Bryden suggests that ‘visual and 
linguistic presence is always more powerful than absence’.55 In other words, the 
additional information given by Luke would naturally capture the imagination of the 
reader more than the lack of details in the accounts of the other Gospel writers. 
Nonetheless, I aver that there is more to Vladimir’s question than a mere challenge to 
the consistency of these biblical accounts. Indeed, his question could represent a 
criticism of the human propensity to subject an ancient text that is rife with unremitting 
incertitude to a convenient coherence. If so, explaining why people choose to pay more 
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attention to Luke’s account seems to be a good example of our propensity to contain 
incertitude in a rational deduction. 
Moreover, rather than merely pointing out the inconsistencies of the biblical 
account, the following comment sheds further light on Beckett’s interest in critiquing 
the human inclination to contain uncertainty: 
I am interested in the shape of ideas even if I do not believe in them. 
There is a wonderful sentence in Augustine... ‘Do not despair; one of the 
thieves was saved. Do not presume; one of the thieves was damned.’ 
That sentence has a wonderful shape. It is the shape that matters.
56
 
The ‘shape’ that Beckett was referring to can be seen in the two seesawing Augustinian 
sentences that, despite a stark contrast with each other, reveal nothing upon first reading 
except a shock of ambivalence. This effect is created through the juxtaposition of 
consolation and caution. The threat of damnation is cancelled in the call to ‘not despair’ 
in the first sentence but reinstalled again in the second sentence. Interestingly, when the 
fear of this threat sets in, one is inclined to refer back to the first sentence for 
consolation before she is led to confront the threat again in the second sentence. Such a 
‘shape’ can perhaps be best described as similar to the curved band of wood that can be 
found attached to the legs of a rocking chair.  
Both sentences can be conceptualised as residing on either end of the band and 
the rocking motion symbolises the trapped thought process as one compares and 
considers the two clauses. I postulate that this overall ‘shape’ of the ‘sentence’ is 
constituted within the parochial space of the audience’s mind. Its metaphorical ‘shape’ 
represents the paradoxical nature of the parochial gaze in which both clauses may 
initially seem reasonable, but quickly become contradictory to each other when 
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compared. I have chosen to imagine this shape as the curved band of wood attached to 
the legs of a rocking chair so as to employ this shape in the next example to illustrate 
Beckett’s evocation and critique of blind faith in the Christian narrative in Rough for 
Radio II.  
Bearing the sense of seesawing contradiction of Beckett’s Augustinian sentence 
in mind, one might note that the image of Christ is starkly alluded to again in this play. 
When the radio drama was first broadcast on BBC Radio 3 on 13 April 1976, it was 
broadcast under the title Rough for Radio, but to avoid confusing this with Rough for 
Radio I, I will continue to refer to it as Rough for Radio II.
57
 In this radio play, as the 
listener is jolted into seeing Dick whipping the faintly crying Fox (F) in her mind’s eye, 
what might come immediately to her mind is the flogging of Christ. The violence 
brought against him by Dick’s whip has been going on for a while and this is implied by 
the Stenographer’s (S) comment that it ‘would take some time’ to find out from her 
notes ‘from the beginning’ if F had ever mentioned the name ‘Maud’ during his 
previous tortures.
58
 That his suffering will continue the following day is suggested by 
the Animator (A) and S’s exchange about ‘yesterday’s’ unsatisfactory ‘result’ and the 
near impossibility of giving F ‘back [his] darling solitude’ since he may ‘prattle away to 
[his] last breath and still the one… thing remain unsaid’.59 This one thing that remains 
unsaid is the ultimate ‘result’ that A and S hope to achieve from the torture of F. Yet, 
paradoxically because it remains ‘unsaid’ and therefore unknown to them, A and S are 
also hoping that they will not hear it since they would not be able to recognise it even if 
they do hear it. By implication, if their ‘free[dom]’ from their repetitive tasks as 
torturers depend solely on F’s successful articulation and their recognition of the one 
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thing that remains unsaid, they are effectively as doomed as F to remain where they 
are.
60
 
The absurdity of F’s interminable torment thus contrasts starkly with the 
immensely significant flogging of Christ. F’s last words the day before the textual 
present, ‘“[…] my god my God” [She strikes with her pencil on her desk.] “My God”’,61 
are reminiscent of Christ’s last words recorded by Matthew, ‘And about the ninth hour 
Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? That is to say, My God, 
my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ (Matthew 27.46). This comparison between F 
and Christ suggests that F’s unceasing suffering is not only like Christ’s in terms of its 
ungodly duration, it is seemingly as devoid of God’s assistance as Christ’s. Although it 
is clear to some theologians that Jesus’ cry of abandonment at the cross could be ‘an 
event within God’ in which the Holy ‘Spirit’ manifests itself through ‘the sacrificing 
Father and the abandoned Son in the power of sacrifice’, the layman’s initial reaction 
upon being presented with the Son’s despairing words would very likely be that of 
puzzlement.
62
 Questions concerning whether God has truly abandoned Christ are 
instinctively raised upon reading these words in the bible. In the absence of a 
satisfactory answer, the haunting cry, at its core, expresses Jesus’ doubt in God. 
Furthermore, in Beckett’s radio play, F is not Christ the lamb; he is Fox, the 
opposite of the lamb. The name Fox seems to be an allusion to the character’s status as 
a sinner when we consider the fact that ‘fox’ is used in the New Testament to describe 
Herod the evil king of Judea (Luke 13.32). Thus, the sense of despairing abandonment 
evoked by Fox’s cry serves no conceivable divine significance compared to Jesus’ cry. 
And this absence of significance is confirmed by the characters’ cluelessness as to what 
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precisely must F say in order that they may finally be freed from their repetitively cruel 
roles. The notion of seesawing ambiguity arises here when we consider F’s position as 
the opposite of Christ’s.  
The unanswered call to God is the curved band of wood linking the lamb with 
the fox and their predicaments reside on the opposing ends of the band. When making 
the comparison between F and Christ, the layman’s thought process is like the 
seesawing motion of the curved band: if God could bear to let His blameless Son suffer 
for our sins, what divine assistance is a presumably sinful Fox to expect from his 
supplication? But if Christ was sent to suffer for our sins, then surely God cares about 
sinners enough to sacrifice his only son? Nonetheless, given God’s non-assistance in the 
face of Christ’s suffering, could anyone’s suffering be so much greater than Christ’s as 
to move God into action? Like Augustine’s sentence on damnation and hope for 
salvation, there is no clear answer that can be drawn from the comparison between the 
blameless Christ and an implicitly sinful Fox. The only apparent point that can be 
derived from the play’s biblical allusion to the flogging of Christ in this radio play is 
God’s inaction in both instances. 
Described as a non-religious but persistently ‘God-haunted man’, Beckett 
projected his preoccupation with this haunting in his works through the employment, 
truncation and distortion of biblical allusions.
63
 Kristin Morrison observed that these 
alluded stories are accessible to a non-academic audience as a result of Beckett’s use of 
biblical stories that are widely familiar.
64
 In addition, she also pointed out that these 
allusions were not usually invoked under full knowledge of which part of the bible 
Beckett was referencing.
65
 Further, the term ‘mythology’ with which Beckett used to 
describe Christianity suggests his doubtful attitude towards the credibility of its 
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narrative, and since the ‘use’ of Christianity in his works can thus be inferred to be not 
at all motivated by a desire to affirm its validity, his reason for not employing the 
allusions reverently is clear.  
By implication, his fascination with Augustine’s works can therefore be 
understood to a certain extent in terms of an artist’s interest in potential materials for 
parodies and interrogation. Indeed, in terms of parodies, critics like Michael Guest 
suggests that ‘[c]o-opting St Augustine’s thought, Beckett supplies a constant source of 
irony for his characters’ narratives and language’.66  In terms of artistic interrogation, 
Elizabeth Barry observes that Beckett’s indebtedness to Augustine is not ‘completely 
understood’.67 Instead of the often-cited allusions to Confessions that Beckett made in 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women, she suggests that it might be useful to examine the 
relationship between Beckett’s works and Augustine’s The City of God as sharing the 
concession that ‘the feverish activity carried out in the space of mortal life is […] in the 
end, a meaningless evasion’.68  As such, it is not difficult to notice that analyses of his 
oeuvre’s relationship with the Christian narrative in Beckett criticism, particularly in the 
light of St Augustine’s thoughts, often conclude with a perspectival alignment to the 
firmly established sense of irony and futility that characterise his works. Nonetheless, I 
would like to point out that an articulation of the audience’s intuition of loss in this 
sense of ineffectuality has so far been overlooked. 
As I have stated in the previous section, whereas futility suggests an existential 
pointlessness, the intuition of loss is an anxiety-ridden awareness that outside of a 
closed system of relations is boundless uncertainty. ‘Loss’ therefore refers to the loss of 
restrictions, and intuiting this loss is tantamount to recognising the uncertainty and 
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chaos that govern our lived reality. The intuition of loss is thus an awareness that the 
metanarrative one subscribes to could potentially disappoint once its veil over the 
uncertain and chaotic reality falls. This veil is presented in All That Fall as blind faith.  
In the context of what we have examined above, the notion of faith requires one 
to assume not only that God metes out Grace to whoever he deems is deserving, but it 
also demands one to expect herself to be one of the selected by virtue of having faith. 
Søren Kierkegaard explained this contradiction of faith better: 
Faith is just this, the contradiction between the infinite passion of 
inwardness and objective uncertainty. If I can grasp God objectively, 
then I do not have faith, but just because I cannot do this, I must have 
faith. If I wish to stay in my faith, I must take constant care to keep hold 
of the objective uncertainty, to be ‘on the 70,000 fathoms deep’ but still 
have faith.
69
 
Following the trajectory of the quotation, I posit that the intuition of loss in a listener is 
elicited by Beckett’s radio play at the point when this faith, established by a habitual 
subscription to a familiar Christian narrative, is questioned as she immerses herself in 
the enactment of the radio plays in her interior mind-space. That is, when the ‘infinite 
passion of inwardness’ is removed from the ‘contradiction’ quoted above, and leaves 
behind ‘objective uncertainty’ as the only experience of reality, Beckett’s characters’ 
predicaments could effectively evoke a subtle punctuation in the audience member’s 
impetus to subscribe to the metanarrative. This punctuation is subtle because it seems to 
be fleetingly experienced as an audience member is listening to the radio play, then 
forgotten at the end of the play as she reverts to her habitual extradiegesis, which is 
governed by her parochial gaze. Nonetheless, the potency of the punctuation may be 
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observed in how these dramatic pieces invariably leave his audiences with an unsettling 
impression of Beckett’s works. The audience’s inevitable reversion to a parochial gaze 
will be elaborated further in the final section. For now, it is worth noting that this 
disruption is particularly poignant in the radio drama because the medium requires 
Beckett’s audience to internally enact the possibility that should a greater power exist, it 
might be impotent or indifferent to the characters’ predicaments. 
While the story about the thieves in Waiting for Godot highlights the human 
inclination to ignore the inconsistencies of the bible, Rough for Radio II portrays God to 
be an impotent or indifferent God because of his inaction, should He exist. Bryden is 
right to suggest that ‘the central disjuncture which Beckett’s writing dramatises’ is that 
‘the God whose hypothesised existence can never be entirely relegated, constantly fails 
to meet expectations’.70 I interpret this to mean that Beckett’s work neither accepts nor 
rejects God’s existence. Instead, it is more likely that his idea of God is always 
appended at the beginning with the conjunction that denotes possibility, ‘should’: 
should He exist, He is not the omnipotent or merciful God that the Christian narrative 
depicts Him to be. Before we examine All That Fall, an elaboration on such a 
perspective is in order. 
Citing the parable about the ‘wicked servant’ who was pardoned by his lord for 
owing him ‘ten thousand talents’, but cast a fellow servant who owed him ‘an hundred 
pence’ into prison ‘till he should pay the debt’, Robert L. Plummer asserts that it is here 
that ‘Jesus emphasizes the immense grace of God in forgiving the depth of our sin, 
while also putting in proper perspective the sins we are asked to forgive in others’ 
(Matthew 18.23).
71
 Plummer’s reading can be interpreted as likening the ‘ten thousand 
talents’ to the ‘depth of our sins’ and the one ‘hundred pence’ to the petty crimes that 
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we inflict on one another. He goes on to cite other parables to substantiate the image of 
an omnipotent and forgiving God.  Poignantly, Plummer’s assertion not only highlights 
the biblical representation of God’s virtues, it also illustrates a general Christian 
conception of the actively forgiving God. Therefore, we must take note that the ‘central 
disjuncture’ in Beckett’s works is not only about God’s inaction, it could also be about 
the corresponding disjunction in man’s unquestioning inclination to see a forgiving and 
omnipotent God, even when their experience of reality do not present any indication 
that the divine qualities described in the biblical and Christian narratives might be true. 
Underlying Bishop Berkeley’s disapproval of ‘the Catholic use of indulgences 
and the treasury of merit’ in exchange for the Grace of God, was his rejection of the 
Pope’s authority and his belief in ‘the individual use of reason and guidance from God’ 
as the ‘keys to salvation’.72 By lucidly challenging papal authority, his emphasis on the 
guidance of God as key to salvation affirmed the absolute and unmediated authority of 
God. Nonetheless, Beckett seems to regard Berkeley’s opinion of unmediated and 
authoritative guidance as contradictory with the Bishop’s attribution of a succession-
governed Nature to the uniformed and constant perception of an Infinite Spirit or God, 
by implying in his works that God’s constant perception may be non-intervening hence 
devoid of guidance. In Branka Arsić’s intriguing explication of a Berkeleian-Beckettian 
conception of esse est percipi in Film she suggests that: 
God’s eye–– we will use Beckett’s solution here–– is therefore similar to 
a camera that is forever rolling and behind which there is no other eye 
looking through it–– there is only the lens, which registers flat planes 
within an angle smaller than 45 degrees and objectifies them, “E is the 
camera.” But no one stands behind this lens. God is the lens that 
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objectifies. The work of this lens is the condition of possibility for 
objectivation, for the existence of the perceived––esse est percipi. But 
this perception is not perceived. Objectivation does not produce 
“subjectivation.” Everything unfolds as if the object objectifies the 
objects of vision, as if there is no subject. There is no gaze to accompany 
God’s gaze.73 
By this, she is not asserting that God does not have a mind, but that the mind is his eye 
as his eye is his mind. I understand this to mean that God’s mind objectifies and that 
since ‘objectivation’ is the sole process of this mind, he is blind. Indeed, in the 
paragraph that follows the quotation, she maintains that God’s seeing is a ‘nonseeing’ 
therefore he is blind, and that ‘his knowledge is a nonknowledge’ thus ‘God perceives 
us constantly, but does not know it’.74 Bryden’s suggestion that God is ‘cursed for his 
perverse absence and surveillant presence’ in Beckett’s oeuvre entails, in my opinion, 
the following question of the hypothesised God’s culpability in the characters’ 
predicaments: Is he prone to being distracted or is he only interested in watching? 
Arsić’s blind God seems to answer this question by exculpating the Infinite Spirit from 
either the flaw of being susceptible to distraction or worse, of maleficent idleness. More 
importantly, in Arsić’s interpretation, God is stripped of the omnipotence implied by an 
omni-perception. If having faith, as examined above, is believing blindly, then I posit 
that the blindness of God suggests that this condition is reciprocal between God and the 
faithful in the context of Beckett’s radio drama.  
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In All That Fall, the most direct allusion to the idea of a blind God is through the 
‘piercing sight’ of Miss Fitt.75 She describes her experience with her ‘Maker’ during 
and after Sunday worship at the church as a ‘big pale blur’.76 I understand this to mean 
that when she is with God everything around her becomes a ‘big pale blur’. The 
character asserts that when she is ‘alone with [her] Maker’ she is ‘not there [...] just not 
really there at all’.77 ‘[T]here’ refers to the diegetic reality that she shares with Mrs 
Rooney. Markedly, she is depicted as suggesting when she is with God, she loses touch 
with her immediate surroundings. As stated earlier, there are always two narrative levels 
in All that Fall: the primary narrative and the unfulfilled potential of the hypodiegetic. 
Since the hypodiegetic level in Miss Fitt’s case occurs when she is ‘alone with [her] 
Maker’, Miss Fitt’s depicted suggestion that there are two distinctly separate ontological 
worlds in the play could imply that reality appears to God from where He is to be a ‘big 
pale blur’ too, should He exist. As such, this could mean that his position in that blurred 
hypodiegetic space is representative of his limited perception. Effectively, blindness 
seems to be illustrated in this play as a reciprocal condition between God and his 
follower.  
Evidently, in Mrs Rooney’s encounter with Miss Fitt, the audience is led to 
imagine that the latter’s faith in God has rendered her blind to the primary world 
whenever the character is transported to a hypodiegetic world where God resides. It is 
worth noting at this point that the audience’s position as a listener can be illuminated 
further by comparing her relationship with her external world (extradiegesis) to Miss 
Fitt’s portrayed relationship with her external world (diegesis). As the listener attempts 
to assemble the diegetic world of the radio play through Mrs Rooney’s experience, she 
is effectively drawn out from the parochial gaze by which she normally perceives her 
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extradiegetic reality. That is, it is at the audience’s intuitive centre that the diegetic 
world of All That Fall is enacted. I pointed out in the previous section that Beckett’s 
plays could occupy the intuitive centre of the listener’s gaze and this is particularly 
evident in All That Fall since the listener’s position at this centre as she is listening to 
the play could potentially give her a third person view of the parochial gaze through the 
character, Miss Fitt.  
Whereas Miss Fitt is drawn into blindness in her withdrawal from the diegesis 
during prayer, the radio drama listener is conversely drawn out of a similar blindness 
and into her central intuition to witness the depicted parochiality as the third person. In 
other words, by assembling the gap-filled diegetic world of the radio play in the mind’s 
eye while being denied access to the blurred hypodiegetic in which God, according to 
Miss Fitt, resides, the play effectively removes the listener from her parochial gaze and 
sets the focus of her mind’s eye at her intuitive centre to bear witness to the reciprocal 
blindness between God and the faithful that is being enacted at the periphery of the play. 
The listener’s intuition of loss is thus invoked as her habitual impression of an 
omnipotent God is disrupted by this depiction of reciprocal blindness. 
Now that I have established how blind faith in the Christian narrative may have 
been depicted to invoke the audience’s intuition of loss, the next section of this chapter 
will be an examination of the relationship between blindness and memory in order to 
illustrate how a similar intuition of loss is invoked in a non-cultural specific context of 
the radio plays. More importantly, the section will also elaborate on the nebulous 
quality of the audience’s centrally located intuitive gaze by investigating how this is 
presented in Embers, Words and Music and Cascando.     
2.3 FROM THE PERIPHERY TO AN INTUITIVE CENTRE 
56 
 
Compared to the culturally specific Christian narrative depicted in the radio 
plays that were examined above, the portrayed interior narrative that will be explicated 
here is subscribed to by the everyman audience member. ‘Subscribed to’ is an 
understatement since ‘depended on’ is more accurate in describing her relationship with 
this Interior narrative, which largely consists of memories and fabulation. It will 
become evident that the intuition of loss is universal when we consider how it is 
invoked through the interrogation of this concomitantly personal and universal narrative 
in Beckett’s radio plays.  It is personal since memories are private, but it is also 
universal because most of us share the ability and the compulsion to select and organise 
these memories into a subjectively coherent life narrative. Therefore, I posit that the 
invocation of the intuition of loss in an audience via the radio plays could be a 
momentary reconstitution of the listener’s perspective to an awareness that outside of 
the organised store of memories and stories in their heads is an ungraspable flux of life.   
As has been considered in relation to All That Fall, there are always at least two 
narrative levels in Embers, Words and Music and Cascando. The primary narrative 
level is the diegesis whereas the secondary level is the unfulfilled potential of the 
hypodiegesis. In the three radio plays that I will be explicating in this section, each 
hypodiegesis is observed to be a narrative or narratives that are under construction. By 
looking at the contrast between the hypodiegesis and the diegesis, I will establish how 
the audience’s intuitive perspective is located on the level of the gap-filled diegesis and 
that this is essentially a position of fluctuating instability from which the unfulfilled 
hypodiegesis in the periphery of each play is perceived. 
In the 24 June 1959 BBC broadcast of Embers, although Beckett’s stage 
direction is ‘Sea scarcely audible. Henry’s boots on shingle’, the audience would of 
course hear the sound of the sea but compared to the stage direction, a more general 
57 
 
sound of footsteps shuffling in thick sand would be heard.
78
 These sounds would form 
the image of a character walking along the seashore and this image, I posit, is the 
primary narrative level or the central vision from which the audience would witness a 
parochial hypodiegesis in her mind-space. The secondary level, or the parochial 
hypodiegesis, is where Ada, Addie, Henry’s silent father, Bolton and Holloway reside. 
Memories and ‘stories’ are constructed and re-constructed at this hypodiegetic level to 
form Henry’s Interior narrative.   
In this radio play, Henry, played by Jack MacGowran, is portrayed as desiring 
but unable to ‘drown’ out the sound of the sea.79 He has tried to do so by ‘talking, oh 
just loud enough to drown it’ and going ‘to Switzerland to get away from the cursed 
thing’, but the sound of the sea persists so ‘now’ he ‘walk[s] about with the 
gramophone’.80 However, it is noteworthy that in the diegetic present, he is portrayed as 
having forgotten to bring the gramophone and so the sound of the sea is audible to him 
and the audience throughout most of the radio play. As a consequence, the audience 
would notice that the sea in the diegetic space is depicted by Beckett as bleeding into 
Henry’s Interior narrative, which is composed of his memories of the people he had lost 
and his seemingly fictional story about Bolton and Holloway. Ada’s question 
‘Holloway, he’s still alive, isn’t he?’ would indicate to the audience that the character 
whom the listener had initially thought was Henry’s fictional character in his story 
could have been a significant person in Henry’s life just as Ada, Addie and his father 
once were.
81
 By implication, Bolton could be Henry’s last name. It is here that 
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memories and fabulation seem to be indistinguishable from one another and become 
conflated fragments of his constructed Interior narrative.  
The sea, which is described by Henry as unpredictably alternating between 
turbulence and calmness, is also presented in this broadcast as loud at times and 
scarcely audible at other points.  Effectively, the sea may be interpreted as a 
representation of the flux that governs the diegetic reality, and consequently, the 
intuitive central vision from which the audience perceives the constructedness of 
Henry’s Interior narrative. An intuition of loss is thus invoked when an audience 
becomes aware that the bleeding of the diegesis (sea) into the hypodiegesis (Interior 
narrative) indicates that despite Henry’s portrayed attempt to select and arrest in his 
Interior narrative, the diegetic events that had or could have transpired in the past, the 
objects of loss in the diegetic reality cannot be reconstructed absolutely and contained 
within his Interior narrative. 
Woburn’s movement away from the island and into the ‘open sea’ in Cascando 
despite the destination being so close in sight exemplifies the Interior narrative’s 
inadequacy to fulfil the Opener’s (Denys Hawthorne) goal of finding a concrete ‘land’ 
where his character, and himself, can retire from a world that seems to be governed by a 
sense of restlessness.
82
 This interpretation is an inference from Voice’s (Patrick Magee) 
depicted assumption that ‘story… if you could finish it… you could rest… sleep… not 
before […] and not the right one…couldn’t rest…straight away another’.83 Although 
Voice might represent a compulsive flow of thoughts in the Opener’s mind and 
therefore be attributed with an associative trait similar to that of a stream of 
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consciousness in the Opener’s Interior narrative, I posit that this mental act of fabulation 
is in fact depicted as compulsively organised.  
In the radio play, the Opener seems to be using Voice and Music to construct his 
Woburn story. When Martin Esslin described these characters, he likened each of them 
to a ‘door or channel of [the Opener’s] consciousness’.84 He added further that the 
music and words in both Cascando (1964) and Words and Music (1962) are like 
‘streams’ that are ‘emanating from more or less mysterious sources, and that they 
depended on ‘the principal characters’ who were ‘more or less successful’ in attempting 
to ‘control’ them in the process of ‘artistic creation’.85  
Implicit in Esslin’s reading is that as ‘streams’, the words and music are initially 
unruly and are only tamed to a certain extent when the Opener or Croak asserts a level 
of control over them. I interpret this perspective as suggesting that at the beginning of 
either play there is an artistic intention on the part of the principal characters to mould 
into an artistic image, a yet-to-be created object. With this understanding, I would like 
to suggest that the emphasis of the play could thus be on the preconceived procedure by 
which both the Opener and Croak are portrayed to employ in order to get to that end-
object. That is, I posit that they quite possibly already know what they are trying to 
create from the outset and are, perhaps more importantly, familiar with the 
disappointing outcome of their repeated endeavours. As I will shortly illustrate, through 
words and music we can see that both principal characters subscribe to a rigid 
framework that they follow repeatedly to arrive at a premeditated but ultimately 
unsatisfactory result. 
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In Words and Music, Words, also referred to as Joe by Croak, rehearses a stock 
speech, which he uses to describe the subject of Sloth as well as Love.
86
 The most 
significant part of this speech is the emphasis on the subject being ‘of all passions the 
most powerful passion and indeed no passion is more powerful than the passion of’ the 
subject.
87
 The ease of substituting the subject is noteworthy for its comical effect but the 
idea of ‘most’, in my view, seems to deserve serious attention here because even when 
Joe tries to improvise a speech later for Love, Age and ‘The face’, he continues to dwell 
in the extreme limit of each subject. For example, love is described as ‘more than all the 
cursed deadly or any other of its great movers [that] moves the soul’.88 Age is presented 
as infirmed old age when ‘a man/ Huddled o’er the ingle/ Shivering for the hag/ To put 
the pan in the bed/And bring the toddy […].89 Finally, Joe is depicted as describing ‘The 
face’ of Lily in terms of her climactic arrival at orgasm and then immediately after, her 
experience of resolution.
90
 This orgasmic moment of a relationship is understood here 
as the highest mental and bodily limit that two people can experience together through 
coitus. Thus, it should be clear by now that despite the changing subject of Joe’s 
speeches, the maximum limit of any subject seems to be the sole constant from which 
his words are depicted as trying to articulate.  
Nonetheless, despite being seemingly successful at evoking, with the help of 
Music, Croak’s desired image of ‘The face’ which preoccupied him since the beginning 
of the radio play, the articulated image seems to effect a sense of disappointment rather 
than satisfaction when Croak lets his club fall and shuffles away in his slippers.
91
 The 
constructed image that very likely fitted with the image in Croak’s head is ultimately 
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only ‘one glimpse of that wellhead’.92  Its insubstantiality and fleetingness only serves 
to remind Croak of what and whom he has irretrievably lost. Whereas Kevin Branigan 
interprets Croak’s departure as being induced by the humbling effect of Words and 
Music’s cathartic power, and Esslin observed this departure as indicative of Croak’s 
experience of ‘total despair of fulfillment’, I maintain that Words’ implorations to 
Music to repeat the last musical statement and his concluding deep sigh could suggest 
unsatisfied yearning rather than cathartic release.
93
 As such, the constructed image in 
the hypodiegesis is interpreted in the context of this chapter as continuing to be 
inadequate at permanently capturing the memory of what has been lost in the diegesis. 
If anything, it only serves to remind Croak of his present state of infirmed impotence.  
Esslin described Music in Words and Music as an ‘emotional’ counterpart of the 
rational Words in Croak’s stream of consciousness, but in Cascando it ‘supplies a new 
element’ by virtue of the Opener’s ability to ‘evoke [music] either by itself or in unison 
with the verbal flow of the Voice’.94 The significance of this ‘new element’ is not 
elaborated by Esslin, but I interpret this as indicative of Beckett’s move to divide Music 
from Words in order to define them further as disparate elements of the principal 
character’s consciousness. Extending this interpretation, I propose that this 
disparateness does not indicate that any clear-cut distinction between thoughts and 
emotions can be made in reality, and that the more Croak or the Opener contrives to 
organise them into constructs of a memory, the more they elude his ultimate aim to 
capture the desired object of loss.  
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Notably, in Cascando, the Opener is depicted as repeatedly denying the 
assumptions of ‘they’ that ‘say’ that the ‘nothing’ and ‘his voice’ are in his head.95 If we 
transpose this to the playwright’s predicament, it is likely that ‘they’ could be a 
reference to critics who try to locate the ‘mysterious source’ of the personified streams 
of voices and music in the playwright’s mind. However, the Opener insists that there is 
‘[n]o resemblance’ of Voice to ‘his own voice’ and soon after, Opener lets Music play 
briefly then asks ‘…is that mine too?’96 It is of course not.  The fact that Opener was 
played by Hawthorne, Voice was performed by Magee and Music was composed by 
Marcel Mihalovici, indicate that the characters in Cascando (1964) are thrice removed 
from the playwright's control. That is, although, the words that structure the play are 
Beckett’s, the articulated end-product can never be the perfect representation of the 
playwright’s initial conception of the play at the time of writing. The participation of the 
audience removes the play even further from its first conception since the unique mind-
space in which the radio play is enacted would differ from person to person.  
It is also worth highlighting that whereas the diegetic world of Words and 
Music, in which the audience’s intuitive perspective is located to view the hypodiegetic 
assembly of a memory through song, can be visualised in the audience’s mind-space as 
a throne room of sorts, Cascando is devoid of the depictions of a thumping staff or 
shuffling feet. Here, the diegesis is only represented by the Opener who seems to be 
controlling an unspecified apparatus that requires him to ‘open’ and ‘close’ in order to 
construct his Woburn story in the hypodiegesis. This reduced representation of the 
diegesis seems to indicate that the more disparate the emotions and thoughts are 
regarded, the more the audience lose sight of and the principal character lose touch with 
the diegetic reality.  
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This inverse proportion seems to be one of the many strands of Beckett’s 
thought patterns. As Esslin helpfully recounted, when Bennett Maxwell tried to adapt 
Play to radio Beckett explained that:  
[…] there must be a clear progression by which each subsection is both 
faster and softer than the preceding one. If the speed of the first Chorus is 
1 and its volume is 1, then the speed of the first Narration must be 1 plus 
5 percent and its volume 1 minus 5 percent. […] The implication is quite 
clearly that any quantity, plus or minus, still has to be a finite quantity; 
however soft, however fast, the same text will go on ad infinitum, ever 
faster and ever softer without quite ceasing altogether.
97
 
From here we can see Beckett’s idea that volume and speed should be inversely 
proportionate. The ‘any quantity’ that is referred to in the quotation above seems also to 
be applicable to the relation between the ‘visibility’ of the diegesis and the distinctness 
of the contrived elements in the hypodiegesis. Just as the diegetic reality disappears for 
Miss Fitt whenever she is caught up in the hypodiegesis with ‘God’, the reduction of the 
diegesis’s visibility in the 1964 Cascando compared to the 1962 Words and Music is 
inversely proportionate to the increased disparateness between Voice (Words) and 
Music in the plays.  
Further, although the Opener is portrayed as denying that Voice and Music are 
his, the discerning audience would recognise that these elements could indeed be in the 
principal character’s head. However, both characters do not represent the Opener 
because they are contrived derivatives of a fluidly intuitive consciousness. They cannot 
be representative of the ungraspable real because they are spuriously regarded as 
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disparate in order to be manipulated into reproducing what one has lost to the flux of the 
diegetic reality.  
By ‘real’, I am referring to the reality of the diegesis, which is also constituted in 
the audience’s intuitive central vision from which the peripheral hypodiegesis is 
perceived. To Bergson, memories ‘more or less adhere to’ perceptions ‘which serve to 
interpret them’.98 He describes these memories as ‘detached […] from the depth of my 
personality, drawn to the surface by perceptions which resemble them; they rest on the 
surface of my mind without being absolutely myself.’99 This surface is also referred to 
by Bergson as ‘the periphery’ of a ‘centre’ self and that this periphery is a ‘frozen 
surface’ of ‘sharply cut crystals’.100 Under these crystals, which are the ‘clearly defined 
elements’ of ‘perceptions and memories’, is ‘a continuous flux’ of a reality that is 
governed ‘by intuition and not by simple analysis’.101  This flux is specifically defined 
as the intuitive experience of an indivisible durée. But this is outside the scope of this 
chapter and will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. For now, in the context of this 
chapter, let it suffice us for the moment to have shown Bergson’s conception of reality 
as one that is indivisible and the breaking of this reality into parts in order to analyse 
and understand one’s experience of the world as akin to a reconstruction of the real. 
Such a reconstruction would never perfectly capture one’s experience of the moments 
that have come to pass. 
Following this trajectory, Beckett’s characters are observed in this chapter as 
being portrayed in Embers, Cascando and Words and Music as incapable of capturing 
their experiences by constructing stories and reconstructing their memories. Henry’s 
depicted incapacity to make Ada ‘stay’, the Opener’s inability to conclude his Woburn 
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story through Voice and Music, and Croak’s anguished departure from Joe and Bob all 
point to the inadequacy of the constructed narrative to represent the intuitively 
experienced reality either in the past, present or future.  
Future here refers to the limit state right before death. Like many Beckettian 
characters such as the Woman in Rockaby and Malone in Malone Dies, the Voice in 
Cascando narrates a story that he anticipates would eventually end as he expires. 
Beckett depicts anticipating the experience of this limit with a constructed narrative as 
persistently foiled by a story ending before the character dies, but the unsuccessful 
endeavours are also what drives the character to doggedly continue fabulating until his 
end arrives. As such, I interpret this to mean that the desire to simulate an unpredictable 
experience of the limit through a constructed narrative would inevitably fall short; that 
is, the end of a constructed narrative would not match precisely the moment of death. It 
is more likely that the character would meet its demise mid-sentence, and the Interior 
narrative would remain imperfect even when death arrives. Therefore, in the context of 
this analysis, the sense of incompletion that is invoked by the disjunction between the 
peripheral interior narrative and the diegetic reality, is intuited by the audience as the 
ungraspable flux of reality. 
Despite Bergson’s assertion that the breaking of reality into parts to understand 
and analyse the world can never be a perfect representation of lived reality, he was also 
aware of the inevitability and necessity to submit to this compulsion to lose ourselves in 
the exterior world of constructs. These constructed narratives are regarded as ‘habits of 
mind more useful to life […] that keeps us in the concrete’ and as a result dispossesses 
us ‘of the simple intuition of the self by self’.102 Paul Ardoin also points out that Beckett 
was aware that ‘[o]ur very existence depends upon the same habit which chains and 
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dulls us.’103 Maintaining that it is difficult to reconcile a thesis and an antithesis 
logically because ‘concepts and observations taken from outside points of view’ cannot 
‘make a thing’, Bergson suggested that when the intuition is invoked, ‘we pass easily in 
many cases to the two contrary concepts; and as in that way thesis and antithesis can be 
seen to spring from reality, we grasp at the same time how it is that the two are opposed 
and how they are reconciled’.104 Similarly, the auditory and visual experience of the 
audience as these radio plays are enacted in her mind-space can be interpreted as being 
‘seized by intuition’ when it becomes apparent to her that a character is inevitably 
trapped in its Interior narrative despite the incommensurability between the peripheral 
constructs with the diegetic reality of its lived experience. 
Turning back to the Beckettian doubt in the cultural specific religious construct 
depicted in All That Fall and Rough for Radio II, which is explicated in the second 
section of the chapter, it is not difficult to observe how Beckett seems to be driven by 
the same impetus to depict the incommensurability between a constructed interior 
narrative that is governed by the Christian narrative and the characters’ lived reality. 
Comparing both plays with Bergson’s concepts as they are presented in this section, I 
would like to point out that the Christian narrative is merely one of the many constructs 
that govern the characters’ interior narratives in these two plays.  
In Rough for Radio II, when the Animator and Stenographer could not extract a 
satisfactory answer from Fox, the Animator decides to embellish Fox’s description of 
Maud by inserting the words ‘… between two kisses…’ into the recorded passage.105 
The Stenographer’s protest that ‘he never said anything of the kind’ is thrown out by the 
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Animator’s angry insistence that she ‘Amend!’ her record of Fox’s words.106 As such, 
even the immediate experience of what had just occurred in the diegetic present is 
distorted by the principal character’s organisation and embellishment of an ambiguous 
passage to his desired interpretation. Ironically, the Animator’s question ‘How can we 
ever hope to get anywhere if you suppress gems of that magnitude?’ suggests his 
blindness to the fact that the fabrication of such ‘gems’ would only take him further 
away from his goal of getting closer to an answer, should there be an answer.
107
 
Similarly, in All That Fall, Maddy Rooney’s obsession with the death of her 
daughter Minnie forms the larger part of the play’s unfulfilled hypodiegesis since the 
audience is not certain how her child has died, and by the end of the play the death of 
the child that had fallen out of the train carriage would also be a mystery that would 
remain hidden in the hypodiegesis that is Dan Rooney’s memory. It has been suggested 
that Dan Rooney could have murdered the child that had fallen out of the train. Paul 
Stewart observes that ‘in the light of St Augustine’s theory of original sin, and 
Schopenhauer’s will-to-live, both of which assert that suffering and death are brought 
into being by birth itself’, the child in All That Fall ‘is viewed as a regrettable guarantor 
of future suffering, thus somewhat justifying Dan Rooney’s desire to murder a small 
child’.108 Sinéad Mooney also notes that Dan Rooney’s hatred for the Lynch twins ‘may 
have prompted him to commit infanticide on the train’.109  
 Nonetheless, I would like to propose an additional motive behind this potential 
murder. If Maddy Rooney is depicted throughout the play as unavailingly resurrecting 
her Minnie through the memories in her mind, Dan Rooney can be interpreted as 
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physically trying to concretise his memory of Minnie by re-enacting her death through 
the death of another child in the diegetic reality. The parental pining for a lost child 
takes an immediately macabre turn as this memory is distorted to become an attempt at 
bringing her back through the death of another child in the physical diegesis. This is 
substantiated further in the following paragraph.  
Although the sex of the child is not stated in the play, Beckett’s response to Kay 
Boyle’s question on whether Willie in Happy Days was trying to reach for his wife or 
the revolver indicated that the child in All That Fall is a girl:  
The question as to which Willie is ‘after’ –– Winnie or the revolver –– is 
like the question in All That Fall as to whether Mr Rooney threw the girl 
out of the railway-carriage or not. And the answer is the same in both 
cases  we don’t know, at least I don’t… […].110  
Since there are only two child deaths in the play, their same sex significantly supports 
the idea that if Dan Rooney had indeed caused the child to fall out of the train, his 
motive might be more than a mere belief that children are ‘regrettable guarantor[s] of 
future suffering’.111 Further, when he started to cry upon hearing the faint music of 
‘Death and the Maiden’, the audience has essentially come full circle to be back at the 
spot where the play first started, except that this time Dan Rooney is the one who is 
overwhelmed with sorrow instead of Maddy Rooney. Recalling that soon after hearing 
the tune at the beginning of the play, Maddy Rooney described herself as an ‘old hag’ 
who is ‘destroyed with sorrow and pining […]’ for her ‘Little Minnie’, the audience 
would notice that Dan Rooney’s sorrow could have been caused by the same subject of 
grief.  
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More importantly, his physical blindness is even more telling in the context of 
this analysis. Compared with Miss Fitt who withdraws almost completely from the 
diegetic reality to take up her position in the hypodiegesis beside her God, Dan 
Rooney’s blindness could be interpreted as a more total blindness; that is, I postulate 
that Dan Rooney can be interpreted as attempting to concretise his memory of Minnie in 
his diegetic reality by re-enacting her death through ending the life of another child.  
As I have stated in the first section, the concept that habit dictates that we 
‘[imprison] the whole of reality in a network prepared in advance’ suggests that this 
‘network’ is constituted in the form of many conceptual elements within the peripheral 
gaze of the audience and the principal characters in the radio plays. For the practical 
purpose of living, the peripheral network is more preferable to the intuitive flux because 
of the former’s clear system of relations.112 By extension, although it always falls short 
of the characters’ experience of their diegetic reality, they are depicted to continue to 
blindly adhere to it because it has become a habit of the mind. In my interpretation of 
All That Fall, the potential murder could be a reflection of the disastrous consequences 
of a life that is lived entirely in the Interior narrative of the peripheral hypodiegesis. 
Caught up in the ‘sharply cut crystals’ of his constructs, Dan Rooney, like the Animator, 
is depicted as having lost touch with his diegetic reality and as a consequence, 
consumed by the tyranny of the Interior narrative’s repeatedly extended distortion. 
Therefore, by examining Beckett’s delineation of ‘blindness’, this chapter has 
established that it is effectively depicted in the radio plays as ‘blind faith’ in narrative 
systems that at best are inadequate to capture, and at their worst grossly distort, the 
reality of a character’s lived experience. As the audience member acoustically and 
visually participates in the imagination of the radio plays in her mind’s eye, she is 
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temporarily reconstituted, for the duration of each radio play, from a parochial gaze that 
is governed by a habitual way of knowing to an intuition of loss  this loss is twofold 
in that it refers to the loss of faith in the familiar systems of relations that instead of 
accurately represent lived reality, repeatedly distort it, as well as the loss of bearings 
that her triggered doubt in her habitual way of knowing invariably entails.   
Following the trajectory of this chapter, in ‘Chapter 3: Film and the Spectator’s 
Ecstatic Becoming’, I explore how the audience’s habitual way of knowing that is 
employed to understand Film is challenged by its depicted resistance to pre-established 
patterns of understanding. Specifically, the chapter examines how a spectatorial 
perspective that is governed by a habitual conceptual framework is unravelled by Film.  
71 
 
CHAPTER 3 FILM AND THE SPECTATOR’S ECSTATIC BECOMING  
 
The diegetic world of Beckett’s film, television, radio and stage plays share the 
common feature of destabilising the spectatorial perspective by colliding head on with 
the perceived world (hereafter also referred to as the extradiegetic world) that is familiar 
to the audience member. In general, like the experience of listening to a radio play, the 
audience member’s interaction with her immediate surroundings recedes to the 
background of her consciousness as she focuses her attention on the images enacted on 
the screen or onstage.  However, one obvious difference between listening to a radio 
drama and watching a film is that the vision of the audience member is sensorily 
restricted to the diegesis when she is watching images that are prescribed to her by the 
visual medium. By ‘more restricted’, I am referring to the visual medium’s demand that 
the eyes be riveted to its presentation rather than to the spectator’s active participation in 
the creation of images in her mind’s eye. In addition, a darkened auditorium would 
further reduce the audience member’s interaction with her surroundings and render her 
physically idle for the duration of the presentation as her vision is singularly employed 
to watch the prescribed images. In this state of focused reception, the viewer’s habitual 
frame of references would usually inform her understanding of the prescribed images of 
a film, but I postulate that Beckett’s images paradoxically challenge the very frame that 
contrives to grasp his images with established patterns of understanding.   
To elaborate, as opposed to the radio play listener who actively creates images in 
her mind’s eye as she listens to a broadcast, the film viewer is less engaged with the 
creation of images and so more focus may be placed on understanding the prescribed 
images as she is watching the film in a darkened environment. The viewer’s habitual 
frame of references is a network of relations that are derived from her known reality and 
is employed to understand the diegetic world that is presented onscreen. As a result, the 
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viewer may take on either a passive role as she lets herself be led by the prescribed 
images that are compatible with her frame of references, or an active role as she resists 
these images because they contradict what she knows. In the context of this chapter, I 
posit that as the spectator struggles to make sense of the enigmatic Beckettian images, 
her perspective may shift from the conceptual frame of references that is governed by a 
habitual way of knowing to an intuitive negative space of the mind when she realises 
that the Beckettian diegesis poses as a challenge to the selfsame frame of references that 
she is employing to understand his work. Following Chapter 2, this chapter is thus a 
continued analysis of the viewer’s intuitive engagement with Beckett’s drama. More 
specifically, the activation of the spectator’s intuition by Beckett’s film is examined as 
entailing a deterritorialisation of habit.  
The habitual way of knowing refers to a habitual blindness that plagues the gaze 
of our immediate reality. As Tomás Gutierrez Alea has it, ‘the typical consumerist film 
spectacle’ induces the spectator to ‘leave the viewing room with the sensation that 
everything’s ok, that we don’t need to change anything. One veil after another has been 
drawn over reality’ in order to trap ‘viewers into a net of relations that will keep them 
from self-knowledge and full self-development’.1 Beckett’s drama offers its audience no 
such delusional comfort. Nothing is ‘ok’ and the ‘veil[s]’, woven into ‘a net of 
relations’ that the audience member is familiar with and has come to expect from a 
typical dramatic plot are either displaced, absent, or unravelling in the Beckettian 
drama. The audience member’s habit of expecting these veils and the familiar ‘net of 
relations’ constituted in the veils therefore define the habitual blindness that clouds the 
understanding of her reality. As such, I postulate that utilizing a habitual frame of 
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reference to understand a work that challenges the selfsame habitual blindness 
effectively highlights a dialectical tension in Film that will birth a reconstituted pathos 
in the form of the spectators’ ecstatic intuition of their entrapment in an organised 
system of habits.  
3.1 THE INFLUENCE OF SERGEI EISENSTEIN 
It is not difficult to see how Beckett’s Film challenged expectations from the 
outset. For instance, by 1964, new filming techniques, sound and colour technology 
were readily available in the production of films, yet Beckett refused to ‘budge from his 
fundamental position in the face of some highly sophisticated arguments about the new 
found flexibility and mobility of the film medium’ and created a black and white film 
that is mostly silent.
2
 At a time of such stark technical advancements, the discerning 
audiences would be aware of Film’s divergence from mainstream cinema and notice the 
influence of the French New Wave and avant-garde films on his work. Notably, the 
immense influence of Russian avant-garde film maker Sergei Eisenstein’s film theory 
on the artist’s work has not gone unnoticed in Beckett scholarship. More specifically, J. 
M. B. Antoine-Dunne’s observation that Beckett made references to Eisenstein’s pathos 
construction in his letters to his friends Mary Manning Howe and Arland Ussher, and 
her essay’s analysis of Eisensteinian influences on the writing of Murphy and Watt, 
convincingly point to Beckett’s active interest in the film theorist’s work.3 Film’s 
engagement with Eisenstein’s concept that ‘a structure of pathos is that which compels 
us, in repeating its course, to experience the moments of culmination and becoming of 
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the norms of dialectic processes’ will be examined and elaborated in the following 
paragraphs.
4
 
In this section, the collision between the Beckettian diegesis in Film and the 
audience member’s habit governed conceptual framework will be elaborated through an 
examination of the extent that Eisenstein’s concept of pathos construction is adapted 
successfully in the work. Following that, the next two sections will illustrate how the 
audience member is consequently reconstituted through a deterritorialisation of her 
habit-body that relies on a habitual way of knowing, into an ecstatic being that self-
reflexively intuits her entrapment in an organised system of habit. 
To begin, it is necessary to quote and briefly introduce Eisenstein’s concept of 
pathos construction: 
A work of pathos is what most profoundly awakes in the spectator a 
sentiment of impassioned enthusiasm. A work of pathos must observe 
throughout in the way it is ordered, the condition of violent explosions of 
action and that of continuous passage to new qualities.
5
 
The ‘impassioned enthusiasm’ in the quotation above is referred to in his Nonindifferent 
Nature as an ‘ecstatic effect’ of ‘“being beside oneself” in the viewer’.6 Ecstasy, 
according to Eisenstein, refers to an effect that is capable of transporting the spectator 
out of conscious conceptualization and into a ‘“pure” effect, feeling, sensation, “state”’ 
and this can be achieved through the concept of ‘imitative behaviours’; that is, by 
presenting the viewer with an ecstatic character onscreen, a similar state of ecstasy can 
be evoked in the audience.
7
 More specifically, in his essay ‘The Structure of the Film’, 
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he maintained that the filmmaker is ‘obliged in the work to suggest to [the spectator] a 
corresponding “guide”. Following this guide, he will enter into the desired condition’ in 
order ‘to gain a maximum “departure from oneself”’ and be transported into 
experiencing a pure effect intended by the filmmaker.
8
 In other words, evoking pathos 
in the audience is, according to my interpretation of Eisenstein’s definition, guiding the 
audience to leap out of the self in order to imitate and arrive at a desired state that is 
intended by the artist.  
As such, if assumed to have been successfully invoked, the ecstatic effect of 
“being beside oneself” in the context of Film may be interpreted as experienced by the 
spectator when she is guided by the filmic sequence to imitate a range of emotions or ‘a 
passage of new qualities’ that are entailed in viewing O’s depicted attempt to escape the 
relentless pursuit and perception of the camera. The following non-exhaustive list of a 
sense of pity, urgency and doubt are provisional examples of ‘a passage of new 
qualities’.  
In addition to avoiding the camera, O’s tearing of photographs, which are 
nostalgic visual records of his life from birth to his present state, and his current 
isolation due to his rejection of any form of companionship by perceiving objects, 
would induce a sense of pity in the audience and contribute to their observation that O 
seems to be agonisingly rejecting all perceptions of his existence. O’s pulse-taking 
scenes that may be understood by the viewers as an indication of an impending death 
would contribute to their experience of O’s sense of urgency to coincide his death with 
the elimination of his perceived existence. The final scene, which shows that O has been 
running from his mirror image all along may confirm the audience member’s inference 
that O’s aim throughout the film may be to achieve a state of total non-perception 
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before he expires. As such, if effectively invoked, the imitative behaviours that 
constitute the Eisensteinian ecstatic effect could influence the spectator to consequently 
question her seemingly straightforward relationship with her self-perception.  
However, I postulate that the Eisensteinian ecstatic effect in Film was not as 
successfully invoked in the spectator’s viewing process as it could have been. I would 
like to point out that the interpretation of the film in the paragraph above could only be 
drawn by an audience member at the end of the film from hindsight, and very likely 
without entailing a range of emotions. This is due to factors that will be elucidated in 
the next paragraph. Echoing Beckett’s sentiment that the film is an interesting failure of 
intention that nonetheless possesses ‘a sheer beauty, power and strangeness of image’, I 
maintain that Beckett’s Film does not successfully create the ‘violent explosions of 
action’ and ‘continuous passage to new qualities’ that Eisenstein advocated to invoke 
the ecstatic effect; nonetheless, what Film does evoke is an ecstatic intuition in the 
audience member that is defined by an unprecedented and evocative spectatorial 
freedom which would render the work uniquely Beckettian.
9
 
To elaborate, although the expression of horror on the faces of the couple and 
the flower lady on the staircase when they are confronted by E, as well as the violent 
tearing of photographs and the picture of God off the wall, seem to qualify as ‘violent 
explosions of action’ that might evoke the audience’s imitative pathos, by virtue of the 
audience’s inability to see E and to clearly comprehend the cause of the characters’ 
horror and O’s fear, the close-ups on these expressions and actions are met with more 
puzzlement rather than a complete readiness to submit to the filmic intention of guiding 
an audience member into imitating the horror that is expressed on the characters’ faces. 
The dialectical montage, which involves the rhythmic repetition of two contrasting 
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images to create an ultimately unified explosion of idea or sensation, was clearly 
attempted in the street and staircase scenes in Film. In the street scene, O’s panic-
stricken flight from E clashes with the stationary couple that were calmly reading a set 
of newspapers along the sidewalk. In one long-shot, the spectator sees two contrasting 
states of the characters collide with great impact to form in itself an explosion of action 
that further highlights O’s great haste to escape from E. Following this, filmed as a 
close-up, the distortion of the couple’s disapproving expressions into expressions of 
horror when they are confronted by the vision of E is juxtaposed with the previous shot 
to invoke, in the spectator’s perception, a heightened sense of E’s malevolent nature 
since it is now clear that it not only induces flight, but also horror. Further, in the 
staircase scene, O’s desperate decision to hide below the flight of stairs is contrasted 
with the flower lady’s calm and cheerful descent down a long flight of stairs. Again, 
these contrasting images in one shot are juxtaposed with the next shot in which the 
close-up of the flower lady shows a facial distortion from cheerful calm to lethal horror. 
These expressions of horror or, in Beckett’s words, ‘the agony of perceivedness’ are 
repeated in order to ‘[reinforce] the unbearable quality of E’s scrutiny’.10 As such, it is 
apparent that the montage in Film involves the rhythmic repetition of two contrasting 
images in each scene to evoke an intense sense of apprehension. 
However, throughout the film, instead of an urgency that is marked by horror at 
the intended intensity of E’s gaze, a sense of curiosity may pervade the minds of the 
viewers as they are swept from the street scene to the stairway scene without having 
quite come to terms with the last scene that they just saw. Like a tourist being scuffled 
through an exhibition by a largely silent guide, the audience member who is 
unacquainted with Beckett’s script or who is unfamiliar with his body of work might 
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understand that there is perhaps a lot to learn from the film that seems to be guiding her 
to experience the horror of ‘something’ but there is simply not enough information to 
suggest what this ‘something’ is. To my mind, the audience member’s greatest 
puzzlement may lie in her inability to fathom the motivation behind E’s relentless 
pursuit of O.  
Beckett stated in the script that ‘[i]t will not be clear until the end of film that 
pursuing perceiver is not extraneous, but self’.11 The ‘intensity’ of E that was intended 
by Beckett to evoke horror during the viewing process may have been crippled by 
precisely this scripted decision to withhold the identity of E as O’s ‘self’ until the end of 
the film. The spectator’s habit-governed conceptual framework sees a pursuit and flight 
sequence but is unable to decipher what induced this chase. Thus, for the rest of the 
film, the mind may become devoted to deciphering this missing puzzle instead of 
submitting to a range of imitative behaviours. When it is finally revealed towards the 
end of the film that E is O and that O seems to have been running away from self-
perception throughout the film, the audience is immediately confronted with yet another 
question: why would the self-perception of O be horrifying to the couple and the lady 
with the flower basket? 
Anthony Uhlmann finds Gilles Deleuze’s conclusion that ‘the fear [of 
perceivedness] stems from the perception of self by self, which can only be escaped by 
death’ unsatisfactory because according to Uhlmann, the horror of perceivedness occurs 
not only between O and E, but also with the couple and the woman with the flower 
basket.
12
 To Uhlmann, Deleuze’s conclusion does not explain why O’s self-perceiving 
side, E, horrified the other characters. Therefore, Uhlmann attempts to answer this 
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question by postulating that these characters regard ‘the perceiving side of the E/O 
protagonist with fear’ due to its ‘intensity’ that he maintains is capable of ‘penetrating 
through the film of their consciousness and penetrating their being’.13 This idea of 
‘intensity’ is not unfounded since Beckett intended the ‘agony of perceivedness’ to be 
caused by an ‘unbearable quality of E’s scrutiny’.14 But I would argue that the film does 
not effectively convey this intention. By the end of the film, a spectator who is unaware 
of Beckett’s scripted intention might have an alternative interpretation of the other 
characters’ horror and this possible alternative is that E is capable of morphing itself to 
whoever is viewing it. As the term ‘self-perception’ suggests, if E is indeed self-
perception then the characters’ expression of horror can be interpreted as the horror of 
perceiving their own image as E confronts them.  
As Colin Gardner also observes, ‘E must clearly function as a multiple subject – 
the ‘I’ as the eye of the spectator watching the camera recording O, as well as a role 
outside of the above, what one might call an ‘any-self-perception-whatever’, taken up 
by whoever might encounter the camera’s gaze and be affected by its piercing look’.15 
Gardner relates this morphing quality further to the Free Indirect Discourse in which the 
line between subjective and objective images is blurred into a ‘free indirect 
subjectivity’.16 Despite observing that Beckett’s ‘use of camera perspective’ was 
‘confusing’ and that this ‘[undermined] his own stated premise and exactitude of the 
piece’s formal integrity’, Gardner suggests that the free indirect quality ‘freed the 
perception-image from the subjective baggage of suturing film language’ and this 
interpretation is in line with Deleuze’s concept that the point-of-view shot can be freely 
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floating, instead of being restricted by a subjective/objective duality.
17
 Therefore, the 
characters’ horror can be read as directed at their self-perception. As such, it is 
conceivable that the unseen image of E may be alternatively interpreted as the image of 
whoever is regarding E; hence, Deleuze’s explanation that the fear stems from the 
perception of self by self is applicable to the couple and the flower lady too, in so far as 
this morphing quality is regarded as an attribute of E. 
Further, the depiction of the couple and the flower lady’s expressions of horror 
as being directed at O’s own self-perceiving image has perhaps a part to play in the 
failure of intention that Beckett had referred to. This is because in the film’s final cut, E 
has clearly become more than merely O’s self-perception. Notably, the morphing 
quality of E, like the intense quality intended in Beckett’s script, is only apparent on 
hindsight when it is revealed that E mirrors O’s image. It is important to reiterate that 
E’s nature is not immediately obvious to the audience as they are viewing the film, and 
this illustrates that the Eisensteinian ‘continuous passage to new qualities’ is only 
vaguely achieved when it is revealed, as O is confronted by E towards the end of the 
film, that O is all along trying to escape self-perception.
18
  In other words, the only 
‘sentiment’ that is ‘continuous’ for the audience member who is watching Film is a 
sense of urgent curiosity, and the only point of transition to a ‘new’ quality is when this 
sense of urgent curiosity is more or less quelled at the moment when E reveals itself to 
be ‘self-perception’.19  
This deferred revelation that follows after an overwhelming sense of curiosity 
essentially prevents the audience from experiencing ‘a continuous passage to new 
qualities’. Indeed, the singularity of this qualitative transition from curiosity to 
comprehension is more reminiscent of the ‘epiphany’ that James Joyce sought to inspire 
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in the reader through the structure of each short story collected in Dubliners. But like 
Eisenstein’s ‘continuous passage to new qualities’, each epiphany invoked in each short 
story is interpreted as part of a collective whole rather than individually self-
contained.
20
 Pyeaam Abbasi and Hussein Salimian observe that ‘[t]he 
interconnectedness of the stories [in Dubliners] creates a system in which meaning is 
generated’.21 And as Francesca Valente has it, ‘Dubliners, in fact, in spite of the 
presence of subjective revelatory moments in the single stories, can be seen as a 
sequence of multiple objective epiphanies because what actually emerges from the book 
as a whole is the revelation of the city itself, perceived in its spiritual, intellectual and 
moral paralysis.’22 Effectively, Dubliners, when analysed as a collection, allows the 
reader to experience ‘the continuous passage to new qualities’ in terms of a Joycean 
passage of epiphanies. Although through the structure of Beckett’s Film, it can be 
observed that it was set up to be a build-up towards a passage to new qualities, the film 
may be interpreted as a failed endeavour at pathos construction because of the singular 
sentiment it inspired in the audience through most of the film. 
What has been discussed so far seems to point to Beckett’s failure at 
constructing ‘a work of pathos’ as it is advocated by Eisenstein; however, the film’s 
narrative about a character’s unsuccessful flight from self-perception and its 
estrangement of the viewer from the narrative by subjecting her to a continuous state of 
urgent puzzlement, nonetheless successfully creates in the viewer another kind of 
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leaping out of the self to be ‘beside oneself’.23 In other words, I postulate that what is 
created in the end is a form of ecstatic spectatorial experience that is unique to Film. 
3.2 FROM HABIT BODY TO ECSTATIC BEING 
As stated earlier, the singular curiosity that plagues the audience member as she 
watches the film implies a blindness that stems from Beckett’s intentionally withheld 
identity of E, whose veil, even at the point of revelation, is merely implicitly lifted. It is 
‘implicitly lifted’ because, despite assuming the perspective of E through most of the 
film, the audience never really sees E. Its intended quality of intensity, when deemed 
ineffectively conveyed to the audience, leaves an ambiguous blind spot in the opening 
sequence of the film where E confronts the couple and the flower lady outside the 
apartment. The alternative interpretation of E’s morphing instead of intense quality is 
formed based on the possibilities opened up by this ambiguity.  
In addition, Beckett’s decision to veil O’s face until towards the end of the film 
contributes further to the audience’s induced partial blindness. In mainstream cinema, 
an omniscient spectator, being led by the camera’s movements, takes up the camera’s 
point of view and regards the information presented through the camera-eye as her 
own.
24
 But the spectator’s partial blindness to O’s face and the nature of E through most 
of Beckett’s film subverts this idea of the omniscient spectator. Raymond Federman 
observes that as opposed to conventional cinema in which ‘the viewer of the film sees 
more than the characters in the film’, O’s “angle of immunity” through most of the film 
ensures that ‘the field of vision of the camera-eye never exceeds that of the 
protagonist’.25 Consequently, this denies the viewer of total visual perception right from 
the very beginning of the work.  Beckett’s spectator experiences a further sense of 
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alienation from the filmic diegesis at the point when she encounters the couple’s 
perplexing reactions to the camera-eye. She cannot avert her eyes from the camera’s 
point of view without losing sight of the film, and neither can she continue watching 
without feeling helplessly bound to an alien sight. Examining Beckett’s prose, David 
Hayman helpfully pointed out that ‘a major attribute of Beckett’s work’ is its ‘deliberate 
play upon the reader’s urge or impulse to accept as valid that which is presented as a 
controlled fiction’ or ‘the suspension of the suspension of disbelief or better the 
unwilling suspension of belief’.26 Similar to a large extent in the context of Film, being 
alienated by the filmic diegesis means that the audience member is caught up in the 
contradictory desire to suspend her disbelief so as to continue to participate in the film 
as an omniscient spectator, and the inability to do so because the narrative eludes her 
habitual way of knowing. 
Adding to the alien quality of E is O’s unawareness of E’s presence in the room 
with him as he attempts to avoid the perception or assumed perception of all the living 
and non-living things in his apartment. The nature of E remains a mystery to the 
spectator throughout most of the film despite its supposed role as the viewer’s 
supplemented vision in the diegetic world of Film. Since a viewer’s frame of reference, 
which is constructed by her habitual experience of the extradiegetic world, cannot 
decipher the nature of E, the Beckettian diegesis effectively clashes with her assumedly 
known reality to transform her sight into a seeing blindness. As the spectatorial vision 
becomes shackled to the alternating perspectives directed by the alien camera’s points 
of view, her now ineffectual conceptual framework which is composed of an arsenal of 
habitual references accumulated from her experience of known reality, gives way to the 
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negative space of the mind which takes to the foreground of her consciousness in order 
to intuitively process this seeing blindness.  
Before explaining what the negative space of the mind is, I would like to 
consider the desirability of the perplexed spectator in the context of this analysis. 
Markedly, a confused audience member’s intuitive experience of Beckett’s film may be 
a more compelling experience of the film. For example, a brief review published in 
Time, which Federman quoted in his essay, is an inadequate interpretation of the film: 
It is a stark, black-and-white portrait of an old man who awaits death in a 
small, lonely room. Seeking absolute solitude, he turns out his cat and 
dog, closes the curtains, covers the parrot cage and goldfish bowl with 
his coat, and blacks out the room’s only mirror. Finally he destroys the 
last reference to the world in which he has lived, a packet of old 
photographs. But he cannot escape himself, and as he lifts his eyes to the 
barren wall before him, he comes face to face with the image of his own 
deadpan likeness, with a patch over one blind eye.
27
 
Beckett’s emphasis that ‘[n]o truth value attaches to’ his scripted direction, ‘Search of 
non-being in flight from extraneous perception breaking down in inescapability of self-
perception’ effectively renders the conclusion that Film is ultimately about an inability 
to escape the self quoted above questionable. Gardner suggests that this writing off of 
his stated direction ‘activates the audience/reader as major agents of meaning 
production, inviting us to see the film structurally and dramatically as a creative work of 
art rather than as a scientific or philosophical tract’.28 In this sense, I maintain that a 
perplexed audience member is ideal since her sustained curiosity signals her resistance 
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to a convenient interpretation of the work according to familiar frames of references. 
This, however, leads us to the question of audience ‘competence’.  
Jonathan Bignell observes in relation to Beckett’s film and television plays that 
‘They challenge the audience to decode the play’s dramatic form and to relate its 
concerns to their own experience and ideas. Here, levels of competence are important, 
and the audiences [may find] it hard to recognise the modality of the plays’.29 This 
seems to be a valid observation; in order to resist oversimplification, the audience must 
first be competent enough to ‘recognise’ and consider the implications of the film’s 
basic organisation and structure according to their habitual frames of references.  
Instead of submitting to a general interpretation that seems immediately apparent the 
moment the film ends, the ‘[highly] competent’ audience ‘would be engaged in a self-
conscious process of questioning their assumptions’.30  However, there are two 
problems with Bignell’s view that prevents an easy transposition of these ideas to the 
context of this inquiry.  
Firstly, his suggestion that ‘[a] high level of competence is required for this kind 
of drama’ implies an inherent exclusivity that discounts the experience of the regular 
non-specialist audience member; but we cannot be certain that Beckett only had 
academics in mind when he was creating these works. Secondly, Bignell’s suggestion 
that the audience will have to relate the concerns of the dramatic works to ‘their own 
experience and ideas’ in order to ‘decode the play’s dramatic form’ could paradoxically 
be the cause of oversimplification, since the mind is governed by the inclination to 
systematically arrest an idea by placing it in a known and probable category before 
more can be learned about it in its state of pure potential.  Beckett’s belief that ‘art has 
always been this − pure interrogation, rhetorical question less rhetoric − whatever else it 
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may have been obliged by the “social reality” to appear’ clearly opposes the drawing of 
a potentially concretizing relation between the reader/audience’s viewing experience 
and his work.
31
 Here, we see Beckett’s stark resistance to an interpretation of art from 
the perspective of established conceptions of reality. By ‘pure interrogation’, he could 
be referring to the need to resist the inclination to arrest art by reducing them to mere 
constituents of clearly demarcated categories. Hence, to illustrate further that Film is a 
work of art that might have been created for the regular audience, I propose to examine 
the sense of alienation, a result of the collision between the audience member’s 
experienced world and the filmic diegesis, as the ideal state of ‘pure interrogation’; that 
is, an intuitive state that dispenses with such notions as ‘levels of competence’. 
By ‘negative space of the mind’ stated above, I am referring to the intuitive 
space from which the audience member receives the negative space of pure 
interrogation set up in the Beckettian diegesis. I postulate that to receive the depicted 
negative space is to concurrently call upon the negative space of one’s mind to meet it. 
In his analysis of Beckett’s prose work from ‘Assumption’ to The Unnamable, Andrew 
Gibson rightly points out that ‘Beckett takes the preservation of the negative space to be 
integral to art’s task’.32 He observes that the reader who is receiving this negative space 
is ‘constantly being asked to keep mutually incompatible attitudes in play’ and is treated 
‘in Beckett’s hands’ as ‘an old-fashioned plodder who wants plausibility, but also as a 
critical modern who doubts the accuracy of a cliché, and has to be convinced of it’.33 In 
Gibson’s perspective, the reader’s reception of the negative space is kept in a general 
sense of ambivalence until she is: 
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[...] endowed, not with the ‘curiosity’ that merely ‘seeks to assimilate’ 
(or even reflect back on) ‘what it is proper for one to know’ but with that 
curiosity ‘which enables one to get free of oneself’. It was precisely that 
kind of reader Nietzsche wanted: ‘a monster of courage and curiosity... 
something supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and 
discoverer’.34 
By transposing Gibson’s observation of the reader of Beckett’s prose quoted above to 
the viewer of Beckett’s film, it is not difficult to see that the concept of the ideal 
spectator who engages in pure interrogation can be described in similar terms. The 
search ‘to assimilate’ the form and content of Beckett’s work with what a viewer thinks 
she already knows is akin to the attempt to arrest the work of art in a state that 
asphyxiates its creative potential.  Nonetheless, merely transposing Gibson’s description 
of the ideal reader to the film audience does not explain the entire process by which a 
spectator’s mind is compelled to intuitively engage with the negative space of Beckett’s 
work during the viewing process and prior to discursively drawing an overall 
conclusion about the film. As such, this intuitive process is elaborated in the following 
paragraphs.  
It is one thing to describe Film as inducing a sense of curiosity that elicits a very 
particular intellectual reaction from the audience and quite another to examine Film as 
being defined by the intuitive reaction of the audience. The former considers the 
audience as intellectually influenced by the artistic process by which she is endowed 
with the ability to logically interrogate her habitual frame, whereas the latter regards the 
audience member as an unsuspecting collaborator in the artistic process that seeks 
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freedom from the habitual frame. The purpose of the following section, therefore, is to 
give definition to this intuitive interaction between the negative space created by 
Beckett in Film and the negative space that is activated in the audience’s mind to meet 
it.    
The idea of a negative space in Beckett’s oeuvre is also considered by Dirk Van 
Hulle, who interprets this space created by Beckett in his works as a ‘textual undoing’.35 
He posits that ‘[t]he awareness of the metaphorical nature of language, the frequent 
failures of communication, and the impossibility to know anything beyond language led 
Beckett to employ words in order to express precisely this impossibility’.36 As such, the 
negative space, in Van Hulle’s perspective, is a space for Beckett’s articulation of the 
impotence of language in lived experience. In the context of Film, Beckett’s decision to 
create an almost completely silent film can be seen as an attempt to shine a spotlight on 
the impotence of language through the muted film. However, since Film is the muted 
product of the written text, it follows that the audience’s reception of this filmic 
representation of textual undoing may, by extension, be regarded as an extended 
unravelling of language in the viewers’ minds since the film offers no linguistic clues 
about what it might be about and can only be interpreted by the audience member 
through the prescribed images. In this sense, Film can be read as an endeavour to 
express the impotence of language in art by dispensing with language in order to create, 
with the audience, a pure affect of Nonhuman Becoming.  
Examining Film, Deleuze had it that a pure affect is ‘the perception of self by 
itself’ and ‘it is the reflexive double of the convulsive man in the rocking chair. It is the 
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one-eyed person who looks at the one-eyed character.’37 However, Deleuze’s definition 
is directed at explaining how this pure affect is experienced diegetically by the E/O 
protagonist and does not consider how members of the audience might experience it. As 
I cited earlier, following a long line of inquiry into the intersection between Deleuze’s 
concepts and Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre, Gardner observes, in Beckett, Deleuze and the 
Televisual Event: Peephole Art, that Beckett ‘activates the audience/reader as major 
agents of meaning production [...]’.38 Nonetheless, this observation does not go beyond 
a nod of recognition that Beckett’s work involves a creative collaboration with the 
audience. Although a chapter is devoted to Film and the Deleuzean concept of 
Nonhuman Becoming, Gardner’s work does not provide an in-depth analysis of the 
spectator’s experience of this process. In sum, I attempt to illustrate in this chapter the 
process of Nonhuman Becoming in relation to the audience member as a Becoming 
Ecstatic. In this process, I will demonstrate how she might intuitively experience the 
self-reflexive ‘pure affect’ as she is viewing the film. Deleuze and Guattari maintained 
that ‘[t]he affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but man’s nonhuman 
becoming’. 39 As such, I posit that the spectator’s Becoming Ecstatic is the crucial 
product of the collaborative effort between the viewer and Beckett’s film, in which she 
is led to expansively intuit beyond her habitual way of knowing without having to 
completely shed away this habit as it is being deterritorialised. 
To begin, the spectatorial vision is shackled to the alternating perspectives 
directed by the alien camera’s points of view. The spectator is E when she observes O 
and the spectator is O when she views the things that O is viewing. This uncontrollable 
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assumption of alternating first-person perspective suggests that the audience’s vision is 
bound to the movements of the camera-eye and to a large extent this effectively subjects 
the spectator to a state of reluctant passivity in knowledge acquisition and steers her 
even further away from her habitual way of knowing and her assumed autonomy of 
sight. In other words, adding to the continuous sense of urgent curiosity caused by the 
audience’s partial blindness is the further sense of estrangement caused by the camera-
led digression from the spectator’s habitual assumption of visual autonomy. While the 
audience is physically bound in such a state of partial blindness by the camera, the 
continuous sense of urgent curiosity may heighten. As a consequence, her ineffectual 
conceptual framework which is composed of an arsenal of habitual references 
accumulated from her experience of known reality, gives way to the negative space of 
the mind which takes to the foreground of her consciousness in order to intuitively 
experience this seeing blindness.   
Considering Berkeley’s idea of esse est percipi (‘to be is to be perceived’) in 
relation to Film, I agree with Uhlmann that ‘one of the things that Beckett’s Film makes 
us see with regard to Berkeley’s formulation is that it does not allow or involve any 
simple connection between the eye and the I. According to Rimbaud, another favourite 
of Beckett’s “Je est un autre”(I is another).’ 40 Clearly, Uhlmann cites in brief this line 
by Arthur Rimbaud to emphasise Beckett’s interest in the divided self, and it is worth 
noting that the sentence that preceded ‘I is another’ in Rimbaud’s shorter “lettre du 
voyant” was ‘C’est faux de dire: Je pense. On devrait dire: On me pense’ (It’s false to 
say: I think. One should say: I am thought)’.41 Indeed, ‘Je est un autre’, when 
understood alongside ‘On me pense’ in the letter, seems to present this divided self as 
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an unravelling of the limiting assumption of the self as an immanent whole. As Edward 
J. Ahearn observes, ‘Rimbaud’s forceful view of the “I” as other than what we normally 
assume can be placed in the context of other poetic attempts to enlarge and transcend 
the self.’42 In Beckett’s Film, the potential to transcend a pre-established assumption of 
wholeness is not limited to the artist and his work. The concept of the displaced ‘I’ from 
the self is a recurrent preoccupation in Beckett’s oeuvre, yet the spectator has never 
been so explicitly made aware of her division from her ‘I’ than when she is viewing 
Film. 
The splitting of the self begins when the spectator’s mind is estranged from the 
information that her vision is receiving. As the film increasingly puzzles her, her body 
becomes increasingly bound to the camera as a mere receptor. This is an extraneous 
bondage which involves the vision and the seated body. It is a visual bondage because 
in an ideal auditorium, the viewer’s eyes are deprived of her immediate reality and 
bound only to the camera-eye and the diegesis; and it is, by extension, a physical 
bondage in that the audience member, in her struggle to make sense of the perplexing 
filmic sequence, is riveted to a state of physical inaction. As her receptor body recedes 
to the background of her consciousness, her unavailingly interrogating mind may give 
way to her intuition as it takes over her experience of the film. 
The Eisensteinian concept of invoking the imitative behaviour of ecstasy or 
‘being beside oneself’ in the audience by depicting an ecstatic character in a work of art, 
may be observed in Beckett’s depiction of a protagonist that is split into E and O in 
order to invoke an imitative behaviour in his audience to split into an ‘eye’ (body) and 
the ‘I’ (mind). But bearing Uhlmann’s words in mind that there is ‘no simple connection 
between the “eye” and the “I”’, we must also be aware that neither is there a simple 
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disconnection between the ‘eye’ and the ‘I’. The main concept of ultimate inescapability 
in Film suggests precisely an inescapable connecting force within the self despite the 
protagonist’s desire to disconnect the two. However, this desire is not peculiar to the 
Beckettian character. It should not come across as a surprise that the audience member’s 
conscious mind is predisposed to imitate the uneasy split of the E/O protagonist since 
the advent of psychology attests to the divisibility of the mind within itself, as in the 
case of schizophrenia, and from the body, as in the case of Coprolalia or the involuntary 
vocalisation of obscene and/or derogatory words. As Simon Critchley succinctly puts it, 
‘we are divided against ourselves by a desire that attempts to deny that which makes 
ourselves the selves that they are. Simply stated, we are a paradox.’43 However, due to 
Beckett’s unsuccessful invocation of Eisenstein’s pathos construction, as examined in 
the previous section, I would suggest that the audience’s ‘imitative behaviour’ is 
skewed to a deterritorialising effect. This means that instead of straightforwardly 
imitating the mind and body split that could be represented by the split of the E/O 
protagonist, the audience member intuitively experiences three main elements that are 
presented in the film that would result in the deterritorialisation of her habit body to an 
ecstatic being in a differentiation process of Becoming Ecstatic.  In the rest of this 
chapter, this process will be elaborated in further detail with the help of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts of ‘Becoming’, ‘Organism’ and the ‘Body without Organs’.    
In ‘The Greatest Irish Film’, Deleuze concluded that Film illustrates the return 
of the action-images, perception-images and affect-images to a pure movement-image 
through a neutralization method that pulverises self-perception to an ‘atom’ that is 
released ‘into the luminous void, an impersonal yet singular atom that no longer has a 
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Self by which it might distinguish itself from or merge with the others’.44 This 
conclusion is derived from an analysis of Beckett’s cinematographic work in terms of 
the diegetic relationship between the protagonist (O) and the camera (E) and it is 
noteworthy that the role of the spectator is starkly absent in his attempt to present 
Beckett’s work as an articulation of a Becoming imperceptible.45  
Critchley rejects Deleuze’s idea that Beckett’s oeuvre ultimately seeks to depict 
‘the world before man, before our own dawn’, but I would like to point out that 
Critchley’s argument that Beckett is instead ‘constantly struggling with the 
irreducibility of the human world’ is not too different from Deleuze’s postulation. To 
reiterate, in Critchley’s view, Beckett’s works are an articulation of the irreducibility of 
the world to a world before man but Deleuze seems to suggest that Beckett attempts to 
reduce his characters to the world before man and was able to successfully achieve this. 
However, in my perspective, Deleuze’s analysis is a description of Beckett’s artistic 
method to articulate precisely the same irreducibility in Critchley’s interpretation. 
Deleuze concluded that the effect of Beckett’s methods is ultimately open-ended: 
But, for Beckett, immobility, death, the loss of personal movement and 
of vertical stature, when one is lying in a rocking chair which does not 
even rock any more, are only a subjective finality. It is only a means in 
relation to a more profound end. It is a question of attaining once more 
the world before man, before our own dawn, the position where 
movement was, on the contrary, under the regime of universal variation, 
and where light, always propagating itself, had no need to be revealed. 
Proceeding in this way to the extinction of action-images, perception-
images and affection-images, Beckett ascends once more towards the 
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luminous plane of immanence, the plane of matter and its cosmic 
eddying of movement-images.
46
  
When understood as retrogression to a ‘world before man’, the above quotation 
can of course be misinterpreted as an analysis of Beckett’s successful reduction of his 
character to a final atomic state. But the ‘world before man’ is described above as being 
governed by the ‘regime of universal variation’, which is an idea that is in line with the 
Deleuzian concept of Becoming. Deleuze’s philosophy emphasises perpetual motion, an 
always coming-into-being and a subjection to the interminable process of Becoming. 
Even after seemingly descending from the ‘subjective finality’ to the more ‘profound 
end’, Beckett’s character, for Deleuze, ‘ascends’ onto another state of denouement and 
that is ‘the luminous plane of immanence’. Again, this is a plane of ‘cosmic eddying of 
movement-images’; that is, a plane of unceasing movement trapped in perpetual 
Becoming. Thus, an emphasis should not be placed on the idea of a final reduced state; 
rather, it should be on the continued ascension of the character to another state of 
Becoming in spite of being in a reduced state. Deleuze’s demonstration of Beckett’s 
precariously near ‘exhaustive’ articulation of the human condition is not too dissimilar 
from Critchley’s attempt to present Beckett as concerned with the ‘irreducibility of the 
human world’; since, in this sense, what Deleuze addresses is the methodology by 
which Beckett’s characters are depicted as trapped in perpetual Becoming despite being 
in an extremely reduced atomic state, while what Critchley observes is the effect or 
articulation in Beckett’s oeuvre of man’s ultimately irreducible hence interminable 
struggle with being. Both philosophers, in my point of view, share a common resistance 
to a reducible finality in their interpretations of Beckett’s work. 
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Like the character’s ascension to an atomic state of perpetual motion through a 
pulverisation of his self-perception in Deleuze’s interpretation of Film, the spectator too 
experiences a similar ascension to an intuitive state through an ecstatic differentiation 
from the habit-governed body. The process of Becoming of the spectator, in the context 
of Film, can be observed in the partial blindness-induced ‘sundering’ of the ecstatic 
being from the habit body. But this description is not good enough since, as stated 
earlier, a split within the self is not a clear-cut split. Indeed, it is not so much a split as a 
differentiation that can be illustrated through the effect of deterritorrialisation.  
I postulate that within the process of this spectatorial differentiation, the 
spectator’s body and mind are deterritorialised as she is viewing the Film. That is, these 
aspects of a spectator are deterritorialised from the organic habit body to become an 
ecstatic being as they experience three depicted elements in the film.  
(a) The first of these three elements is the portrayed anticipation of the 
audience’s habitual framework of understanding. This anticipation is considered here as 
one of the three elements depicted in the film because the work clearly anticipates this 
state of mind by depriving the audience member of an easily comprehensible context 
and the comfort of spectatorial omniscience, as I have pointed out in the beginning of 
this section. The anticipation is particularly evident in the portrayed ‘sssh’, the only 
sound in the film which is made by one character to prevent another character from 
speaking and potentially offering the audience member any verbal clues about the 
protagonist or the film. Effectively, I observe that the spectator’s habit-governed mind 
is consequently deterritorialised as she is thrown out of her habitual way of knowing 
and plunged into an unfamiliar negative space to intuit beyond her constructed concepts 
of reality. The intuitive experience of Beckett’s film can thus be considered as a 
development from the audience member’s structured frame of references when these are 
no longer adequate to decipher the images prescribed by Beckett in the film.  
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In ‘Expression and Affect in Kleist, Beckett and Deleuze’, Uhlmann explains 
that an actor’s projection of a ‘familiar, easily recognisable emotion’ could interfere 
with the creation of affects because the audience that is receiving this familiar emotion 
‘do not sense the unfamiliar affect of the work’ and would therefore be ‘comforted in 
the belief that they have grasped the “meaning”, and the play [would fail] to affect them 
in the least’.47 This supports the idea that the couple’s ‘sssh’ gesture, which subverts the 
audience member’s expectation of verbal clues about the film could eject the spectator 
from her comfort of knowing through familiar frames of references. By implication, this 
corroborates with the concept that a spectator’s habit-governed mind is consequently 
deterritorialised to an intuitive experience after witnessing how her habitual way of 
knowing is anticipated and subverted by the film. 
(b) The second depicted element is the predicament of O. As the viewer 
compares O’s physical predicament and other characters’ reactions to it, she notices 
immediately that O’s behaviour is unusual. In addition, throughout the film, the 
spectator sees that O is the only character that is fleeing from E and therefore O may be 
regarded as unusually bound to E by virtue of its subjection to pursuit. Nonetheless, O 
may seem trapped in this cat and mouse chase but I posit that he is in fact depicted as 
more liberated than the other characters who are not engaged in such a struggle, and that 
the audience member is in turn affected by O’s delineated resistance to E. 
In Beckett’s original script, his intention was to depict ‘workers [as] going 
unhurriedly to work’ and all heading ‘in [the] same direction and all in couples’.48 His 
intention was to portray them as being ‘contentedly in percipere and percipi’ or 
contentedly perceived by another and perceiving the other. If the filmed footages had 
not been destroyed by the strobe effect, it would be even more obvious to the audience 
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that O is a displaced character in the film since by attempting to hide from E, he is not 
conforming to living as the other characters live, contentedly ignorant of their bondage 
to E.
49
  
Nevertheless, O is similarly made alien to the audience when the lady’s ‘sssh’ 
prevents the man’s vituperation and effectively cuts off a potential diegetic speculation 
through speech that could explain O’s unusual behaviour. Consider this following 
sequence that involves the couple: the silencing gesture, the agonising confrontation 
with E, the closing of their eyes and the walking away in the opposite direction of O. 
The sequence suggests the unquestioning couple’s instinctive decision to turn a blind 
eye to a malevolent entity, which role as ‘self-perception’ at this point remains 
unknown to the audience. Instead of acknowledging and resisting it, their movement 
towards the opposite direction of O highlights their preference to maintain the status 
quo (and this is another example of how the habitual way of thinking is anticipated and 
depicted in the film). Markedly, in contrast with the couple, O’s dogged attempt to 
escape the agonising self-perception suggests a firm acknowledgement of it, albeit an 
acknowledgement that takes the form of resistance through flight.  
In this regard, compared to the couple that choose to walk away and resume 
their contented lives in percipere and percipi, O’s flight may be interpreted as a 
depicted resistance to living a life in resolute ignorance. Similar to O’s subjection to E’s 
pursuit, the habit body of the spectator is bound to E as the camera-eye imposes the 
filmic images on her vision. The body may at first seem trapped as the limited vision 
afforded by the camera-eye causes it to become a mere extraneous receptor of the filmic 
content. However, like O, the ecstatic being that results from the deterritorialisation of 
the trapped habit body is one that is liberated from its habitual function to actively 
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anticipate the familiar. Deprived of familiar and readily comprehensible images in a 
darkened auditorium and also of an assumed visual autonomy, the ecstatic being is the 
result of the spectator’s submission to bodily passivity as she views O’s as yet 
inexplicable flight from E. Instead of simply walking away, like the early film critics 
who ‘clobbered’ and ‘ignored’ the film, the audience member has chosen to experience 
a unique liberation from her habit body by staying.
50
 
(c) From the effects of deterritorialisation examined in relation to the two 
depicted elements above, we see that the ecstatic being differentiates from the habit 
body as the spectator is deterritorialized from her habitual function of actively 
anticipating data that can be easily transmitted to and comprehended by her mind. Her 
active vision is displaced by the film to result in a perceptual passivity that no longer 
anticipates a familiar sequence of images, which promises the comforting illusion of 
spectatorial omniscience. In other words, the spectator surrenders to a state of limited 
vision; by unavailingly questioning what she is seeing and not seeing, her habitual 
conceptual framework is deterritorialised, and by being visually bound to the 
perspectives and enigmatic images directed by the camera-eye, she becomes free from 
the habitual function of anticipating the familiar. As the film increasingly puzzles the 
spectator, her consciousness of her habit body decreases to accommodate the pure affect 
of Becoming, which has been established earlier as a self-reflexive perception of self by 
itself. This means that the spectatorial differentiation process between the now 
extraneous habit body and the ecstatic being is rendering the spectator to become self-
reflexively perceptive of the habitual self by the intuitive self.  
 Just as E can be interpreted as an amorphous ‘self-perception’ that represents 
the furcation and unification of the perspectives of E and O by the end of the film, so 
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too is the spectator’s pure affect of Becoming, a ‘self-perception’ that connects her habit 
body and ecstatic being as self-reflexive double by the end of the film. As such, I 
postulate that the final scene in which E is revealed to be ‘self-perception’ is the third 
depicted element that significantly supports the audience member’s differentiation 
process of Becoming Ecstatic.  
As stated earlier, I observe that due to Beckett’s unsuccessful employment of 
Eisenstein’s pathos construction, the ‘imitative behaviour’ of the audience is skewed to 
a deterritorialising effect. Nevertheless, with this effect film is still able to invoke an 
ecstatic spectatorial experience that is uniquely Beckettian. That is, instead of the 
Eisensteinian ecstasy of ‘being beside oneself’ in the audience, Beckett’s film creates a 
pure affect of Becoming in the spectator in which the deterritorialising effect renders 
her self-reflexively intuitive of both her habit body and ecstatic being. Essentially, this 
spectatorial process of Becoming culminates at the point when E is revealed as the force 
which represents the furcation and unification of the E/O protagonist in the film, 
because the scene reflects back to the audience the deterritorializing effect of the 
differentiation process that has activated her Becoming from a habit body to an ecstatic 
being, which is capable of self-reflexively intuiting beyond her familiar frames of 
references.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion that if Becoming is viewed as a line-system, 
it is a ‘movement by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points 
indiscernible: the rhizome, the opposite of arborescence; break away from 
arborescence.’51 ‘The law of arborescence’ refers to the dualistic thinking of ‘this as 
opposed to that’ and is founded upon the basis of ‘distinctive opposition’, for example, 
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‘male-(female), adult-(child), white-(black, yellow or red)’.52 The rhizome, on the other 
hand, refers to a decentred way of thinking that presupposes that everything is part of an 
assemblage and cannot be attributed to a single cause. To think in binary terms is akin 
to considering only one particular part of an assemblage. In the context of this 
explication, the Becoming of the spectator is an intuitive perception of both her habit 
body and her ecstatic being. The Becoming of the spectator renders her an assemblage 
of multiplicity in which the ecstatic being that is freed from a habitual way of knowing 
becomes a pure affect that allows the viewer to self-reflexively perceive herself as both 
the habit body and an ecstatic being. Effectively, the audience member undergoes the 
differentiation process in which the habit mind and body are deterritorialised so as to 
reconstitute her as an ecstatic being that is freed from the ‘law’ of arborescence and as a 
result, open to a decentralised intuition that is characterised by lateral multiplicity 
instead of duality.
 53
   
As such, instead of an imitative ecstatic audience advocated by Eisenstein, 
Beckett’s film creates within his audience, a heightened intuition of her capacity for 
non-dualistic thought as she becomes beside herself within herself through an internal 
differentiation process of Becoming described in this section. To put simply, Beckett 
had achieved an ecstatic spectatorial experience of pure affect that is uniquely 
Beckettian, not Eisensteinian. 
 
3.3 TO HAVE DONE WITH THE JUDGEMENT OF ‘GOD’ 
The theme of partial blindness that pervades Film and leads to the reconstitution 
of the spectator into a self-reflexive ecstatic being is examined in this section as a 
critique of man’s habitually parochial vision. By invoking the intuition of our inherent 
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ability to look beyond the law of arborescence, we are being made aware of our 
potential to reject ‘the judgement of God’. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, ‘The 
judgement of God, the system of the judgement of God, the theological system, is 
precisely the operation of He who makes an organism, an organization of organs called 
the organism […]’.54  In brief, an acceptance of binary thinking can also be seen as an 
acceptance of our subjection to the stratifying order of God, ‘You will be organized, you 
will be an organism, you will articulate your body [the stratified body] –– otherwise 
you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted –– 
otherwise you’re just a deviant.’ 55  
Deleuze’s essay’s title ‘To Have Done with Judgement’ alludes to Antonin 
Artaud’s radio play To Have Done with the Judgement of God. True to its title, the play, 
which was recorded in 1947, is a cacophonic mix of poetry, screams, shouts and 
glossolalia that articulate the protagonist’s frenetic resistance to the judgement of God. 
The play concludes that in order for man to be ‘restored to his true freedom’, man will 
have to become a ‘body without organs’ for ‘there is nothing more useless than an 
organ’.56 Deleuze explains that ‘judgement implies a veritable organization of the 
bodies through which it acts: organs are both judges and judged, and the judgement of 
God is nothing other than the power to organize to infinity’.57 The body can only escape 
judgement if ‘it is not an “organism,” and is deprived of this organization of the organs 
through which one judges and is judged.’58 Garin Dowd explains this further that ‘the 
organed body is striated’ in that it ‘generates hierarchies and imposes structures’, 
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whereas the Body without Organs (BwO) ‘is rhizomatic’ and free of the ‘arborescent 
model’.59 
In relation to the concept of organized judgement stated above, I would like to 
reiterate that the ecstatic being of the spectator is the result of being reconstituted from a 
habitual arborescence into a decentred assemblage of self-reflexive pure affect. In the 
script of Film, O’s frantic movement against the flow of ‘workers going unhurriedly to 
work’ in the ‘small factory district’ is the first representation of the project’s resistance 
to the economic organ of the stratifying organism.
60
 By ‘economic organ’, I am 
referring specifically to the ‘economy of want and power’ that has a hand in subjecting 
one to stratification.
61
 Paul Stewart observes that ‘the relationship between want and 
power in Endgame would also be an appropriate gloss on, or a laying bare of, the 
economy that prompted the rise to power of totalitarianism, both of fascist and Stalinist 
hues, in the pre-war era’.62 Similarly, Beckett’s Film, written in 1963, is set in the year 
1929 which is the year of the Great Depression and the preamble to the economic 
hardships that would fuel the impending Second World War. In my perspective, in 
addition to regarding the film as set in the pre-WWII era, it is also helpful to look at 
1929 as post-WWI because it significantly marks the precarious apex of the post-WWI 
economic boom that mirrors that of the post-WWII economic prosperity between the 
1950s and 1960s.  
Indeed, the intended depiction of the workers as being contentedly perceiving 
and being perceived by each other as they make their way to work suggests a general 
mood of idyllic optimism that is, unbeknownst to them, on the verge of becoming 
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shattered. The purpose of mirroring the positive outlook of the 1950s and 60s with the 
year 1929 could be Beckett’s way of illustrating the ignorant optimism that induces 
people to repeatedly continue to pursue our insatiable material wants by relinquishing 
our freedom to the bonds of an unsustainable economic organisation that adheres to an 
inevitable pattern of boom and collapse. If the footages of the group scenes had not 
suffered ‘badly from that strobe effect that’ caused them to be ‘impossible to watch’, by 
following the camera’s dogged pursuit of O, an audience member might have had the 
opportunity to experience a very visual tearing away of her attention from the collective 
enthusiasm in fuelling the economic organ, to the frantic resistance of the protagonist 
who is running in the opposite direction of the masses.
63
                
Next, O’s tearing of the pictures that chart the milestones of his life and his 
ultimate confrontation with E that reveals a confrontation with his self indicate the 
film’s resistance to the social organ. By ‘social organ’, I am referring specifically to the 
social determinants by which people allow themselves to be defined. This 
representation of resistance is a blatant reversal of Jacques Lacan’s seminal idea that at 
the mirror stage, where an infant first recognises himself in the mirror, an “ideal-I” is 
formed:  
[…] that situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social 
determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible 
for any single individual or, rather, that will only asymptotically 
approach the subject’s becoming, no matter how successful the 
dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with 
his own reality.
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The ‘dialectical syntheses’ as a means by which his ‘discordance with his own reality’ 
must be resolved, refers to his ‘social’ interactions and relations later in his life that will 
‘determine’ the extent of his success or failure to achieve the “ideal-I”. But this is a 
‘fictional’ goal that is doomed from the outset, since at the point of the ideal-I‘s 
formation, the mirage of a total form of his body does not reflect the reality of the 
infant’s ‘motor impotence and nursling dependence’.65 In other words, the image of a 
total form is an illusion because it hides the infant’s actual physical weakness at this 
stage of his life and sets up the illusion of a complete ideal-I that is ultimately 
unattainable throughout ‘the subject’s becoming’ or development in life because the 
subject has never been complete. He is, or rather, we are intrinsically fragmentary.  
Shane Weller observes that ‘One source for a theorisation of literary style in 
relation to psychosis that Beckett may have encountered in the mid-1930s is the work of 
Jacques Lacan’.66 According to his footnotes, Weller was informed by James Knowlson 
that Beckett once remarked to him that the ‘late Lacan is unreadable’.67 Implicit in this 
comment is that Beckett had been following Lacan’s work. Effectively, these 
observations encourage and support an interpretation of Film with reference to Lacan’s 
early work. It is therefore likely that Beckett was familiar with Lacan’s early essay on 
the mirror stage and that this could have contributed to his conception of the E/O 
confrontation scene.  
Further, Angela Moorjani has it that ‘Beckett’s textual mirrors, doublings, and 
disintegrating forms echo the mirror stage’s constitution of the I as other (self-
estrangement) and the introjection and projection of virtual marionettes of bodily 
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wholeness, on the one hand, and of bodily fragmentation and the dissolution, on the 
other’.68 More specific to Film, Norma Bouchard also suggests that ‘[l]ike Lacan, 
Beckett emphasizes the shortcomings of vision’ and that the confrontation scene 
represents the E/O protagonist’s ‘seeing eye’s failure in positing a homogenous, unified 
subject’.69 Nonetheless, in contrast to both Moorjani’s consideration that the mirroring 
or doubling aspects of Beckett’s oeuvre are an ‘echo’ of the Lacanian mirror stage and, 
Bouchard’s attribution of the painful confrontation between E and O to the Lacanian 
conclusion that the specular imago can never be realised, I posit that the scene is not a 
mere iteration of the mirror stage. Regarding it as such would gloss over the nuances 
that can be extrapolated from the E/O protagonist’s unique characterisation. With 
reference to my observation that Beckett may have appropriated the jubilant infant from 
Lacan’s essay by transforming him into a dispirited old man in Film, I postulate that the 
emphasis of the E/O confrontation scene may be on the mirror stage’s embeddedness in 
the protagonist’s stratified reality.  
To elaborate, the protagonist’s ideal-I, E, haunts him despite his bleak 
knowledge that the promise of cohesion is empty. Towards the end of the film, O’s 
confrontation with E is a mirroring that involves no physical mirror to reflect the ideal-I. 
As stated in the previous section, E represents the furcation and unification of all 
perceptions in and of the film. There is no need for a mirror in the confrontation scene 
to mediate E’s manifestation since it is depicted as a representation of the omnipresence 
of perception per se. Instead of a mirror that mediates and sets up, in the infant’s 
reflection, the subject’s misdirected assumption of a potentially ideal cohesion of form, 
the E/O confrontation in Film presents the audience with the haunting spectre of the 
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omnipresent E as an ideal which is so ingrained in the film’s diegetic world, that the 
protagonist needs only to drop his guard to engage with it once again.  
Further, despite the near similarity of both images, which is evident at the end of 
the film, O’s abject fear of E underscores an incompatibility between the twin images 
that highlights an inherent disjunction between the two. As opposed to the sense of 
jubilation the infant initially experiences when he first recognises what he assumes to be 
his own image in the mirror, O’s confrontation with E is marked by an anticipated sense 
of anguish so intense that he is compelled to cover his face with his hands. The aged 
man’s rejection and fear of the image of his ideal-I is a stark contrast to the infant’s 
initially happy acceptance of the ideal-I. The term ‘asymptote’ comes from the Greek 
word ‘asumptotos’ and means ‘not falling together’. With reference to Lacan’s idea that 
the image of the ideal-I that forms the ego will ‘forever’ only ‘asymptotically approach 
the subject’s becoming’ throughout his life, the aged O’s flight from E can be 
interpreted as representing O’s resistance and fear of a relapse into believing that he 
could ever develop into his ideal-I. Essentially, this confrontation scene indicates that O 
is so deeply embroiled in the paradoxical fear of his compulsion to strive towards the 
ideal whole, that his futile resistance to all forms of perception, whether social or 
imaginary, causes the very sense of anguish that elliptically propels the entire filmic 
sequence.  
This resistance can also be seen in O’s tearing of the picture of ‘the face of God 
the Father [with] eyes [that are] staring at him severely’, which represents the film’s 
resistance to the theological organ that structures the organism as a whole in the form of 
a metaphorical judgement of God. 
70
 In Lacan’s work, the ideal-I is also referred to as 
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the ‘Imago’.71 This is a Latin term that alludes to the Augustinian concept of the ‘imago 
Dei’ or the ‘image of God’. John A. Lorenc explains that in the De Trinatate, 
‘Augustine speaks of the image of God (imago Dei) in human beings’ in terms of ‘its 
deformity (deformitas, immunditia, obscuritas) on account of sin, and the need for it to 
be reformed (reformare, transformare, mutare, transire, renovare) in order to regain its 
likeness (similitude) to God’.72 Nonetheless, Lacan’s allusion to the ‘imago Dei’ is an 
ironic one because the ideal image of Lacan’s subject is an unattainable image of an 
ideal self.  
As such, the Beckettian protagonist’s rejection of his ideal-I and the image of 
God may be interpreted as a dual-layered rejection of any possibility of a personal or 
even spiritual cohesion. To reject the ideal-I is to recognise the futility of trying to 
become the ideal-I by subjecting oneself to the ultimately ineffectual social 
determinants of the organism. In the same vein, to reject the image of God is to 
recognise the vanity of trying to fulfil the theological organ’s criterion that one should 
strive to attain a devoutly God-like irreproachability. In the following paragraphs, I 
examine the tragic dimension that is employed by Beckett in the film, which will further 
inform our understanding of the protagonist’s rejection of the authoritative organism.  
Juxtaposing Nell’s famous line in Endgame that ‘Nothing is funnier than 
unhappiness’ with Beckett’s decision to cast a veteran comedian Buster Keaton to take 
on the grim role of the protagonist, Film may be regarded as a tragicomedy.
73
 Moreover, 
Beckett’s intention, as it is stated in the script, was to evoke the audience’s laughter 
throughout the film. However, as can be attested by any viewer of the film, the 
screenplay certainly does not send the audience into stitches. Bignell notes that the film 
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alludes to the ‘Keaton comedies’ but does not produce ‘a satisfactory spectating 
position for many actual film viewers’ to appreciate its intended humour.74 Instead, it 
‘leaves the film viewer with the sense that he or she is out of place’.75 The audience’s 
puzzlement created by this sense of displacement thus takes the ‘comedy’ out of the 
term ‘tragicomedy’ and aligns the film more with the tragic genre than with comedy. 
Bennett Simon observes that ‘[f]rustrated in its search for meaning in Endgame, the 
audience typically experiences thwarted and poorly articulated affective responses while 
watching the play’.76 This description of the audience’s response to Endgame is also 
applicable to the viewer’s response to Film. As opposed to Waiting for Godot, I regard 
Endgame as a tragedy, although it contains quite a few jokes.  Similarly, in the creation 
of Film, Beckett might have had intended it to be a tragicomedy that is reminiscent of 
the bleak humour in Waiting for Godot, but the end product is definitely a tragedy in no 
uncertain terms.   
Connecting the tragic genre with psychoanalysis, Simon argues further that ‘the 
nature of tragedy in Beckett’s works’ is defined by the ‘psychiatric disorders of 
infancy’.77 Comparing Eugene O’Neill’s dramatic works with Beckett’s, Simon 
maintains that Beckett’s drama denies his audience the tragic catharsis and fulfillment 
that O’Neill’s works evoke. He goes on to describe Endgame as a ‘commentary on the 
history of Western tragic drama’ and that Beckett’s goal is to ‘get beyond’ the search, 
which ‘began with the Greeks’, for a satisfactory solution to the ‘intractable conflicts 
inherent in the family’.78 At one point in his book, Simon assumes Beckett’s persona by 
writing as Beckett in the first person to suggest that his solution was to portray in his 
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works the elimination of a character’s past. This past includes the character’s personal 
history and the potential for the continuation of this history. Nonetheless, ‘this solution 
doesn’t work’ because people are always looking for ‘some secret meaning’ behind this 
elimination.
79
 Simon’s description is of a playwright who is looking for a solution to the 
tragic drama by eliminating everything that could potentially give rise to the familial 
conflicts that are central to tragedy. Although a ‘solution’ that is perpetually teetering on 
the brink of implausibility is a possible interpretation of what Beckett is trying to 
convey to his audience with his minimalist and apocalyptic settings, we must not 
overlook the fact that his works are not completely devoid of the traditional elements 
that define a tragic drama of antiquity.   
In my perspective, the scene in which O sits in his rocking chair and rips up the 
pictures that record the significant achievements of his life depicts an acute reversal of 
the protagonist’s circumstances. The concept of ‘reversal’ is not new in Beckett 
scholarship. Paul Lawley notes that in the master and servant relationship in Beckett’s 
plays between 1961 and 1963, there is a ‘final peripeteia in which the detached master 
is revealed to be slavishly dependent upon his servants. It is the terminal relationship 
foreshadowed by Krapp and his recorder’.80 He supports this observation further by 
noting that Steven Conner sees ‘the peripeteia of Play in terms of power, “the reversal 
of perceptual positions brings about a shift in the relations of appraiser and the 
appraised. The effect is not to elide or abolish power. Rather, it is to point to power as 
centreless and unfixed, as consisting in exchange rather than in permanence’.81 As such, 
the peripeteia in Film can be viewed in terms of the reversal of power relations between 
the protagonist (servant) and the organism (master). Nevertheless, in my analysis of the 
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film, I maintain that it may be helpful to consider the more traditional ‘dramatic 
reversal’ of the protagonist’s fortune alongside Lawley and Connor’s concept of 
peripeteia.  
In Film, the photos from the envelope capture the chronological milestones of 
the protagonist’s progressive movement towards what could be deemed a wholesome 
life. It is interesting that from infancy to fatherhood, these images entail an aspect of 
servitude. As a toddler, he was taught to pray to the Lord. As a child, he taught a dog 
how to beg. As a father, his military garb leads the audience to infer that he was once a 
civil servant to his country. Nonetheless, the abrupt final photo of a solitary man with an 
eye-patch over one eye depicts a sudden reversal of the protagonist’s circumstances.  
O’s departure from a lifetime of glowing achievements, as represented by the 
contrast between the photos and his present state, marks an acute reversal of O’s state of 
existence. The photos chart his unrewarded adherence to the dictates of a stratifying 
organism that promised an eventual wholesomeness. Turning back to Lacan, after a 
brief moment of jubilation at the mirror stage, the infant recognises its own lack when it 
notices the seeming wholeness and omnipotence of the ‘other people’ around him. The 
infant regards the ‘other people’ as imaginary rivals or ‘semblables’. 82  It enters into 
competition with them and this turns the ‘specular I’ into the ‘social I’.83 Lacan has it 
that the development of the I from this moment on will be ‘mediated by the other’s 
desire’.84 Understanding this in the context of the stratifying organism, the development 
towards the ideal-I from this moment on can be interpreted as being dependent on the 
social and cultural dictates of the larger organism rather than the natural instinct of the 
child. However, compared to the infant, the Beckettian protagonist has gone through the 
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stage of striving towards achieving the ideal-I and failed. He no longer harbours any 
illusion that the ideal-I or imago, which is governed by the determinants of the 
organism, can ever be realised. The tragic dimension of Film is thus observed in 
Beckett’s portrayal of the protagonist’s reversal from a deluded but purposeful life to a 
disillusioned but more lucid existence. Effectively, O’s rejection of E highlights a 
rejection of the fabled hope for personal cohesion, but more importantly, it accentuates 
his resistance to being subsumed yet again by the stratifying organism. In terms of 
power relations, O’s resistance to the organism is effectively a consequence of the 
reversal of his circumstances. His resistance is interpreted here as an attempt to wrest 
his autonomy from the deceitful grasp of the organism.   
Such reversals represent Beckett’s calculated attempt to deterritorialise the 
audience’s expectation of familiar filmic narratives that may for example, as opposed to 
Film, involve an errant protagonist who actively pursues his reintegration into the 
organism or die trying. When the audience observes by the end of the film that E and O 
may be two aspects of a single protagonist she would notice that O’s resistance is 
towards assimilation with E. Although she may not explicitly recognise this resistance 
as a rejection of the stratified organism, as her mind encounters the unusual filmic 
sequence, she distinctly experiences the organism through her habitual frames of 
references that cannot seem to assist her to comprehend O’s actions. As she exhausts 
her habitual ways of seeing, she is led to abandon her arborescent frame of 
understanding by ceasing to anticipate the familiar and consequently submits, in her 
ecstatic state, to the flow of the film’s resistance. This can be likened to the moment 
when the first-time viewer of a stereogram gradually crosses her eyes and discovers that 
she has the capacity to see things differently. Effectively, as the viewer observes O’s 
recognition and rejection of the stratified organism in the diegetic world of Film, she is 
deterritorialised by the film from her habit body to an ecstatic being.  
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 That is, insofar as the spectators choose to remain physically bound to the 
camera-eye, they have the opportunity to experience a momentary liberation from the 
conditions of the stratified organism. Film’s epigraph is the Berkeleyan phrase esse est 
percipi and by portraying O as fleeing from the perception of E, the film is effectively a 
depiction of O’s rejection of being the object of perception. This consequently 
highlights his depicted resistance to the notion of cohesion, but whereas O’s attempt at 
escaping self-perception is superficially unsuccessful, his portrayal, as running away 
from the general direction of the crowd in the original script and as moving towards an 
increasingly enclosed space as opposed to the couple and the flower lady who are 
respectively moving within and towards the outdoors in the film’s final cut, suggests 
that the focus of Film is on the process of going against the grain of the organism as 
much as it is a fixation on the futile inescapability from it. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I stated that humans are predisposed to divide 
within ourselves, but that we are also under the constant compulsion to conform to the 
stratified system that governs our daily lives. The implicit pressure to conform in the 
film might have been influenced by the advent of social psychology between the 1950s 
and 1960s. One notable work is the highly influential ‘Studies of Independence and 
Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority’ conducted by Solomon 
E. Asch in 1956. Briefly, the study involved putting the subject in a position to decide 
whether she or he should concur with an obvious error of judgement by the majority of 
the ‘participants’ who were in fact planted by Asch. The conclusion was that people are 
indeed compelled by a need to fit in. As Asch had it, ‘Yielding subjects seriously 
underestimated their compliance. They offered a variety of reasons for their errors, the 
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most usual being the painfulness of standing alone against the majority’.85 During the 
height of research interests in social psychology, Wilfred Bion, the psychoanalyst whom 
Beckett underwent psychotherapy with from 1934 to 1935 at the Tavistock Clinic, 
published Experiences in Groups in 1961.
86
  
 Although it is uncertain if Beckett kept up with the research developments of his 
former therapist, Steven Conner astutely points out that 
one cannot but feel that something more momentous should surely have 
ensued from this meeting, at a formative time for both of them, of a man 
who was to become perhaps the most important European writer of the 
1950s and 1960s, and a psychoanalyst who was to become one of the 
most famous and distinctive English psychoanalysts of his generation.
87
 
According to Connor, Bion was occupied by the interactive processes of groups 
between ‘about 1940 to about 1950’ and this interest culminated in the publication of 
Experiences in Groups.
88
 In this work, Bion ‘[considered] that group mental life is 
essential to the full life of the individual […] and that satisfaction of this need has to be 
sought through membership of a group’.89 Bion goes further to assert that at no point at 
all, no matter how ‘isolated in time and space’, should an individual ‘be regarded as 
outside of a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology’.90 Although 
we do not know if Beckett had read this particular work by Bion, Knowlson reports that 
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Beckett was encouraged during his therapy sessions ‘to counter his self-immersion by 
coming out of himself more in his daily life and taking a livelier interest in others’.91  
Nonetheless, as Knowlson observes, ‘Beckett never liked groups’ and when ‘the 
panic attacks started up again at night, leading him to despair that nothing had been 
resolved by two whole years of analysis’ he wrote a letter to Tom MacGreevy and 
stated, ‘no more Bion’.92 If we consider the idea of being trapped within the stratified 
organism as akin to being subsumed in a group psychology by maintaining one’s 
membership in the organised group, then we can perhaps see how Beckett’s termination 
of his therapy sessions in 1935 could be an intuitive resistance to such an entrapping 
concept of a ‘full life’ which Bion would subsequently postulate later in his career.  
In addition, Bion’s concept of ‘O’, which bears no overt relation to Beckett’s 
designation of the capitalised letter to his protagonist in Film, is highly intriguing. 
O does not fall into the domain of knowledge, or learning, save 
incidentally; it can be ‘become’, but it cannot be ‘known’. It is darkness 
and formlessness but it enters the domain of K (knowledge) when it is 
evolved to a point where it can be known, through knowledge gained by 
experience, and formulated in terms derived from sensuous experience; 
its existence is conjectured phenomenologically.
93
 
By ‘its existence is conjectured phenomenologically’, Bion is referring to his concept 
that ‘O’ can only be intuitively experienced. To Bion, ‘O’ undergoes evolutions and it 
can only be intuited when it is transformed into ‘knowledge gained by experience’ 
during its evolutions. In Transformations, Bion makes a distinction between ‘O’ and the 
‘transformations of O’. On one hand, ‘O’ is an unknowable reality ‘for the same reason 
that makes it impossible to sing potatoes; they may be grown, pulled, or eaten, but not 
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sung. Reality should be ‘been’: there should be a transitive verb ‘to be’ expressly for 
use with the word ‘reality’.94 On the other hand, the ‘transformations of O’ are the final 
products that can be known from a patient’s intuitive experience of the dark and 
formless O. Thus, Bion’s ‘O’ is a thing-in-itself that cannot be directly known.95 
According to Robert White, the experience of ‘O’ is an intuitive arrival at an Absolute 
Truth through the knowledge of its transformations.
96
 This can be thought of as ‘the 
experience of the analytic pair at any one moment, both the patient’s experience of O 
and the analyst’s experience of O. Only the transformations of O are available to the 
patient and analyst to work on’.97 James S. Grotstein has it that intuitively to experience 
O is also to arrive at a point in which ‘one is now in the realm of a realization beyond 
knowing, a concept that approaches faith and coherence’.98 Grotstein goes further to 
suggest that Bion discovered that intuitively experiencing O is equivalent to 
transcending into an ‘inner world’ or ‘the Unconscious’ and meeting ‘the ineffable and 
inscrutable Godhead’.99 Thus, despite the impossibility of ever knowing O, Grotstein 
explains that the aim of Bion’s work is for the analysand to arrive intuitively with the 
help of the analyst at this absolute inner truth that promises to be unifying. 
In the context of Film, the Beckettian protagonist’s hope to achieve total non-
perception is a search, not for a unifying Godhead (literally depicted when the picture of 
God was torn off the wall), but for an absolute zero. It is clear that his portrayed 
resistance is directed at the very notion of meeting another perceiving being, whether 
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living or non-living. The unbearable quality of anything that could presumably be 
perceiving him is what he is physically fleeing from. Again, taking into account 
Berkeley’s ecce est percipi, if being perceived is what gives us an illusion of being a 
cohesive whole, then the protagonist’s search for total non-perception is a resistance to 
this illusion. Beckett effectively portrays the protagonist as one who sees potential 
cohesion through the stratified organism as a fear-inducing illusion. If this search for 
total non-perception resonates with the writer’s predicament at all, actively pursuing an 
Absolute Truth that is unknowable but can be glimpsed intermittently under the 
guidance of a therapist’s intense gaze would be akin to allowing himself to be abused by 
the painfully erratic lifting and dropping of the Schopenhaurian ‘veil of Maya’.  
Beckett’s interest in the veil of Maya is well-documented. Matthew Feldman has it that 
it is, ‘without doubt, a major influence on both Beckett’s artistic temperament and his 
philosophical outlook during the interwar period’, and I gather that this influence may 
have extended to his conception of Film.
100
 
I stated earlier in the first section that Beckett denies his audience the delusional 
comfort of a ‘veil’ that is a woven net of relations that the audience member is familiar 
with and has come to expect from a typical dramatic plot. The Schopenhaurian veil of 
Maya is analogous to this veil in that it represents an illusive world, which we 
experience from day to day while concealing ‘the world as it truly is’.101 Also referring 
to the veil of Maya in relation to Beckett’s work, Ulrich Pothast astutely observes that 
the ‘true world’, to Beckett, ‘only becomes visible in rare moments, and it is a world of 
pitiless light which most likely shows a pitiless reality’.102 Therefore, this 
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understanding, that the immediate reality is an illusion and that what lies behind this 
illusion is if not worst then no better, suggests that Beckett’s work is not about 
transcending into a wholesome Bionic O of absolute truth and ultimate reality. What 
Beckett and his characters seek is an absolute zero that is outside of this binary between 
illusion and ultimate reality.  
Based on the above, I maintain that the Beckettian zero is the complete opposite 
to Bion’s ‘O’. Even though Bion’s description of O as dark and formless makes it 
tempting to assert a similarity between Bion’s unknowable O and Beckett’s search to 
articulate the absolute zero, one must bear in mind that Bion’s path is towards an 
ultimate unity whereas Beckett’s path is towards an absolute nothingness. If placed on 
an imaginary spectrum, the two endeavours would be placed on opposing ends.  
Further, comparing Bion’s attribution of O with a cohesive quality to Beckett’s 
characterization of O’s incomplete corporeality, Beckett’s resistance to the thought of 
finding any concrete state of unity is stark. That is, the Beckettian protagonist’s flight 
from all perceptions including the perception of self-by-self is not merely a rejection of 
the illusion that a unified self is attainable, it is also a resistance to the idea that this 
false sense of cohesion is liberating. As such, in the rest of this section, I will illustrate 
in relation to Film and with reference to the Deleuzean concept of ‘Becoming’, the 
audience’s ecstatic departure from their habitual expectation of and desire for a 
semblance of cohesion as it is dictated by the stratifying organism.       
The organism that embodies the promise of unity is often compared with a 
‘theological body’ and I consider this as a metaphor for the inextricably oppressing 
pressure in our immediate reality to conform. Judith Poxon observes that Deleuze 
compares the ‘body-as-organism’ to ‘the theological body’ in that ‘it provides the 
material guarantee of the identity and immortality of the self that is constituted by 
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negation, limitation and exclusion.’103 This comparison is founded upon the idea that 
the ‘mind, or soul’ is only guaranteed its immortality when it is returned to the 
conformed body.
104
 Fundamentally, being a subject of the theological order means 
being a subject to this clear demarcation of the mind and body by which union, 
separation or reunion depends solely on the divine judgement of God. Nonetheless, as a 
result of viewing O’s resistance to the ‘body-as-organism’, it is noteworthy that the 
spectator’s differentiation within the self differs from such clear distinctions between 
the mind and body since the ‘split’ within the self triggered by the film is, as stated 
earlier, Becoming a lateral multiplicity that is neither a reduction of being nor a clear-
cut separation of the mind from the body.  
In the context of O’s portrayed resistance to the theological organism, his 
rejection of ‘the conformed body’ implies his desire is to be expunged from the 
organism. Similarly, the Becoming of Film’s spectator can be observed most distinctly 
in her momentary liberation from the theological organism at the point when she is led 
by the camera-eye to witness O ripping off and tearing up the image of God. Such an 
explosive gesture can be interpreted as O’s resistance to being subjected to the 
perception of God, the purportedly indestructible authority figure. But considering the 
obvious ineffectualness of the action against the omnipresence of God, the nature of this 
resistance is by no means a ‘combat against judgement’.105 Deleuze explains that the 
‘combat-against’ is destructive or repellent whereas the ‘combat-between’ is ‘a force’ 
that seeks to appropriate ‘other forces’ in order to ‘make it one’s own’.106 Instead of 
myopically interpreting O’s gesture as a destructive ‘combat against judgement’, it is 
worth considering that the gesture is ‘a combat between Oneself’ that is capable of 
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‘replacing judgement’ with the force of resistance instead of destroying it.107 I will 
elaborate this further in the following paragraphs.  
In the context of Film’s protagonist, ‘it is the combatant himself who is the 
combat’ as he struggles to resist self-perception.108 The crux of Film is the illustration of 
the anguish of perceivedness or the anguish of being the Object of perception. This 
anguish is directed at the experience of perceivedness per se which is assumedly 
reciprocal in that the perception of anything whether animate or inanimate can result in 
the assumption of a reciprocated glance. Hence, the tearing of the picture of God is a 
symbolic gesture that attempts to replace the protagonist’s assumed reciprocated divine 
perception of God with the force of his resistance. It is a combat between himself as it is 
a combat between his inclination to assume reciprocity and his resistance to this 
inclination.  
In the context of Film’s spectator, the protagonist’s combat between himself ‘as 
a way to have done with God and with judgement’ by replacing the judgement with the 
force of his resistance, is translated into the spectator’s combat between her habitual 
regard for the organism as an absolute system that structures her extradiegetic world and 
her intuitive resistance to this habit in the process of her becoming an ecstatic being. 
Following Deleuze’s concept that the combat-between is the enrichment of one force by 
the other, it can be inferred that the effect of the combat-between the spectator is not a 
replacement of a habitual perspective with a deterritorialised perspective, but an 
enrichment of the spectator by placing the intuitive perceptions of both the habit body 
and the ecstatic being in self-reflexive juxtaposition. Her liberation from the organism 
lies precisely in this ecstatic intuition that she is in fact not restricted to looking out 
from within the organism and that she now looks at the organism from without too.  
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In the words of Deleuze, ‘The way to escape judgement is to make yourself a 
body without organs, to find your body without organs’.109 Having an overview of the 
organism as opposed to being merely a part of the organism marks the precise moment 
when the spectator finds herself to be a body with organs or the body-as-organism. That 
is, the spectator is concurrently becoming a body without organs as she intuits her body-
as-organism. By virtue of intuiting the organism from within and without, she is turning 
her back against the theological organism. As Poxon has it, the body without organs is 
set ‘[a]gainst [the] divine order’ as an affirmation of the ‘order of the Antichrist, an 
order expressive not of identity but of difference’ that ‘undoes the order of God and the 
judgement on which it is based and which it in turn enforces.’110  I maintain that by 
intuiting the organism from within and without, the spectator is at the cusp of this 
difference, where the singular ‘identity’ of the organised divine order that is familiar to 
her habitual conceptual framework becomes a part of an intuitive assemblage of 
possibilities.   
Uhlmann compares Deleuze’s concepts in ‘To have done with Judgement’ with 
what he deems to be Beckett’s aesthetic ideal, that is, a ‘non-relational art’ or an artistic 
expression that is not constituted by distinctive connections and relations, and observes 
that ‘there can be no judgement where there is no possibility of “obedience” and there is 
no possibility of obedience in an aesthetic system that claims to admit no relation’. 111   
The all-encompassing intuition within and without the organism admits no distinctive 
relation between the organism and the non-organism because it is viewed as an 
assemblage and this vantage point is not coloured by an intention to dominate or 
overpower. Uhlmann defines ‘Obedience’ as a relation of and adherence to inadequately 
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understood terms that perpetuates ignorance and ‘makes judgement possible’.112  By 
being within and without, the spectator becomes ‘disobedient’ from an organic 
perspective because the divine authority that requires her to be exclusively subjugated 
within the divine order of theocentric relations is subverted. But the term ‘disobedient’ 
is employed loosely here since from the ecstatic perspective, there is no subjugation or 
subversion as there is no domination without organic stratification and hierarchies. 
Instead, having done with the judgement of God, what remains is maximum potential 
and possibilities. The concept of Obedience no longer has a place in this assemblage. 
Therefore, in the context of this chapter, the Beckettian spectator effectively enters into 
an intuitive process of becoming an ecstatic body-without-organs when the organic 
system of judgement loses its foothold in her mind. 
Tracing back to Deleuze’s assertion that Beckett’s Film pulverises self-
perception to an ‘atom’ that is released ‘into the luminous void, an impersonal yet 
singular atom that no longer has a Self by which it might distinguish itself from or 
merge with the others’, the spectator’s habitual conceptual framework is also broken 
down and reconstituted from an adherence to the law of arborescence to become an 
ecstatic intuition of an assemblage of possibilities rather than stratified limits. 
Nonetheless, it would be naive to assume that such a reconstitution is infinitely 
enduring since as discussed earlier, outside of Film we are under the constant 
compulsion to conform to the stratified system that governs our daily lives. Thus, what 
Beckett offers to his audience through Film is a momentary liberation from the habit-
governed world. 
The next chapter continues to investigate how the spectator’s habitual frame of 
references is reconstituted as she intuitively experiences Beckett’s stage plays. More 
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specifically, the chapter will explicate the depiction of quantitative Time in the stage 
plays as the foundation of the characters’ as well as the audience’s habitual experiences 
of their immediate realities, so as to illustrate Beckett’s possible employment of the 
Bergsonian durée to challenge this incarcerating time continuum.  
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CHAPTER 4 TIME OUT FROM THE WORLD: RESPITE IN BECKETT’S STAGE 
PLAYS 
 
In this chapter, I explore the intersection between drama and the philosophy of time 
with a focus on interpreting Samuel Beckett’s stage plays through the lens of Henri 
Bergson’s concept of the intuitive durée (duration). The aim of this analysis is to 
establish how a brief sense of respite is invoked in the characters and how the audience 
member is deprived of it as she bears witness to the Beckettian characters’ entrapment 
in an interminable time continuum. In the stage plays, I observe that Beckett’s 
storytelling characters seek to invoke the internal Bergsonian durée by inventing stories 
so as to temporarily escape an incarcerating external time continuum. With this in mind, 
I propose that in the midst of attempting to create the effect of the internal durée, the 
possibility of a sense of respite for the characters is produced.  
Bringing the concept of the stratified Organism from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, I 
would like to draw a connection between a mechanical external time continuum and the 
Organism in order to illustrate the time-cage that has been constructed for the 
Beckettian characters in the plays. I will define this time continuum in terms of 
Immanuel Kant’s concept of sequential time.  
By ‘time continuum’, I am referring to the Kantian time continuum that can be 
intuitively represented by a straight line ‘progressing to infinity’ in which an instant 
gives way to the next before fading away. Kant asserted that ‘Time is not something 
which subsists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination, and 
therefore remains, when abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition 
of things’.1 This means that time can neither be a thing-in-itself, nor an objective order 
that is inherent in things. It is nothing if it is separated from the human intuition. In 
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other words, to Kant, time is internal intuition. As an intuition time is formless, 
however, in order to facilitate his explanation of this intuitive time, Kant attributes to it 
the form of a straight line and maintained that since an intuitive time ‘determines the 
relation of representations in our internal state’, the representation of time as a 
successive line ‘is itself an intuition’.2 Implicit in this description is that this inherently 
intuitive time structures our experience of all phenomena as representations. Gilles 
Deleuze pointed out in his preface to Kant’s Critical Philosophy that what was truly 
revolutionary about Kant’s theory of time was the ‘reversal’ of time’s subordination to 
movement in traditional thought to movement’s subordination to time in the Critique of 
Pure Reason.
3
 In other words, time is no longer regarded as a mere measurement of 
movement, instead movement is conditioned by time. Time, to Kant, ‘is the formal 
condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever.’4 With this in mind, the representation 
of the time line as successive is itself an intuition since our experience of all phenomena 
is conditioned by intuitive time.  
One difference between Kant and Bergson’s respective concepts of ‘intuition’ is 
that Kant’s is an organised intuition whereas Bergson’s is a ‘simple intuition’.5 In one 
example, Bergson likened intuition to our ability to ‘distinguish our right from our left 
by a natural feeling’.6 An intuition is that ‘which no formula, no matter how simple, can 
be simple enough to express’.7 For Bergson, the durée is time that is qualitatively 
apprehended through intuition. As opposed to Kant’s formulation of time as an 
organised intuition and ‘is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series)’, 
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Bergson’s concept of time is a qualitative duration which ‘consciousness reaches 
immediately’ through simple intuition.8 To my understanding, Kant’s postulation that 
intuitive time is inherently an organized time because time can be spatialised in the 
mind as a successive order is one of the reasons that Kant’s successive time is likened 
by Bergson to the limited ticking of the mechanical clock and consequently deemed as a 
‘spurious concept’.9  
To elaborate what he meant by ‘spurious’, Bergson asserted that measurable 
time is but a construct. The successive units of time evenly divided into hours, minutes 
and seconds are contrived by the mind as residing in an imagined homogenous space 
that allows the setting of two points (i.e. a past moment A and a present moment B) in 
juxtaposition. Quantifiable time to Bergson is merely a symbolic representation of real 
duration or durée, necessary for the ‘[adaptation] to the requirements of social life in 
general and language in particular’.10 As opposed to measurable time, the durée is an 
experience of the process of reality that is unquantifiable; to Bergson, the process of 
reality can only be qualitatively experienced through human intuition.  
In view of Kant and Bergson’s contrasting concepts of ‘time’ and ‘intuition’, I 
posit that as the characters in Beckett’s plays seek an end to their grim predicament of 
being trapped in a seemingly interminable successive time continuum, the non-
successive durée presents itself as a viable short-cut that could plausibly ‘speed up’ their 
experience of the continuum, and by implication, speed them towards the end of 
consciousness. This postulation will be elucidated further in the following sections. 
4.1 STRATIFIED ORGANISM AND KANTIAN TIME 
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For Kant, time is regarded as ‘a line progressing to infinity’.11 His idea that ‘the 
representation of time is itself an intuition’ suggests that time is a priori awareness 
within us. Kant suggested further that although time can be conceived of as a straight 
line, it must not be thought that all the parts of the line coexist. Instead, time is 
‘successive’ and instants do not coexist, as would the parts of a straight line; an instant 
fades as it is extended.  Asserting that ‘it is quite indifferent whether we consider future 
time as ceasing at some point, or as prolonging itself to infinity’, Kant pointed out that 
time is the ‘synthesis’ of a series of conditions where the conditioned ‘time past’ 
precedes the unconditioned ‘time future’.12 This consistent process of conditioning, in 
relation to all external phenomena, indicates that the passage of time entails change or 
an infinite series of transformation from being unconditioned to conditioned. Beckett 
described a similar conditioning of time as ‘a constant process of decantation, 
decantation from the vessel containing the fluid future time, sluggish, pale and 
monochrome, to the vessel containing the fluid of past time, agitated and multicoloured 
by the phenomena of its hours.’13 However, despite Kant’s assertion that the process 
involves changes and transformation, his concept of successive time continues to 
remain rooted in a systematic structure; that is, his suggestion that the sequential nature 
of time is a priori meant that it affects every aspect of how our intuitive experience of 
phenomena as representations is organised.  
By limiting the intuition to the knowledge of representations, Kant was also 
suggesting that we can never know anything beyond representations.  Bergson’s 
opposition arose from this limitation of the Kantian intuition. He proposed that intuition 
is ‘simple’ and that we can in fact intuit beyond representations. Bergson asserted that 
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Kant’s representation of time as a successive order subscribes to a closed system of 
time-space causality and fails to articulate the nature of time as pure duration, which ‘is 
nothing but a succession of qualitative changes’ and cannot be measured unless it is 
‘symbolically represented in space’.14 Implicit in Beckett’s German letter to Axel Kaun 
that he was interested in getting behind the veil of language is also the idea that there is 
a desire to get beyond representation, and this is examined further in the next section.
15
 
For now, in the context of Beckett’s stage plays, I postulate that the external time in 
which the characters are trapped resembles the Kantian time, and time of this nature 
governs the external worlds of both the Beckettian characters and the audience. In my 
perspective, the most obvious representation of this interminably sequential external 
time is Beckett’s characters’ physical state of decrepitude. 
At the beginning of most of his plays the marked physical deterioration of the 
characters creates an early impression within the audience that a long period of time has 
gone by. In Krapp’s Last Tape, for example, Beckett describes Krapp as a ‘wearish old 
man’ in a pair of trousers that are ‘too short for him’, and in addition to being ‘very 
near-sighted (but unspectacled)’ he is also ‘hard of hearing’.16  The delineation of 
Krapp as wearing a pair of trousers that are too short for him could imply that he had 
outgrown his trousers. By portraying him as very near-sighted but unspectacled Beckett 
seems to be suggesting that the actor playing Krapp should perform this near-
sightedness from the outset of the play in such a way that would induce the audience to 
notice the character’s want for a pair of spectacles. By deliberately depriving his 
character of what he needs, in this instance a pair of trousers of the appropriate length 
and a pair of glasses, the playwright is setting up the premise of lack and consequently 
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accentuating the degenerative physical state of his character right from the beginning of 
the play. The ailment of a deteriorating sight or outright blindness recurs in many of his 
dramatic works but the earliest play that presents this deterioration in a sequential order 
is Waiting for Godot.  
In the first act, Pozzo puts his glasses on and takes them off three times. The 
first time is to inspect Didi and Gogo in order to ascertain condescendingly that they are 
of ‘the same species’ as he is and made in his ‘likeness’.17 He repeats this action again 
as he comments that their likeness to him is an ‘imperfect one’.18 Finally, he puts them 
on and takes them off for the third time to watch Didi as he urinates.
19
 Pozzo’s action of 
putting on and taking off his glasses is bound firstly to the highly memorable dark 
humour of his condescension towards the humanity of Didi and Gogo, then later to the 
slapstick humour of Didi’s weak bladder. These associations direct the audience to 
observe the wretchedness of Didi and Gogo’s physical appearance and weak 
constitution. But perhaps more importantly, the glasses also draw attention to Pozzo’s 
characterisation in the first act as a pompous observer in order to pave the way for his 
contrastingly helpless predicament as a blind man with absolutely no sense of direction 
in the second act. It is noteworthy that as he prepares to leave Didi and Gogo in the first 
act, he notices that the watch he was constantly checking to keep time is either missing 
or has stopped ticking. By the second act, Pozzo is completely blind and along with his 
sight he also loses his sense of time: 
VLADIMIR  I’m asking you if it came on you all of a sudden. 
POZZO I woke up one fine day as blind as Fortune. [Pause] Sometimes I 
wonder if I’m not still asleep. 
VLADIMIR  And when was that? 
POZZO I don’t know 
VLADIMIR But no later than yesterday  
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POZZO (Violently.) Don’t question me! The blind have no notion of time. 
The things of time are hidden from them too. 
VLADIMIR Well just fancy that! I could have sworn it was just the opposite.
20
 
 
In the dialogue quoted above, Vladimir is almost certain that he saw Pozzo ‘yesterday’, 
which was in Act One. He seeks to verify this by asking Pozzo if he became blind ‘no 
later than yesterday’, but Pozzo’s response seems to imply that he had lost his sight for 
a while now. He had confessed earlier in the first act that his memory is defective and 
shortly after the quotation above, he admits that ‘tomorrow’ he would not be able to 
remember he had ‘met anyone today’.21 By juxtaposing Pozzo’s line that‘[t]he blind 
have no notion of time’ with Vladimir’s assumption that ‘it was just the opposite’ or in 
other words, that the blind have a notion of time through the use of other senses, 
Beckett seems to be questioning the validity of regarding time as a singularly visual 
experience of all phenomena.  
Although it is stated clearly by Beckett in Act Two that the act takes place ‘Next 
Day. Same Time. Same Place’ it is unclear to an audience whether the two acts 
represent two consecutive days.
22
 That Vladimir is the only character that believes it is 
the next day renders his testimony dubious to himself and the audience. As such, the 
shifting aspect of reliable/unreliable testimony would preoccupy the audience for the 
rest of the play. This indeterminable proximity of the two days can be attributed further 
to the tree in the play that is portrayed as barren in the first act and suddenly covered 
with leaves in the next. However, if we take Beckett’s description of Act Two as it is 
(and consequently, Vladimir’s assumption in this act that he met Pozzo ‘yesterday’ in 
the first act), then we will notice that there is a marked tension between the playwright’s 
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portrayal of successive time through these two acts, his delineation of multiple 
subjective intuitions of time through his characters, and in his depiction of nature.  
To elaborate the above idea further, the disruption of the characters’ as well as 
the audience’s sense of time in the context of Waiting for Godot seems at first to be 
effected by the loss of the ability to hear the ticking of the watch then followed by the 
loss of sight.  With blindness specifically, Pozzo can no longer rely on the visual 
representation of his immediate surroundings to judge which direction he is heading or 
what time of the day it is.  The common assumption, as articulated by Vladimir, that the 
blind possess a notion of time by relying on other senses, is reversed by Pozzo when he 
announces in an axiomatic tone that ‘[t]he things of time are hidden’ from the blind.23 
This exchange between Vladimir and Pozzo seems to be Beckett’s way of deriding a 
concept of time that is based on surface representation. In other words, Pozzo’s ironic 
lines are targeted at the concept that time is the a priori condition by which all 
phenomena is represented to the visual sense as apparition and hence the representation 
of time can consequently only be visually perceived in the successive order of changes 
to the conditions of all these apparitions. Pozzo’s lines sardonically suggest that without 
the ability to visually perceive these changes around us, we immediately lose our sense 
of time. As such, the view that time is perceptible only through the visual regard of the 
changes wrought by successive time to the representations of phenomena is rendered 
absurd in this exchange.   
Notably, the audience’s perception of time as successive is challenged since we 
may be inclined to side with Vladimir that the two acts are two consecutive days, but to 
every other character in the play the first act either never occurred or possibly happened 
a long time ago. This inclination to side with Didi may be the result of the audience 
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knowing Didi is right from the outset of the second act that the pair of boots belong to 
Gogo, who left them on the stage in Act 1 but has forgotten that he did that by Act 2. 
This could suggest to the viewers that Gogo’s memory of events are unreliable and 
consequently induce them to adopt Didi’s perception that the two acts represent two 
consecutive days. However, with the addition of Pozzo, Lucky and the boy as the act 
progresses, the audience become less certain of the consecutiveness of both acts as two 
days because, unlike Didi, these characters do not seem to remember having ever met 
Didi and Gogo. As such, our inclination to side with the supposedly rational explanation 
is upturned. (Nevertheless, in the third section of this chapter, time as perceptible only 
through a visual perception of the successive changes to representations of phenomena 
will be presented as the ultimate governing concept of time in the characters’ experience 
of their diegetic world and most audience members’ assumption of their extradiegetic 
world.)    
Another way that the representation of external time is delineated as successive 
and sequential is the depiction of each Beckettian play as an enactment of a well-worn 
routine. This portrayal presents a repetitive process of conditioning in which sequential 
instants belonging to the external time order condition a series of actions that is 
regularly executed by the characters so as to form a pattern of human habit. Poignantly, 
the pegging of a repeated set of actions to time leads to Didi’s reflection that ‘[h]abit is 
a great deadener’.24 The character is referring to the stultifying effect of the repetitive 
pattern of human habit. As Ruby Cohn also observed, ‘Much of [Waiting for Godot] 
dramatizes habitual routines, repetitions that stretch and flatten time to an eventless 
continuum.’25In addition, the barrenness of Beckett’s dramatic landscapes lays bare his 
characters’ reliance on habit to go on living under such sterile conditions. Eric P. Levy 
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asserts that in Beckettian time, ‘[n]othing more can happen in time but repetition of 
what has already occurred’.26 What he means by this is that the future is extended by 
past moments that are indistinguishable from one another, as can be seen in the daily 
routines of the characters in Act without Words II that will repeat indefinitely and render 
each day to be indistinguishable from the preceding one. The commingling of these 
non-differentiable past moments results in a ‘stagnation’ in which ‘the temporal passage 
betokens temporal fixity’.27 That is, the forward movement of time only indicates the 
changelessness of a character’s predicament because of repetition.  
However, although Levy is right about the nature of Beckettian time’s forward 
movement and the repetitiveness of each instant that gives way to the next, his assertion 
only identifies the external time illustrated by Beckett and seems to set up a cul-de-sac 
that impedes an understanding of Beckett’s meticulous depiction of time as both 
quantitative and potentially qualitative in his plays. I postulate that Beckett’s conception 
of time in his plays is not singular, but dual. The struggle is between an external time 
continuum and an internal duration. However, Levy posits that time is always portrayed 
as either a ‘reduction of time to one continuous moment’ or  ‘the reduction of time to 
the succession of identical moments’ in Beckett’s oeuvre.28 This ‘either/or’ statement is 
tantamount to suggesting that time is always portrayed as singular in each Beckettian 
play. To Levy, the repetition of a routine or the reliving of a past is a ‘futile compulsion’ 
that is ultimately aimed at ‘forgetting’, which he deems is the ‘fundamental repetitive 
act’.29 His view of time as singular and his attribution of repetition of the identical as 
constituent of the linear isochron are consistent with a closed-system interpretation of 
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Beckett’s oeuvre as a project that is aimed at articulating futility. For an essay that 
claims to be ‘the first to examine the Beckettian representation of time in relation to the 
conceptual complexity of time itself – the cluster of concepts informing the idea of time, 
philosophically construed’, Levy’s perspective is limiting.30 Nonetheless, his view of 
this ultimately futile flow of time is helpful in our understanding of the sequential 
nature of the external time continuum that we are examining in this chapter.  
In the context of this analysis, I posit that repetition may be a means to forget 
but more can be excavated from its function to conceal and the object of its 
concealment. Repetition, when regarded as a repetitive pattern of habit, could 
potentially be a woven veil that conceals a desired object beneath the ‘haze of our smug 
will to live’.31 I posit that this desired object could be self-destruction, as suggested by 
Bergson. As I will demonstrate later in the next section, the layers upon layers of habit 
that individuals, societies and nations have piled upon themselves and one another could 
potentially be the driving force that enables humankind to go on living. This will be 
examined further in the second section in terms of Bergson’s concept of ‘fabulation’ 
and Beckett’s delineation of his habit-governed characters. But let us now look at a few 
more examples of a Beckettian routine in order to firmly establish in this section the 
incarcerating nature of the external time continuum. 
The opening scenes of Endgame and Happy Days offer a few more poignant 
examples of a Beckettian routine as representations of an external time. In Endgame, the 
blind and wheelchair-bound Hamm wakes up, asks Clov what time it is and receives the 
reply, ‘The same as usual.’32 This ‘usual’ point in time hints at the precision of Clov’s 
mechanical opening actions of drawing back the curtains, checking in the bins and 
waking Hamm from his sleep. Like Didi and Gogo’s daily meet-up to wait for Godot, 
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Clov and Hamm’s exchange would appear to the audience as a well-worn one. Winnie, 
in Happy Days, opens the play with the line ‘Another heavenly day.’33 According to the 
lengthy stage directions, she begins her day by first praying, then taking out her 
toothbrush, a tube of toothpaste and brushing her teeth. This mundane sequence of 
actions would immediately be recognised by the audience as a representation of a daily 
morning ritual. However, what is visually incongruent to this implied mundaneness is 
Winnie’s physical entrapment in a mound. Her physical limitation is emphasised when, 
after putting on her spectacles and attempting to read with great difficulty what is 
written on the handle of the toothbrush, she concludes that she will be ‘blind next’ and 
resignedly consoles herself that her ‘old eyes’ had ‘seen enough’.34  When her ongoing 
physical deterioration is juxtaposed with the representation of a morning ritual, the 
movement of time as a sequential and single-tracked continuum is clearly illustrated 
onstage as a steadily incarcerating process of physical degeneration.   
In Gilles Deleuze’s ‘On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the 
Kantian Philosophy’, he lauded Kant’s conception of time as a ‘reversal’ that liberates 
time from the traditional role of being a measurement of movement in classical 
philosophy; that is, the perception of time as subordinated to phenomena is reversed in 
Kantian philosophy when Kant subordinated all phenomena to the order of time.
35
 
Nonetheless, in his lecture ‘On Kant’, Deleuze, following the lead of Bergson, 
maintained that Kant’s philosophy is ‘stifling’ in that the system he imposes to explain 
our way of experiencing the world around us is rigid and limiting.
36
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For Deleuze, such a closed system prevents the new from occurring and leads us 
back to the concept of the organized system established in the previous chapter. With 
reference to the Organism that is governed by a systematic stratification examined in 
Chapter 3, the rigid Kantian time would permeate and structure the Organism, since 
according to Kant, all our human experience is in this organised time. John McCumber 
astutely points out that Kant did not claim that his own thought is true, ‘but that it is 
systematic’.37 This observation is explained further in the following paragraph. 
Notably, in his preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant asserted that 
[…] pure speculative reason has a true structure. In such a structure 
everything is an organ, i.e., everything is there for the sake of each 
member and each individual member is there for the sake of all, and 
hence even the slightest defect, whether it be a mistake (error) or an 
omission, must inevitably betray itself when we use that plan or system.  
I hope, moreover, that this system will continue to maintain itself in this 
unchangeable state.
38
 
These ‘organs’ are the conditions that constitute one’s understanding of the organic 
world and any transgression of this structural arrangement would be deemed a ‘defect’. 
This relegation of difference to a ‘defect’ valorises organised stratification and 
disparages multiplicity. Deleuze noted that one of Kant’s greatest contributions was 
freeing phenomena from the ‘appearance/essence’ duality by establishing the 
‘conjunctive couple’ that is the ‘apparition/ conditions of the apparition’.39 Implicit in 
the ‘appearance/ essence’ duality is the idea that there is always something (essence) 
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behind the appearance, but in the ‘apparition/ conditions of the apparition’ pair, we 
know that we cannot know anything beyond this apparition except for the conditions 
that orders our experience of the apparition. However, for Deleuze, Kant’s idea that we 
cannot know anything beyond the conditions of an apparition is problematic in so far as 
it denies the possibility of multiple systems of experience that can arise a posteriori or 
from experience, instead of merely a priori or presupposed in experience. Kant’s hope 
that his system would remain ‘unchangeable’ further explains Deleuze’s description of 
Kant’s philosophy as stifling.   
Instead of setting unchangeable conditions on how we know, thinking in terms 
of difference and multiplicity opens up possibilities for the new. Following Bergson’s 
challenge to Kant’s concept of time by postulating that the understanding of time should 
be intuitive instead of rigidly analytical, Deleuze’s three empirical models of time in 
Difference and Repetition challenge Kant’s conception of time as an organised a priori 
time. Deleuze’s Habitual time, Memorial time and the Futural time can be regarded as a 
development from and opposition to the three Kantian modes of time, and these are 
Permanence, Succession and Co-existence.  Let us first look at the three modes of 
Kantian time to establish how these might relate to Beckett’s portrayal of the external 
time as a trap.  
None of the three Kantian modes of time are capable of defining time in 
isolation. They are instead strict rules of one system of time that govern all relations of 
phenomenal apparitions. Briefly, Permanence refers to that which is permanent in all 
phenomena. Kant maintained that ‘the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the 
substance (phenomenon)’ that renders the other two modes, Succession and Co-
existence, possible.
40
 What this means is that any object of experience can only be 
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perceived as successive or co-existent if there is an unchanging foundation of 
permanence in that object. According to Kant, ‘it is only by means of the permanent that 
existence in different parts of the successive series of time receives a quantity, which we 
entitle duration.’41 Here, Kant was referring to the idea that it is only because 
permanence is a foundation of phenomena, that the successive transition from one 
moment to the next in time, or quantified duration, is perceptible by us.   
With reference to the Beckettian landscape, despite the presentation of a 
seemingly unified actor/character blend of physical deterioration, a spectre of the 
Beckettian character coexists with but is distinct from the bodily actors’ deterioration 
and suffering in the audience’s perception; that is, I posit that the stories that a character 
is portrayed as narrating offer the audience members spectral glimpses of its lived life 
whereas the actor’s body anchors the character to its present physical reality through the 
presentation of deterioration and suffering. This effectively aligns the deteriorating body 
of the actor with the audience members’ spatial reality, in order that they may perceive 
time as a successive continuum. The spectre of a character in relation to the actor’s body 
will be elaborated further in the next section.
42
 
In terms of Succession, Kant posited that ‘[o]ur apprehension of the manifold of 
phenomena is always successive’.43 To explain this point, Kant employed the analogy 
of a ship floating down the stream of a river. The ship’s movement from point A to 
point B, from a higher position to a lower position on the course of the river, cannot be 
perceived in a reversed order. This ‘order of apprehension’ is ‘determined’ and 
‘regulated’.44 The order is irreversible. Therefore, events in time are similarly perceived 
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in a causally determined order in that each event of change must necessarily be 
preceded by a prior condition that allows the present state to be possible.   
The on-going mental and physical degeneration of the Beckettian character 
presented by an actor occurs in an irreversible order that are reflected in Pozzo’s line, 
‘They are given birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it’s night once 
more.’45 Even though the quotation may at first seem like the description of an instant, 
the fall from birth to grave is in itself a macrocosmic representation of an irreversible 
sequence of life despite it being a metaphorical representation of the brevity of life. 
Indeed, by breaking up the quotation into three sequential moments: birth, gleam, grave, 
we will see that the process of physical degeneration that pervades the Beckettian 
oeuvre occurs in precisely ‘the light [that] gleams an instant’. Therefore, with reference 
to Levy’s assertion that in some of Beckett’s plays ‘time is reduced to a single moment’, 
I would suggest that the external time continuum is the sequence of succession that 
governs this ‘light’ and that it is precisely in this ‘gleam’ that the Beckettian habitual 
routines and corporeal deterioration unfold.  
Finally, in his definition of Co-existence, Kant stated that ‘all substances, in so 
far as they can be perceived in space at the same time, exist in a state of complete 
reciprocity of action’.46 It is noteworthy that he regarded ‘substances as phenomena’ 
and the two terms are interchangeably employed here.
 47
  Therefore to rephrase his 
definition of Co-existence in the terms that this chapter has been employing thus far, a 
phenomenon is perceived to exist in terms of its relations with all the other phenomena 
which it exists with. The ‘reciprocity of action’ refers to how the possibility of 
perceiving one substance is dependent on the perception of another substance or how 
the possibility of perceiving one phenomenon relies on the perception of another 
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phenomenon.  Against the barren landscape of the Beckettian drama, the actor’s starkly 
localised and articulated physical and sensory afflictions are in themselves a web of 
reciprocal relations that is perceptible by the character (if it is a play involving a solitary 
character), by the other characters (if there is more than one character) and also by the 
audience.       
For Kant, these three modes of time are ‘principles of the determination of the 
existence of phenomena in time’ and work together in unity to qualify time as a priori 
since these modes are ‘[valid] for all and every time’ in relation to all phenomena.48 He 
regarded these three modes of time as ‘transcendental laws of nature’ that anticipate 
experience and ‘without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would 
itself be impossible.’49 At this point, it should be clear that the rigidity of Kantian time 
is the premise from which I am led to postulate that the external time continuum in 
Beckett’s dramatic works is an incarcerating temporal trap.   
In summary, I have pointed out in the paragraphs above that the Beckettian 
characters are observed by the audience as physically subjected to the irreversibly 
successive time continuum through the Beckettian actors’ presentation of the characters’ 
physical degeneration and immersion in well-worn habits and sequential routines. As 
such, the only way out of the characters’ predicament is, I posit, by a manipulation of 
their internal perception of time through storytelling. By seeking a ‘way out’, I am 
referring to the characters’ delineated attempts to engage with an internal Bergsonian 
durée in order to effect an intuitive ‘acceleration’ through time towards the end of their 
seemingly interminable entrapment in the external time of their diegetic world.  The 
next section of this chapter will examine the nature of the internal time in Beckett’s 
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plays and the final section will focus on the potentially accelerating effect of the 
intuitive durée and the sense of respite that is generated through storytelling. 
4.2 OUTSIDE OF TIME 
Relating Beckett’s drama to Bergson’s philosophy is important and necessary. 
Beckett scholars such as Anthony Uhlmann, S.E. Gontarski and Colin Gardner have 
observed that Beckett was familiar with Bergson’s ideas.50 To illustrate the playwright’s 
familiarity with Bergson’s work, specifically his work on Time, Gardner points out that 
the main theme of Beckett’s 1931 Trinity Dublin Lectures on André Gide and Jean 
Racine was Bergson’s ‘distinction between “spatial time” and “duration”’.51 More 
recently, in Understanding Bergson, Understanding Modernism, David Addyman, Paul 
Ardoin, and Dustin Anderson also point out Bergson’s influence on some of Beckett’s 
prose works.
52
 Although a consideration of Bergsonian concepts in relation to Beckett’s 
prose is not new in Beckett scholarship, these essays in the volume imply that Bergson’s 
philosophy has an important place in Beckett’s oeuvre, and I hope to extend this 
understanding of Bergsonian influence to Beckett’s stage plays.  As I have postulated 
earlier, the focus of this chapter is Beckett’s dual representation of time in his stage 
plays as a Kantian external time and a Bergsonian internal durée, and the tension that I 
seek to examine between these two concepts of time can be seen as the tension between 
what Bergson perceived to be Kant’s spatialisation of time and Bergson’s own concept 
of the simple intuitive durée.  
In my subsequent analysis, Beckett’s delineations of external time in his plays as 
Kantian and of internal time as Bergsonian will be elucidated with references to 
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Deleuze’s three empirical models of time but, ultimately, the focus will remain on 
Beckett’s portrayal of the tension between Kantian and Bergsonian time in his stage 
plays. Deleuze’s ideas will work as a means to elucidate Kant and Bergson’s 
philosophies since he had written extensively on both philosophers and his own 
philosophical ideas were also to a large extent influenced by his interest in the arts. As 
Ian Buchanan and John Marks pointed out, Deleuze’s ‘interest in the “in-between” 
seems to have been reason why Deleuze was so drawn to modernist authors like Beckett 
and Joyce since they were the first to explore it self-consciously.’53 The ‘in-between’ of 
Beckett’s drama in relation to external and internal time will be elaborated in the next 
section.
54
 
To reiterate, Bergson’s concept of time is the internal durée, which differs from 
a rigidly quantifiable time in that it is qualitative and malleable. This concept of time is 
significant as it challenges the successive and sequential time proposed by Kant. 
Bergson’s durée, defined by Stephen Barker as ‘the experience of time in subjectivity’, 
is a personal internal duration that resides within each of us and can only be 
apprehended intuitively.
55
 As opposed to the rigidly measurable external time, the durée 
is fluid and immeasurable. Measurable external time, to Bergson, is the ‘ghost of space 
haunting the reflective conscious’ and that only the internal ‘pure duration is the [true] 
form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, 
when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states’.56 In other 
words, Bergson is suggesting that ‘time’ is merely contrived to be quantifiable under the 
assumption that psychical states are separate and successive. The ‘real’ time or durée is 
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fluid, ‘the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells 
as it advances’.57 Letting one’s ego ‘live’ implies freeing the conscious mind from the 
constructed concept of quantifiable time. I posit that the durée’s trait of fluidity presents 
the possibility of sparing the Beckettian characters’ experience of time from the external 
rigidity of Kantian time.  
This possible escape is attempted by creating pockets of opportunity through 
storytelling to effect the intuitive durée. The potential result is this: as a character turns 
its consciousness to the invention of a story, it also turns its consciousness away from 
the experience of the external time continuum. At the end of a story, the character 
would experience a leap forward in time when it emerges from storytelling and falls 
back along the external timeline to find that a significant amount of the seemingly 
interminable time has passed. I postulate that the only motivation that leads them to turn 
towards the attempt to effect the intuitive durée is this hope of speeding up their long-
drawn wait for the end of consciousness, but what they are depicted as ultimately 
accomplishing is merely a temporary sense of respite.  
Storytelling in Beckett theatre entails the conflation of imaginative inventions 
and reminiscences. Quoting from the Robert Dictionnaire, Ronald Bogue helpfully 
points out that although the French term ‘fabulation’ was first used to refer to “an 
imaginary representation of a set of facts”, it became associated in psychology with 
‘mythomania and pathological lying’ by 1905.58 He also notes that Bergson was the first 
to use the word as a philosophical term in his 1932 The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion.
59
 In The Two Sources, Bergson regarded fabulation as the myth-making 
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function of the intelligence that ‘[counteracts] the work of intelligence’ itself.60  To 
Bergson, intelligence in an individual strives towards ‘initiative, independence and 
liberty’ or to put simply, the individual’s self-interests, but carried too far, such 
endeavours may threaten to ‘break up social cohesion at certain points, and assuming 
that society is to go on, there must be a counterpoise, at these points to intelligence’.61 
Myth-making, which favours the individual’s survival as a social being, comes into the 
picture to ‘arouse an illusory perception, or at least a counterfeit of recollection so clear 
and striking that intelligence will come to a decision accordingly.’62 In short, myth-
making, which is evident specifically, to Bergson, in the form of religion, is a 
‘defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence’ to self-
destruct.
63
 But Beckett’s characters do not seem to seek either survival or social 
cohesion.  As such, the function of storytelling in Beckett’s drama is different from the 
fabulation function of constructing a coherent structure to guard against ‘the dissolvent 
power of intelligence’. Instead, there is a marked distinction between fabulation and 
storytelling in Beckett’s stage plays. The former is related to the habit-governed 
external timeline whereas the latter is related to the internal durée. 
Bergson’s negative regard for fabulation as responsible for the construction of 
what he deemed to be a closed-society governed by a static religion composed of the 
myth of supernatural and omnipotent beings reminds us of the Organism and Kant’s 
closed system in which ‘everything is there for the sake of each member and each 
individual member is there for the sake of all’.64 Indeed, in Bergson’s Two Sources, he 
suggested that in closed societies ‘constituent part must be ready to sacrifice itself for 
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the whole’ and this is in line with nature’s partiality towards ‘society than with the 
individual’.65 Myth-making is nature’s way of preserving societies and preventing man 
from self-destruction, but it is also a limiting impulse that impedes the formation of a 
truly open society. In order to break out of this closed system, Bergson brings in the 
concept of the Creative Emotion.   
Whereas myth-making is an ‘infra-intellectual’ or instinctual impulse, the 
creative emotion is a ‘supra-intellectual’ or intuitive emotion that requires ‘the artist to 
make a constantly repeated effort such as the eye makes to rediscover a star which, as 
soon as it is found, vanishes into the dark sky’.66  Obeying this emotion would involve 
creating new ideas that is beyond writing and would be an ‘attempt to realise the 
unrealisable.’ 
[The artist] will revert to the simple emotion, to the form which yearns to create 
its matter and will go with it to meet ideas already made, words that already 
exist, briefly social segments of reality. All along the way he will feel it 
manifesting itself in signs born of itself, I mean in fragments of its own 
materialization. How can these elements, each unique of its kind, be made to 
coincide with words already expressing things? He will be driven to strain the 
words, to do violence to speech. And, even so, success can never be sure; the 
writer wonders at every step if it will be granted to him to go on to the end 
[…].67 
The quotation above suggests that the artistic creation will have to come from the 
reversion to ‘simple emotion’ as opposed to established systems of reality and 
specifically a reality that is constructed by an existing language. The artist will have to 
‘do violence to speech’ and I interpret this ‘violence’ in Beckett’s drama as a revolt 
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against established linguistic expressions by inventing fragmentary forms of expressions 
that subvert the conventional use of language.  
At first, the characters’ tendencies to tell fragmentary stories, as delineated by 
Beckett, point precisely to a pursuit of the Creative Emotion in his dramatic oeuvre. 
This seems to exclude the concept of fabulation, which is targeted at the preservation of 
social cohesion and consequently, an impetus that does not seem to exist in the 
Beckettian world. Perhaps more importantly, in plays such as Quad, Act Without Words 
I and II, the desertion of speech poignantly points to an attempt to dispense with 
language altogether and, as a potential consequence, shirk off the baggage of established 
social system and its associated strictures. Nonetheless, I posit that both fabulation and 
the Creative Emotion exist in the Beckettian drama, but they are presented in the stage 
plays as existing in states that indicate the aftermath of an irreversible entropy and are 
inextricable from Beckett’s representations of external time and the internal durée.  
In Chapter 2, I have already established that should God exist in Beckett’s 
dramatic landscape, He is characterised as a God that does not seem to act. Fabulation, 
in the context of Bergson’s philosophy, is the basis of a static religion by which a closed 
society is constructed through myth-making. Bergson explained that religion has its 
roots in the myth of ‘life after death’ because man must be able to take comfort in the 
possibility of continuation in order to grapple with the certainty of death; thus, Bergson 
posited that ‘religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by 
intelligence, of the inevitability’ of death.68 Although the ‘multiplication of habits 
throughout the ages’ for ‘“primitive” peoples’ is deemed by Bergson to ‘have occurred 
in a different way’ compared to ‘the civilised man’, both types of belief systems are 
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‘rational inasmuch as it was in the interests of the society’.69 Therefore, implicit in such 
multiplication of habits is the instinctive goal of ‘social preservation’ in terms of ‘the 
good of society’ through the establishment of a ‘religious order’.70 This religious order 
may be regarded as a system of rewards and punishment that promises, for example, life 
after death as a reward for obedience and eternal damnation for transgression.   
If we accept that the God of the Beckettian dramatic diegesis is a static one and 
that his characters’ ultimate goal is to experience an end of their conscious existence, 
then their inclination to invent stories becomes untangled from Bergson’s concept that 
the human’s instinctual impetus is to construct a coherent narrative in order to guard 
against self-destruction. Indeed, the inaction and implicit impotence of God indicate the 
entropy of religion in the Beckettian landscape. Reduced to its bare bones, ‘religion’ is 
portrayed by Beckett as diminished to unavailing habit and routines, as opposed to the 
layers of habits that piled and are piling upon generation after generation of people in 
the process of human development as we continue to seek a sense of order and stability 
in societies and nations. Beckett’s characters’ habitual routines are representative of 
Bergsonian fabulation that is stripped of its layer upon layers of myth-based narratives 
of social preservation and cohesion.  
The sequential and successive characteristics of routines, as stated earlier, share 
an affinity with Kant’s concept of a closed system of time, and this becomes more 
evident when we consider Bergson’s disparagement of such habit-based fabulation as 
constitutive of static religion in closed societies. In Time and Freewill, although 
Bergson criticised the mechanical time, he recognised the necessity of a closed system 
of time by stating that a successive and sequential representation of time in the 
systematic form of quantifiable time that is evenly divided into hours, minutes and 
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seconds, is necessary for the ‘[adaptation] to the requirements of social life in general 
and language in particular’.71 I interpret this to mean that in order, for example, to make 
and fulfil social appointments, time has to be regarded as organised in a specific order 
so as to facilitate the day-to-day maintenance of life in general. In terms of language, 
Bergson’s statement is fairly self-explanatory since every language is a system whether 
spoken or written; straying from the system would render verbal or written 
communication difficult to comprehend or completely unintelligible. This application of 
systematic time to the external world of social interaction and communication between 
humans cannot, however, be applied to the subjective experience of the qualitative 
durée.      
To reiterate, Beckett’s portrayal of external time in his plays as a closed system 
of interminable successive time is presented through the actors’ performance of the 
characters’ habitual routines and physical degeneration. In Act Without Words II, even 
though Beckett stated that ‘A is slow, awkward (gags dressing and undressing), absent’ 
whereas B is ‘brisk, rapid, precise’, he emphasised that both sequences ‘should have 
approximately the same duration’ as the two actors execute their respective routine in 
sequential order.
72
 The mime is intended to be performed ‘on a low and narrow platform 
at the back of the stage’ that is ‘violently lit in its entire length’ to present a ‘[f]rieze 
effect’.73 This means that A and B will each take an approximately similar duration to 
perform along this single strip of lit path. Since each routine should be timed to achieve 
an approximately similar duration, A’s performance would, according to Beckett’s 
diagram, traverse the first half of the strip and B’s routine would complete at the end of 
the strip. Of course, in a characteristically Beckettian move, before the curtain falls, the 
goad would enter again to suggest to the audience that A and B’s routines will continue 
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interminably. While the narrow strip of light and the actors’ timed, linear and successive 
movements through it represent the quantifiable duration of the external time, the 
closing suggestion effected by the goad that the mime will continue indefinitely points 
to time as a continuum. Markedly, from the audience’s perspective, the subjective durée 
may be experienced by an audience member when she watches A’s ‘slow’ and 
‘awkward’ performance and perceives it to be longer and more tedious than B’s ‘brisk, 
rapid, precise’ performance; that is, even though both routines would take an 
approximately similar amount of quantifiable time to complete, the audience, without 
the aid of a mechanical watch, would qualitatively experience both timings as 
dissimilar. 
Further, it is important to note that the sluggish character A begins his routine 
with a prayer whereas the energetic character B begins each action of his routine by 
consulting his watch. If we agree that the routines are respectively sustained by faith 
and the mechanical time, then the approximately similar amount of time that both 
routines take to be completed by the characters could suggest a similar contrivance 
between a system of faith and a spatialised temporal order of life. Nonetheless, the 
audience member’s subjective experience of both structures, as stated in the previous 
paragraph, by witnessing the juxtaposition of the two routines on Beckett’s stage 
poignantly indicates the existence of an intuitive form of time that eludes clearly 
defined sequencing and timing. David Addyman also points out, ‘Bergson holds that 
action, or movement  is indivisible’ and that to Bergson there is ‘real space and 
spatialized space  conceived as interpenetrating movement, and space conceived as 
simultaneous, quantifiable succession.’74 This corroborates with my interpretation that 
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Beckett’s audience members experience intuitive time as they view the two routines 
because the durée that is intuited is effected by their perception of the characters’ 
contrasting enactments of interpenetrating movements in real space, rather than a 
contrived spatial time that is determined by extraneous systems that order life.   
Indeed, even before Act without Words II, in Waiting for Godot, Didi and 
Gogo’s exchange after Pozzo and Lucky leave them in the first act, already gesture to 
this difference between the quantitative and qualitative experiences of time: 
[Long silence.] 
VLADIMIR  That passed the time. 
ESTRAGON  It would have passed anyway. 
VLADIMIR  Yes, but not so rapidly. 
[Pause.]
75
 
In these three short lines, two conceptions of time emerge. Poignantly, Pozzo and 
Lucky’s antics had offered Didi and Gogo a distraction from their external time and the 
result of this is Didi’s perception that time passed ‘rapidly’ when his attention was 
turned away from it. Gogo’s response that time ‘would have passed anyway’ refers 
directly to the irreversibly successive and sequential external time continuum whereas 
Didi’s response to Gogo’s observation is a reference to time that is experienced 
subjectively, in other words, a durée that is experienced internally. Therefore, in the 
context of this analysis, time, from the outset of Beckett’s plays should not be 
considered as singularly quantitative, but should instead be regarded as quantitatively 
and qualitatively presented to the audience. The contrast between the two concepts of 
time in his plays crucially depends on the audience’s expectation that time is a 
quantifiable and successive continuum, so that this expectation can be disrupted by the 
characters’ incongruent experiences of time despite residing in the same diegetic space. 
Notably, the audience may not necessarily find the words to articulate this dual 
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representation of time, but their experience of temporal uncertainty is testament to the 
disruption of this specific expectation.  
The intuitive Creative Emotion that Bergson postulated as an alternative to the 
instinctive fabulation of systematic and habitual routines deviates from the successive 
external time continuum and constitutes the internal durée.  As I have explained earlier, 
an artistic creation, according to Bergson, will have to come from the reversion to 
‘simple emotion’ as opposed to established systems of reality and specifically a reality 
that is constructed by an existing system of language. To reiterate, the artist will have to 
‘do violence to speech’ and I interpret this ‘violence’ in Beckett’s drama as a revolt 
against established linguistic expressions by creating fragmentary forms of expressions. 
Everyday language is employed in Beckett’s plays but the characters’ fragmented 
stories and reminiscences divert them from a focus on the diegetic present. The 
abstraction of the narrating character from the external timeline by immersing it into the 
creative recesses of its mind can be interpreted as the playwright’s way of boring holes 
into the audience’s habitual expectation of a linguistic narrative that is coherent with the 
successive timeline. Consequently, this effectively subverts the spectator’s instinctive 
compulsion for narrative closure.  
Plays, in general, are no strangers to the soliloquy or the dramatic monologue by 
which a character discloses to the audience, for example, a motive, suspicion, or an 
emotion that is unknown to the rest of the characters (in the case of the soliloquy), and 
sometimes pointedly directed at another character (in the case of the monologue). The 
dramatic monologue, when it is directed at another character, might involve bringing up 
the past by the protagonist that would entail entering the recesses of the mind to retrieve 
that memory. One might be curious if this act of recalling the past is what was earlier 
referred to as an abstraction of the speaking character from an external timeline, but that 
is not an abstraction. Similarly, the soliloquy that reveals the inner thoughts of a 
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character, and may perhaps be a deeper immersion into the recesses of a character’s 
depicted mind since it is directed only at the character itself and may to a certain extent 
be considered a more accurate expression of the character’s inner struggles, is also not 
an abstraction of the speaking character from the timeline. Soliloquies and dramatic 
monologues are generally complicit with the plot of its play’s narrative. The word 
‘complicit’ comes from the Latin complicare, which means to ‘fold together’. These 
dramatic devices fold together with the rest of the dramatic work in order to create a 
coherent whole. Every articulated thought of the past is motivated to build up to a 
climax or a coherent resolution. However, the Beckettian storytelling, which is more 
often than not a likely mix of past and fiction, eschews the clarity and obvious 
coherence that an audience would expect from a dramatic work of art performed by 
speaking actors.  
With reference to Bergson’s understanding that a coherent system of language is 
necessarily pegged to the successive and sequential time, Beckett has ‘done violence to 
speech’ through his characters’ fragmented stories that do not contribute to the 
coherence of each play and do little to drive the ‘plot’ to a climax or resolution. As a 
consequence, I postulate that in the moments when an actor engages with the act of 
telling a story, the character that she or he is presenting can be regarded as abstracted 
from the external timeline that governs the immediate diegetic world, although the 
actor’s body continues to be grounded to the diegesis, as well as the audience’s 
extradiegetic reality.  
Michael David Fox asserts that the audience’s empathy with the Beckettian 
characters is in fact empathy with the actors’ suffering body because this suffering is 
‘staged in the existential reality’ that is shared by both the audience and the actors’ 
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bodies.
76
 Although I would not go as far as Fox to assert that ‘Emotion created through 
the actor’s artifice would get in the way’ of evoking empathy in the audience because I 
aver that ‘carrying out the instructions precisely set forth in the text’ is in itself a 
process of creating an artifice, I would like to extend Fox’s interpretation by specifically 
adding that the actor’s bodily ‘existential reality’ is constituted by the same temporality 
in which the spectators occupy.
77
 Anna McMullan has it that ‘[a]s spectators we are 
reminded of our own situatedness, and yet simultaneously of the strange tricks that 
theatrical perception plays via the faculties of vision and voice, transporting us into 
other worlds and other bodies.’78 As the audience members empathise with the physical 
entrapment of the Beckettian actors in a mound, bin or vat, they are made highly aware 
of the temporal incongruence between the actor’s physical entrapment in an external 
time continuum and the characters’ anachronical stories. I posit that this is because the 
actors who reside in both the diegetic and extradiegetic spaces that are governed by the 
external time continuum are a persistent reminder to the audience members of their 
situatedness in the form of their habitual expectation of a temporally coherent narrative 
structure that can explain the reason for the depicted entrapment. The temporal 
incongruence is perceptible when the anachronical narratives that cannot explain the 
depicted incarcerations thwart the expectation of an easily discernible coherence. 
Further, Fox suggests that Beckett’s theatre does not require ‘the actor’s 
presence to be subsumed into the representation of character’ in order to evoke empathy 
in the audience because ‘the process of negation and cancellation’ in his theatre ensures 
‘that the fictional suffering of his stage figure is existentially present as the real physical 
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and spiritual suffering of the actor’.79 I agree that the Beckettian actors sustain a certain 
level of pain as they present the fictional suffering of the stage figure, but I maintain 
that this physical pain, fictional and real, is perceptibly distinct from the characters’ 
spectral history as the spectator struggles to understand the anachronical stories that 
subvert her habitual expectation of narrative coherence and closure. I have stated earlier 
in the previous section that the stories unreliably offer the audience members a spectral 
mix of hypodiegetic fiction and glimpses of a character’s lived history whereas the 
bodily presentation of physical entrapment onstage anchors them to the perception of 
the character’s bodily present; as such, what is precisely abstracted from the external 
time continuum is the character’s spectral existence as it engages with storytelling, 
which is distinct from the actor’s presentation of the stage figure’s physical entrapment. 
In Endgame, Hamm’s prophetic monologue which I find is worth quoting at 
length is directed at Clov and is a poignant example of how the spectre of a character is 
abstracted from the external time continuum: 
HAMM In my house. [Pause. With prophetic relish.] One day you’ll be 
blind, like me. You’ll be sitting there, a speck in the void, in the 
dark, forever, like me. [Pause.]One day, you’ll say to yourself, 
I’m tired, I’ll sit down and you’ll go and sit down. Then you’ll 
say, I’m hungry, I’ll get up and get something to eat. But you 
won’t get up. You’ll say, I shouldn’t have sat down, but since I 
have I’ll sit on a little longer, then I’ll get up and get something to 
eat. But you won’t get up and you won’t get anything to eat. 
[Pause.] You’ll look at the wall a while, then you’ll say, I’ll close 
my eyes, perhaps have a little sleep, after that I’ll feel better, and 
you’ll close them. And when you open them, there will be no 
wall any more. [Pause.] Infinite emptiness will be all around you, 
all the resurrected dead of all the ages wouldn’t fill it, and there 
you’ll be like a little bit of grit in the middle of the steppe. 
[Pause.] Yes, one day you’ll know what it is, you’ll be like me, 
except that you won’t have anyone with you, because you won’t 
have had pity on anyone and because there won’t be anyone left 
to have pity on.
80
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Here, Hamm is describing a future time in which he no longer has a place, but in his 
‘prophetic’ description he seems to be melding a past experienced by himself with 
Clov’s future experience of bleak solitude that is marked by a descent into catatonic 
paralysis. This intersection of a past in which Hamm had a role and a future in which he 
will be absent occurs in the present in which Hamm is both the subject who has lost his 
place in the past and the subject who will soon lose his place in the prophesied future. 
The melding of the past and future in the present moment of ‘storytelling’ renders 
Hamm outside of the sequential and successive time continuum since the storyteller is 
paying no conscious attention to his existence in the present moment, which is situated 
along the line of the external time continuum; he can be likened to a time-traveller who 
is visiting the past and a ghost haunting a future in which he has no part. Both the time 
traveller and the ghost do not reside in the present because they are characterised by a 
necessary inertia. That is, to be both time traveller and ghost is to possess an inertia that 
excludes one from the successive and sequential forward movement of the external time 
continuum.  
In Footfalls, May’s mother’s monologue about the moment her daughter began 
pacing up and down the ‘strip’ of path is followed by May’s ‘Sequel’ which involves 
the story of Mrs Winter and her daughter Amy.
81
 Although the correspondence between 
May, her mother, Amy and Mrs Winter is ambiguous, what the audience can be certain 
of when May utters the words ‘Will you never have done… revolving it all?’ is that the 
conversation between Mrs Winter and Amy resembles the exchange between May and 
the disembodied voice of her mother.
82
 In the closing lines of Steven Connor’s ‘About 
There or Thereabouts’ at the Catalysis Conference on Space and Time, he states that, 
‘When Billie Whitelaw, playing the part of Amy, asked Beckett if he could explain who 
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she was, and where she was, and in particular, whether she was alive or dead, Beckett 
replied, “let’s just say, you’re not quite there.”’83 Whitelaw played the role of May in 
Footfalls, but Connor is not wrong, whether deliberately or mistakenly, to describe 
Whitelaw as playing the part of Amy. In the ‘Sequel’, all the roles of the characters in 
May’s story were voiced by her and tracing backwards, Voice’s instruction to the 
audience to ‘let us watch [May] move, in silence’ suggests that May’s actions are 
subsumed within Voice’s narration too.84 Indeed, like the Matryoshka doll, Voice is a 
disembodied conduit in which May resides and May is the container in which Amy 
resides. However, unlike the Matryoshka doll, Voice as a ghostly disembodied conduit 
in the play’s diegetic present renders its content, that is May’s physicality, ghostly too. 
A child bore by a ghost can only be a spectre.  
Connor has it that ‘Beckett’s spectral imagery has much in common with the 
spirit-photographs that may have been a familiar part of his childhood’.85 Although 
Connor does not elaborate how Beckett may have been familiar with spirit photography, 
the technique of superimposition is an interesting one with reference to Footfalls. If 
deemed as a fraud, the absence of genuine contact between the subjects in the picture, 
since the image of the client and the image of the deceased are taken from two separate 
pictures, becomes obvious. Both images appear in one present image but the people 
photographed were never really together at the moment when the picture was taken.  
The distance between the living and the deceased loved one in a superimposed 
photograph can be quantitatively measured by the difference between the times each 
picture was taken. Nonetheless, a pocket of imagined time and space outside of the 
external timeline is qualitatively created in this photograph in which the living is able to 
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experience the illusion of a reunion with his or her loved one retrospectively. Indeed, 
even within May’s story, Cohn observed that ‘fictional mother and daughter inhabit 
different worlds or times, for the daughter says that she was absent from evening prayer, 
and yet Mrs. Winter asserts that she heard her “Amen.”'86   
As such, I aver that the abstraction of the characters from the external timeline in 
Footfalls is similar to the superimposed images. The stage is the medium, upon which 
the three imagined subjects from three disparate time-dimensions are superimposed. 
When we consider the disembodied Voice to be the invisible envelopment of May and 
regard May as the ethereal source of the story of Amy, what the audience would see is 
the superimposition of three disparate spectres that are constituted by voices, being 
juxtaposed with the physical body of an actor. Although the actor delivers May’s lines, 
the words leave the body to join the disembodied voices of the spectres that remain 
outside of the actor and the audience’s existential present. Therefore, compared to 
Endgame, the characters in Footfalls may be regarded as an extreme case whereby all 
three characters are depicted as completely inhabiting a dimension that is outside of an 
external timeline; this external timeline that I am referring to is, I repeat, the one that 
governs the audience members and the actor’s extradiegetic reality.  Significantly, the 
concept of a time continuum that is external to one’s subjectivity is effectively extended 
beyond the Beckettian diegetic stage to encapsulate the extradiegetic temporal space in 
which the actor and the audience reside. Perceiving the ‘ghostly’ quality of May is in 
effect intuiting the qualitative durée that lies outside of external time.          
Having established what is meant by the abstraction of a character’s spectre 
from an external time continuum through the actor’s performance of storytelling, the 
Beckettian drama’s challenge to the audience member’s habitual expectation of a 
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linguistic narrative that is coherent with the successive timeline should be apparent at 
this point. However, this is not to suggest that by challenging the audience’s instinctive 
compulsion for order, Beckett successfully subverts the sequential and successive 
mechanical time which, even Bergson reluctantly agrees is a necessity to the social and 
linguistic order in our daily lives. Bergson’s description of the internal durée as a 
qualitative time of multiplicity in which the past, present and future meld together is a 
revolt against the quantitative mechanical time, and Beckett seems to be articulating this 
rebellion in his stage plays as a dogged enterprise, though not necessarily an enduringly 
successful one. What this section has demonstrated, by postulating that the durée is an 
intuitive experience of time that lies outside of the external timeline in the context of 
Beckett’s stage plays, is that regarding Beckettian time as singular is overlooking 
Beckett’s nuanced delineation of time as a tensive relation between a quantitative 
external time and a qualitative internal durée.  
As opposed to Kant’s three laws that govern one system of time, Deleuze, 
following Bergson, suggests three models of time (Habitual, Memorial and Futural) or 
three syntheses by which time may be experienced. These three syntheses of time as 
opposed to Kant’s limiting transcendental laws of time will be elaborated further in 
relation to Bergson’s concepts of multiplicity and the durée in the following section. 
Deleuze’s Futural time will be of particular significance to the context of my analysis 
since it would help elucidate Beckett’s abstractions of his characters from the external 
timeline as potentially creating the effect of temporary respite.    
4.3  RESPITE 
I will briefly relate Deleuze’s three syntheses of time to Kantian and Bergsonian 
time. This will hopefully help pave the way for a better understanding of the possible 
motive behind Beckett’s delineation of the two forms of time in his dramatic works.  
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Firstly, Deleuze’s Habit model points to a cyclical passing of successive instants 
such as the seasonal passing of time in nature. Such a successive movement of time can 
be regarded as governed by a natural law that is external to a subject’s conscious mind. 
According to Deleuze, a subject experiences this habit of cyclical time as passive 
syntheses. A passive synthesis refers to a ‘contraction’ or ‘fusion’ of successive past 
instants into a present expectation of continuity and ‘perpetuation’.87 He adds further 
that habit does not only concern ‘sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), 
but also, before these, the primary habits that ‘we are’; that is, the thousands of passive 
syntheses of which we are organically composed’.88 In other words, Deleuze seems to 
be suggesting that we are composed of a multiplicity of habits by virtue of our 
automatic expectation of continuity.  In one example, Deleuze explains this expectation 
as the automatic anticipation of a ‘tock’ after we hear a ‘tick’.89  
However, Habitual time to Deleuze is only the time of the living present due to 
its nature of rendering the past and the future as contracted dimensions of the present. 
He posits that ‘there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can occur’ 
because the present in the first synthesis of time ‘is a multiplicity of syntheses, of 
stretches or durations. This leaves open the difficulty of how all its stretches are related, 
a problem concerning order of priority and interactions in time’.90 The Memory model 
resembles in form Kant’s conception of time as a straight line and works with the Habit 
model, according to Deleuze, like ‘the alliance of the sky and the ground’.91 Bearing in 
mind his praise for Kant’s conception of time as a straight line as a great ‘reversal’ of 
time from the cyclical time established in classical philosophy, Deleuze seems to be 
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combining the idea of the cyclical expectation of time and Kant’s notion of the 
successive time in his reference to this ‘alliance’ in order to explain the passing away of 
the Habitual present into a second synthesis of time, the Memory. Memorial time is 
Deleuze’s second synthesis of time which, according to James Williams, ‘makes the 
present pass through a process’ that would determine its representation as a ‘pure 
past’.92 Williams goes on to explain that the word ‘pure’ implies an independence from 
‘particular experience of the presents’. 93  In other words, former presents are retained in 
the memory as a general past with the potential to be recreated as many possible 
representations in the future. It is this process of re-creation that brings us to the third 
synthesis of time, the Future.  
The third synthesis of time is defined by Deleuze as successive presents.  Unlike 
Kant’s succession of equal temporal instants, Deleuze’s succession of time is an ‘order 
of time‘ that can be likened to the ‘purely formal distribution of the unequal in the 
function of the caesura’.94  It is a succession of events that do not have a uniformed 
beginning and end. It is an order because we are able to ‘situate any event in relation to 
any other as before or after, not through an external reference to their position on a time 
line, but through reference to the before and after of each cut’ of an event.95 The central 
focus of the third synthesis of time is the creation of the new with the past and the 
present as dimensions of the novel future.  Deleuze offers three examples to explain the 
complex mechanism of the third synthesis of time. With the help of Williams’s guide, 
we will examine one of the three examples here.  
Deleuze suggests that we regard the automatic expectation of continuity of the 
present (Habitual time) as an ‘agent’ and the past (Memorial time) as the ‘condition’ to 
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effect the creation of the new (Futural time).
96
 This means that the present as agent must 
inevitably pass into the condition of the past to become memory and accumulate at a 
level of pure past from which it awaits an opportunity to resurface and contribute to the 
creation of the new in the future. Deleuze concludes that ‘each present’ is thus ‘no more 
than the actualisation or representation of one of these levels’ of pure past and the 
empirical life is ‘the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past’.97 The return of 
these levels of the past is developed from Nietzche’s idea of the Eternal Return and for 
Deleuze, it is defined as the return of difference. As Deleuze puts it, ‘what is produced, 
the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition’ that ‘repudiates the condition 
and the agent’ after it has made use of them and asserts its ‘independence’ as ‘complete 
novelty’.98 
The tension between the Beckettian external time, which I had related to the 
Kantian time continuum earlier in this chapter, and the internal time, which I had related 
to the Bergsonian intuitive durée, resides at the point in which a character ‘retrieves’ the 
pure past from memory and weaves this past into the stories. However, I posit that 
instead of Deleuzean ‘retrievals’, these are depicted as slippages onto the levels of the 
accumulated past and are therefore also moments of a character’s self-abstraction from 
the external timeline. More accurately stated, it can be visualised as a spike in the linear 
external time continuum.  Such a spike suggests that the Beckettian character is not 
completely abstracted from the timeline.  Storytelling is a distraction that attempts to 
induce the effect of the internal durée by allowing a character to momentarily turn its 
attention away from the interminable time that it is trapped in. Each conscious 
emergence from storytelling to the external time is marked by pauses that subtly 
represent an anticipation that at least some of that seemingly never-ending external time 
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has passed. If a significant amount of time is perceived to have passed then an intuitive 
durée has indeed been effected. 
For example, in Rockaby, the long pauses at the end of Voice’s repeated story 
about the arrival of a long awaited end are indicated in Beckett’s stage direction 
‘[Together: echo of ‘time she stopped’, coming to rest of rock, faint fade of light. Long 
pause.]‘.99 Voice, presumably the Woman’s, is interpreted as the internal monologue 
that is composing the story about her wait for and her arrival at the end of her life. By 
portraying the corporeal woman and her voice coming ‘together’ and echoing the line 
‘time she stopped’, Beckett seems to be suggesting that this point of union is the 
moment when the internal mind emerges from within and is exteriorising as speech by 
passing through the Woman’s lips. This emergence from internal story to external 
speech is followed by the Woman’s utterance of ‘More’.100 The word can be regarded as 
an exasperated demand for more stories upon emerging from the internal storytelling 
and noticing that her end has not arrived. The process of degeneration which I 
established in the first section as representative of the external time continuum is, in this 
play, inferred from Beckett’s instruction that the utterance of ‘more’ must become ‘a 
little softer each time’ which suggests that the character is getting weaker.101 Beckett’s 
delineation of his character as consciously drifting in and out of storytelling and the 
external time line demonstrates his character’s active attempt to invoke the intuitive 
durée. Although the engagement with this internal experience of durée is not 
immediately successful since the external time continues to seem interminable, his 
character’s dogged repetition of this process nevertheless generates the effect of a 
temporary respite.  
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Similarly, in Ohio Impromptu, the Listener and the Reader are to be ‘as alike in 
appearance as possible’ and this suggests that the two might be constituents of a single 
character.
102
 As the Reader tells the story of a man who moved to ‘a single room on the 
far bank’ so as to obtain ‘[r]elief he had hoped would flow from unfamiliarity’, he is 
frequently interrupted by the Listener’s knock on the table.103 Following each knock, 
the Reader would repeat the last sentence he had read, and pause. He continues reading 
only after the Listener knocks again. What is of particular significance to the context of 
this analysis is that towards the end of the play, as the Reader closes the book, the 
Listener knocks again, but to no avail.  
The knock, which at first seems to indicate that the Listener is directing the 
Reader’s narration, becomes helpless towards the end of the play as the book is closed. 
The final knock, which can be interpreted as the Listener’s desire for more, is met with 
‘Silence’.104  Following the poignant silence, ‘Simultaneously they lower their right 
hands to table, raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. Expressionless. 
Ten seconds. Fade out.’105 Like the union between Voice and Woman in Rockaby, this 
is the point where the storyteller or Reader returns to the corporeal present or the 
external time line in which he who is the Listener physically resides. The notion that 
relief can hopefully ‘flow from unfamiliarity’ in the story that is being read may be 
perceived as the Listener’s search for solace in the composition of a doubly fictional 
story in an imagined book instead of remaining perpetually conscious of his immediate 
external reality. Although the fictional story in the imagined book may be a partial 
account of a past, its nevertheless fragmentary and possibly fictional parts render it 
incomplete hence ‘unfamiliar’.  
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To understand the idea that the story fragments are ‘unfamiliar’ to the Beckettian 
storyteller, who is portrayed to be ambiguously inventing fiction and embedding past 
experiences in his stories, let us refer to Deleuze’s third synthesis of time. As stated 
above, the complete novel is the repetition of the past that abandons the retrieved past 
after making use of it in order to ‘assert’ itself as an independently ‘complete novelty’. 
The stories that the Beckettian characters tell either to themselves or to other characters 
are often ambiguous in that the audience member does not know which parts of the 
story are invented and which parts are from the character’s past. Regardless of the 
ambiguity, since the past that creates the new is eventually discarded at every moment, 
then the new must at every moment be unfamiliar to the storytelling subject. The very 
act of storytelling therefore may be perceived as a turn to the unfamiliar, which the 
Beckettian character is depicted as hoping would offer some ‘relief’ from the awareness 
of an interminable external time continuum.    
Nevertheless, the stories do not offer the sought after relief, but merely 
temporary respite. Following Deleuze’s concept that the level of the pure past is 
retrieved to assert the new in the future, it seems that the level of the pure past must be 
retrieved from the internal memory and placed onto an immediate future moment. In the 
context of Beckett’s dramatic works, if we liken this immediate future to be lying 
somewhere ahead and along the external time line, then the new is successfully 
generated in the time continuum and permanent relief becomes plausible because every 
moment becomes new, hence every instant is perpetually unfamiliar. However, as I 
have demonstrated with the examples above, the stories do not satisfy the characters’ 
desire for relief from the interminable external time line. What Deleuze’s concept of 
time offers us is only an example of how the new is created from the melding of the past 
and the present in the future. In this analysis, the characters’ ‘retrieval’ of the past is 
instead ‘slippages’ onto the levels of the accumulated past because the self-abstraction 
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from the external timeline does not involve the reintegration of the past with the present 
along the progressing external timeline to generate the new.  
In other words, the level of the pure past does not, for the characters, assimilate 
with the external time as a new moment that extends into the future, and this is why 
every moment of the external time seems like an uneventful repetition. The slip onto the 
level of the pure past is unfamiliar because it is a half-remembered fragment. Deleuze’s 
example of the caesura to explain the unequal cuts before and after each event in a 
successive order of events is a luxury that the Beckettian characters do not seem to 
have.  By applying to the external time line Levy’s idea that Beckettian time is static 
because each moment is the repetition of the same, it is not difficult to see why the 
interminability of external time induces the character’s desire to end their consciousness 
of it. The characters’ internal levels of pure past are fragmentary because they are no 
longer capable of differentiating one moment from the next. This loss of capacity to 
distinguish between events, and the past from fiction may be attributed to mental 
entropy caused by their physical degeneration. Nonetheless, it is precisely this lack of 
clear order in the mind that allows for the melding of a fragmented past with invented 
fiction to create the temporary pocket of unfamiliarity that in turn offers the characters a 
moment of respite from their external reality.  
The hoped for internal experience of the illusion of a ‘sped up’ external time is 
encapsulated by the beginning of each story and the moment of the character’s 
emergence to their external reality. Externally, what the character experiences seems to 
be a successive sequence of the perpetual alternation between hope and disappointment. 
Nevertheless, this relentlessly disappointed hope (and I mean ‘hope’ in its grimmest 
hue) continues to be the Beckettian characters’ persistent preoccupation because only 
the creative imagination, through storytelling, retains what little power a character has 
in its significantly weakened state to provide respite for itself.    
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Roland Barthes asserts that in a creative text ‘language is redistributed’ and that 
‘such redistribution is always achieved by cutting’ from which ‘[t]wo edges are 
created’.106 It is the ‘seam’ between the two edges or the in-between which is ‘the site of 
a loss’ and also where ‘bliss’ may be located.107 To elaborate, the difference between 
the two edges is that one is a non-subversive edge, ‘an obedient, conformist, 
plagiarizing edge (the language is to be copied in its canonical state, as it has been 
established by schooling, good usage, literature, culture)’ and the other is the subversive 
edge ‘mobile, blank (ready to assume any contours), which is never anything but the 
site of its effect: the place where the death of language is glimpsed’.108 Pleasure is 
derived from the seam between the two edges because here is the ‘site of loss’ as well as 
a moment of ‘bliss’.109 Barthes’ original term for ‘bliss’ was jouissance, which connotes 
an orgasmic moment of abandonment. The storytelling Beckettian character, who is 
regarded in the context of this analysis as both the author and audience of their stories, 
invents fragments that are hardly comparable to the novels that Barthes attributed the 
power to generate Pleasure and bliss in the reader. As Graham Fraser also observes, 
‘Little pleasure is available to the inhabitants of Beckett’s texts, let alone Barthesian 
jouissance.’110  
Nonetheless, if we bring Barthes‘s concepts of Pleasure and bliss down a notch 
to ‘Desire’ and ‘respite’ respectively, we will be able to demonstrate how respite is a 
miniature of bliss experienced by Beckett’s storytelling characters. In The Pleasure of 
the Text, Barthes differentiates Pleasure from Desire by stating that the latter is the 
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former’s ‘victorious rival’ insofar as Desire is never satisfied.111 Whereas Pleasure is 
defined as a reader’s relish in the site of loss where the non-subversive and subversive 
edges collide, Desire is defined as arising from a reader’s experience of ‘disappointment 
[and] deflation’ immediately after an ‘[expected] scene occurs’.112 Consequently, the 
‘books of Desire’ would not afford the reader the experience of Pleasure and by 
extension, ‘bliss’.113 Markedly, this disappointment can be seen in the Beckettian 
characters’ persistently disappointed Desire for the end of consciousness, a Desire that 
is thematically reproduced in the fragmented stories as well as in the very act of 
storytelling. The characters cannot experience Pleasure in their fragmented stories 
because the subject of their focus is the ‘[expected] scene’ of arriving at the brink of 
death (which is being perpetually disappointed), and not on relishing in the site of 
collision between the subversive and non-subversive edges of their stories.
114
 With this 
in mind, the Beckettian character’s roles as storyteller and audience can only afford it 
Desire, instead of Pleasure.     
Barthes sought to distinguish between Pleasure and bliss by maintaining that 
‘pleasure can be expressed in words, bliss cannot.’115 His definition of ‘bliss’ as 
‘unspeakable’ is of particular relevance to the Beckettian respite that this section is 
attempting to (perhaps, paradoxically) articulate.
 116
 The abstraction of a character from 
the external time line by turning its consciousness inwards into storytelling cuts the 
character from the play’s exterior diegesis that is governed by the external time 
continuum. The result of this is the creation of a play-within-a-play or an internal 
narrative of Desire for an end of consciousness within an external narrative of 
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interminability. As such, I posit that respite does not merely lie in the internal pocket of 
unfamiliarity that characterises the stories; it more precisely resides at the seam between 
the habit-governed external reality and the internal narrative of Desire.  
In my understanding, the seam is a site of loss from which bliss or jouissance is 
experienced for Barthes because it entails a sense of abandonment or a loss of 
inhibition.  At a much-reduced scale, the seam is the site of loss from which a 
Beckettian storytelling character experiences respite because it entails a momentary 
distraction from the interminability of the external time. In other words, what is lost 
momentarily at this site of loss for the Beckettian storyteller is the consciousness of 
interminability. As established above, their stories often freely give away their Desire 
for an end of consciousness, and their arrivals at the end of these story fragments 
represent subverted Desire. As such, respite is derived from the ‘in-between’ of the 
persistently simulated Desire (during storytelling) and thwarted Desire (at the point of 
emerging from storytelling to the external reality) for an end of consciousness. Like 
‘bliss’, respite lies ‘between the lines’ or at the seam, because the experience of respite 
is an amnesiac abandonment of a character’s knowledge of its desired object’s 
unattainability.
117
   
For the audience, however, the Beckettian characters’ fragmented stories do not 
offer respite, only the potential of respite. I postulate that although the audience member 
experiences both depictions of qualitative and quantitative time in Beckett’s stage play, 
their focus on finding a coherent narrative may hinder a lucid retention of the dual 
representations of time they had just witnessed. Significantly, the audience’s hoped for 
respite in terms of their expectation of some sort of narrative closure is different from 
the characters’ in that the characters’ respite is an abandonment of knowledge, whereas 
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the audience’s is an expectation of knowledge. The audience member is resident in the 
external time line insofar as she is external to the character’s internal turn to 
storytelling.  More specifically her compulsion to seek out a narrative coherence from 
the outset of each Beckettian play and/or in the story fragments invented by the 
characters renders her an unrelenting subject of the stratified Organism.  
Andrew Gibson offers a compelling perspective on the audience’s expectation of 
knowledge.
118
 His terms ‘pathos of intermittency’ is directed at Beckett’s focus on 
dramatizing the wait for the event. As the title of Gibson’s work suggests, the ‘event’ he 
is referring to is Alain Badiou’s rare event. The event promises a ‘truth’ in Beckett 
drama, but it rarely, if not never arrives and Gibson views Waiting for Godot as the 
epitome of the ‘big non-event’.119 The ‘intermittent’ thus refers to Beckett’s 
dramatization of and interest in the ‘in-between’ instead of the event that rarely occurs. 
As Gibson puts it, ‘Beckett the dramatist does not think the event in relation to truth or 
truths. He thinks the possibility of the event from the side of its relation to the 
remainder. In this respect, his art remains sedulously, painstakingly liminal.’120  The 
‘remainder’ is the déchet or waste matter that is anything apart from the event and ‘the 
pathos of intermittency is generated in the gap between events and their remainder.’121  
He adds further that Beckett’s ‘pathos of intermittency, the melancholy of a world 
without truth . . . can precede the event’ and that what the ‘problem-creating rather than 
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problem solving’ dramatist conveys in his oeuvre is ‘a sense of what the common 
experience of that world must be as an experience of the remainder’.122  
If we agree with Gibson that Beckett’s plays are indeed dramatizations of the 
abject remainder, then the unfamiliarity of the Beckettian landscape to the modern 
audience is testament to their familiarity with ‘a culture in which jouissance had 
become an imperative, a culture obsessed (but also obscurely tormented) by a dream of 
plenitude, the illusion of being able to square the circle and have it all. Its will to 
completion would be the reverse of the ‘waiting subject’s will’.123 The jouissance that is 
referred to here is ‘the limitless satisfaction of need’ by subscribing to a systematic 
‘economy of jouissance’ that promises ‘unlimited access “to the goods of the 
world”’.124 Such a system that might exist in the world outside of Beckett drama is also 
a world that the audience might reside in. It is worth noting that Gibson’s focus is 
ultimately on establishing Beckett the artist’s portrayal of the pathos of intermittency 
therefore it sheds little light on how an audience member might experience this pathos. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine this sensibility as transposable to the spectator. 
The ‘will to completion’ in the quotation above is especially relevant to the audience’s 
experience of pathos reconstitution, which I will now elaborate further in the following 
final paragraphs.  
In the depictions of the characters’ ultimately futile obsession with invoking the 
intuitive durée through anachronical storytelling, the audience member’s expectation of 
a coherent narrative that coincides with the experience of a successive time continuum 
is firmly thwarted at every turn. As the characters’ attempts to invoke the durée are 
pulled to the forefront of the audience member’s consciousness, her expectation of each 
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play’s dramatic narrative to be systematically coherent is disappointed. The intuitive 
durée, an in-between experience, is described as being pulled to the forefront of an 
audience member’s consciousness while she is viewing Beckett’s stage play, because on 
a regular day its potential for inducing the experiential leaps through time is often 
casually dismissed as a lapse of concentration. For example, the drive from home to the 
university usually takes thirty minutes, but an engaging conversation with a companion 
might take one’s mind off the journey and render the drive to feel like a ten-minute 
journey. This intuitive experience of time as duration instead of successive moments is 
often written off as merely the result of being distracted and the mundane task of 
travelling to work from point A to point B quickly resumes its place within the 
clockwork of the organised time continuum.  
However, set against the background of the barren Beckettian landscape, the 
playwright presents what the audience member would deem as mundane tasks in the 
form of his characters’ grimly repetitive routines.  These routines and habits are 
rendered unfamiliar to the audience because the characters are portrayed as wretchedly 
performing these tasks despite desiring an end to it all. Subjective time and an organised 
time are effectively portrayed as clashing in this contradiction between an incarcerating 
obligation to habit and the desire to escape it. Further, whereas unfamiliarity through 
story-telling is the source of respite for the characters, the unfamiliarity of the 
anachronical stories in addition to the depicted wretchedness that is associated with the 
characters’ entrapment in their habitual routines are sources of destabilization for the 
audience. In a destabilised state, the audience member may experience Beckett’s dual 
depiction of time in terms of temporal uncertainty. More significantly, this 
destabilization, which at first entails pity for the Beckettian characters’ grim 
predicament, may also result in an audience member’s reconstituted pathos for her 
entrapment as a subject that is bound to the stratified Organism.    
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In other words, reconstituted pathos in this context refers to the spectator’s shift 
of focus from actor to character to self at the end of each play when she wonders, in 
addition to experiencing temporal uncertainty in the play, if narrative closure is 
deliberately withheld from her by the playwright or that she had not been able to 
appreciate the play adequately. The anxiety of not knowing could be translated into a 
sense of inadequacy. The trajectory of the audience member’s pathos can thus be 
interpreted as shifting from stage to self, from destabilizing pity for the seemingly 
pointless suffering of an actor who is presenting the predicament of a character that is 
unavailingly waiting for a death that does not come, to self-pity.  
‘Self-pity’ is employed here not as a banally self-absorbed sorrow over one’s 
personal troubles but in terms of the spectator’s disappointment in failing to recognise a 
familiar pattern of coherence in the drama. As a spectator watches a Beckettian play, 
she experiences an obstruction to the ‘will to complete’ or compulsion for coherence 
and closure. It is worth noting that there is nothing immensely transformative that 
results from this obstacle. Reconstitution in this context is not a transformative 
restructuring of the spectator from not knowing to knowing, but resumption from a 
destabilized state back to an organised state when the lights in the theatre are turned 
back on. Nevertheless, the perplexed spectator’s reconstituted state as an organised 
subject is resumption with a difference. As she steps out of the theatre to resume her 
place in the Organism, the irrevocable loss of assumption that all phenomenological 
experiences must follow an organised coherence, is precisely the trace difference that a 
reconstituted pathos has left her.  
To conclude this chapter, Time may be regarded as having two forms in 
Beckett’s stage plays: an external time continuum and an internal durée. The Beckettian 
characters’ delineated attempt to invoke the internal durée through storytelling in order 
that it may ‘speed’ them towards experiencing their end of consciousness entails a 
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temporary self-abstraction from the incarcerating sequential external time line that 
extends interminably. The endeavour is almost always unsuccessful, but the resulting 
moment of respite from their grim predicament is, what I posit to be, the main 
motivation that induces them to ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ and feel better, at 
least for a short while.
125
  
Although the audience might experience the dual depiction of time, she might 
not be able to articulate it, since her compulsion for narrative closure and coherence 
would prevent her from clearly recognising that the temporal uncertainty that is induced 
in her by Beckett’s stage plays is the resulting effect of this depiction. Consequently, 
caught up in this unsatisfied compulsion for completion, she is barred from respite for 
the length of each play. However, as the audience member leaves the theatre, the 
exposure to such a destabilising experience might leave her with an inkling of her 
possible bondage to a stratified organism that resembles the one that the characters are 
portrayed in the Beckettian world as being bound to.  
In the next chapter, I continue to examine the destabilising spectatorial 
experience of Beckett’s works by translating the television viewer’s inclination to 
disengage from his television plays as the effect of intuiting an inexplicably familiar 
sense of loss. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE DISENGAGING BECKETTIAN TELEVISION AUDIENCE AND THE 
MONUMENT TO LOSS 
 
This chapter explores how Beckett’s television plays erect a monument to loss by leading 
the ‘disengaging spectator’ to experience a forgotten ‘familiarity’ as she gradually gives up 
trying to find an easily discernible ‘point’ in his plays. A number of Beckett scholars such as 
Linda Ben-Zvi and Jonathan Bignell have attributed the pedagogical effect and value of 
provoking new way(s) of seeing to Beckett’s teleplays. The inclusion of his works by public 
service broadcasters such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Raidió 
Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) in arts channels that positioned themselves as providers of 
educational programming might have influenced such an attribution to his teleplays. 
However, his teleplays’ propensity to induce a non-specialised audience member to feel 
inclined to disengage herself from his work as she is viewing each play is often only 
cursorily acknowledged and insufficiently explored. I posit that this spectatorial inclination 
to disengage could potentially render the teleplays’ assumedly educational function to raise 
the cultural standards of the general audience untenable.   
Instead of understanding such an audience as unable or unwilling to appreciate 
Beckett’s works, I attempt to examine the often-overlooked negative reception of Beckett’s 
teleplays by suggesting that the viewer’s desire to disengage (physically and/or 
intellectually) could be an intuitive response to the plays’ evocation of a forgotten, and 
therefore, seemingly subject-less sense of loss. 
With reference to historical events and studies that have been conducted on the 
television viewing experiences of the British public between the mid-twentieth century to 
the start of the twenty-first century, I hope to demonstrate in the first section of this chapter, 
how an average anglophone television viewer’s expectation to be entertained and/or 
informed as she turned on the television might have been subverted by the minimal mise-en-
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scène and lack of a clear plot in the television plays Eh Joe, Ghost Trio, Quad I + II and 
…but the clouds…. I postulate that as a result of these disappointed expectations, an 
uncomfortable uncertainty was evoked within the viewer, which can be translated into an 
experiential sense of loss.  
Following this trajectory, in the second section, I posit that Beckett’s television plays 
subscribe to an aesthetic of loss, and I explore how this aesthetic of loss could potentially 
remind the audiences of their mass amnesia.  Finally, the last section extrapolates from Tim 
Aspinall’s opinion, ‘All I know is that Beckett writes straight from the heart and the 
stomach. I don’t think you have to understand him intellectually’, to assert that the 
disengaging home viewer, despite her exasperation at not being able to understand the 
teleplays, was and still is the artist’s unsuspecting corroborator in the establishment of a 
monument to loss.
1
  
5.1 THE DISENGAGING BECKETTIAN AUDIENCE 
By the time Beckett’s Eh Joe? was broadcast on BBC2 in 1966, the stageplay 
Waiting for Godot was already an international success and had itself been adapted into a 
television play. This, the first example of a television broadcast of a Beckett work, had been 
part of New York’s WNTA-TV ‘Play of the Week’ project in the United States of America 
on 13 April 1961. Directed by Alan Schneider and performed by Burgess Meredith, Zero 
Mostel, Kurt Kasznar and Alvin Epstein, the Waiting for Godot teleplay was introduced by 
Barney Rosset, who was the president of Grove Press and the U. S. publisher of Beckett’s 
works. The way that Rosset introduced the play is significant in that he clearly had in mind a 
television audience who were unfamiliar with Beckett’s works. Stating that the play ‘has 
become a classic of the modern theatre’ and that it was being staged internationally in ‘most 
of the great cities of the world’, Rosset was not only informing, but also emphasising the 
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fact that Beckett was widely acknowledged ‘as one of the great writers of our times’.2 
Asserting further that ‘there has been almost as many interpretations of Godot as there have 
been members of the audience’, Rosset explained to the home viewer that ‘Samuel Beckett 
himself calls his play a tragic-comedy and leaves it at that’.3 He continued, ‘Perhaps Waiting 
for Godot, despite its seeming simplicity leads to a very personal experience for each of us. 
It depicts the human situation and its universal qualities reveal some of the elements both 
tragic and certainly comic of what life is all about’.4 From Rosset’s introduction, it is not 
difficult to notice a tensive awareness that the programme was going to reach out to mass 
audiences that were far more diverse than theatre audiences. His introduction sounds almost 
like a pre-emptive measure against the home viewers’ potential mental ‘walkout’, 
reminiscent of the physical walkout of the 1956 American premiere of Waiting for Godot, 
also directed by Schneider.  
In fact, prior to the underappreciated American production in 1956, during the course 
of each of the 1955 London performances directed by Peter Hall at the Arts Theatre 
‘approximately half the audience walk out, shouting abusively’, according to Vivyan 
Ellacott.
5
 Ellacott reports that  
The trigger point at each performance comes when, after a very long pause, 
one of the characters onstage says ‘I’m bored’. Each night this line elicits 
strong reaction from the audiences. It usually takes just one angered patron to 
shout back ‘So am I’ to start a series of catcalls, hisses, protests, walk-outs 
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and scenes not witnessed in British theatre since the wilder days of the 18
th
 
Century.
6
 
The negative reaction, which Beckett’s play provoked in his early audiences, has certainly 
receded over the past few decades, following an increasing familiarity and better 
understanding of his modus operandi through the rise of Beckett scholarship and more 
importantly the spread of Godot performances around the globe. Nonetheless, even with the 
knowledge that Beckett was an acclaimed writer of novels and drama and was awarded The 
Nobel Prize in Literature in 1969, there are still members of the audience who do not 
appreciate his television works due largely to the perceived lack of easily discernible plots 
and narrative threads in the teleplays.  
 As Bignell also observes, ‘From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, Beckett’s work 
was frankly disastrous in terms of the audience ratings, competitive audience share, or 
retention of the audience across an evening’s broadcasting.’7 In Colin Gardner’s Beckett, 
Deleuze and the Televisual Event: Peephole Art, he suggests that the reason behind the 
negative reception of Beckett’s television works could be their stark resistance to ‘audience 
desire for character development, conventional plot and, well, drama.’8 By ‘conventional’ 
drama, Gardner may be referring to realist drama. The presence of realism as a contrast to 
the playwright’s works has been contentiously asserted and refuted in Beckett criticism. 
Whereas Beckett scholars Jan Kott and Richard N. Coe argued persuasively that Beckett 
was a realist, critics like Theodor Adorno and Julie Campbell begged to differ.
9
 If Beckett 
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was indeed a realist, he was an unconventional one, and it is almost certainly because of this 
unconventionality, which led some viewers to perceive his works as inaccessible.  
In this section, I explore the extent to which the expectations of an average television 
audience of the 1960s and 1970s were ‘realist’, so as to demonstrate how these home 
viewers’ expectations were subverted by Beckett’s teleplays, and how this could have 
concurrently evoked in them an uncomfortable uncertainty that can be translated into an 
experiential sense of loss.   
Members of an audience are not a group of undifferentiated and passive people, 
therefore there is no easy answer to the questions, ‘What is an audience?’ or ‘Who were 
Beckett’s audiences?’ Nonetheless, the fact that Beckett’s Not I, Ghost Trio and …but the 
clouds… were broadcast on ‘a specifically elitist, arts-oriented context on BBC 2’ as part of 
the ‘Lively Arts Series’ in Britain on 17 April 1977, suggests to me that its target audience 
could be people who were already familiar with the hermeneutic requirement of the 
channel’s programmes.10 An ideal audience would therefore be, in that context, a home 
viewer who was expecting thought-provoking televisual content and who, armed with a few 
ideas of what questions a work of art might ask, was prepared to engage with the teleplays 
on an intellectual level. Thus, such an ‘ideal’ audience of a Beckettian teleplay is also 
referred to in this chapter as the engaged audience.  This does not then mean that the 
disengaging viewer whom I am specifically examining in this chapter was not ideal and did 
not possess the intellectual curiosity to engage with Beckett’s teleplays. Logically, by virtue 
of tuning to this channel at a specific time to catch the teleplay the home viewer was likely 
to be more or less prepared to intellectually interrogate a work of art presented by the 
programme. Nonetheless, the unfavourable ratings his teleplays received indicate that there 
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is something about Beckett’s works, which seems to have turned some of these viewers’ 
curiosity into frustration.  
Bignell has established that whereas some viewers found the ambiguity of his 
teleplays fascinating, others became unpleasantly agitated and inclined to disengage from 
their viewing experiences. I would like to examine this agitated desire to disengage from 
Beckett’s teleplays as possibly caused by an acute empathy with the characters. Examining 
the concept of empathy in relation to a disengaging audience’s negative reception of 
Beckett’s works is important, in my opinion, because it might help to wrestle his television 
drama from assumptions that they seem only to have an effect on the intellectually engaged.  
In sum, what I hope to achieve by the end of this chapter is a demonstration of how 
Beckett’s television works seem to be aimed at evoking a shared intuition of loss between 
the audience and his characters rather than at solely provoking intellectual engagements.     
How might an audience empathise with Beckettian characters that reside in a 
diegetic world so starkly different from the accustomed realism that was employed in most 
television productions in the mid-twentieth century? We could begin to answer this question 
by first looking at the domination of realism on television from the late 1950s to the 1970s.  
Britain’s ITV appealed to popular preference for realism through the production of 
pre-digested news programmes, television series such as the soap opera Coronation Street 
which has been airing since 1960, as well as teleplays such as those collected in the hugely 
popular anthology series Armchair Theatre, which was broadcast between 1956 and 1974.  
Renée Dickason points out that ‘[b]y the early 1960s, television fictions were dealing with 
the lives and discontents of ordinary people by producing programmes which were examples 
of what Mal Young may have called British realism but which others, with varying degrees 
of sympathy for the classes represented and the mode of depiction, were inclined to dub 
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kitchen sink or social realism.’11  The soap opera genre in particular exemplifies the popular 
form of realism.  
As Andrea Millwood Hargrave and Lucy Gatfield put it, ‘The genre stands out from 
other television programme types as one in which the audience invests both time and 
involvement, building relationships with characters over time.’12 The result, as Nick Perry 
has it, is that ‘through watching a particular soap opera over time […] the notion of a soap 
community comes to be constructed and the audience becomes implicated in it.’13 The more 
the audience is familiar with the characters and their portrayed struggles, the easier it seems 
to retain the viewer’s interest in the programme for the duration of its run. Dorothy Hobson 
defines the soap opera as creating ‘the illusion that the characters and the location exist and 
continue whether the viewers are there or not. They invite their viewers to drop in and see 
the characters and share their lives, but the illusion depends on the credibility that life goes 
on, even when the viewers are not watching.’14 To maintain this credible realism, soap 
operas encourage a sense of familiarity in the viewer through props, costumes, the portrayal 
of characters discussing current affairs and their generally recognizable attitudes to issues 
that are more often than not scripted to mirror those that are prevalent in contemporary 
British life.
15
 The soap opera therefore becomes an illusory extension of the viewer’s 
immediate reality (hereafter, the immediate reality is also referred to as the extradiegetic 
world) and the television screen effectively becomes a window that opens to that extended 
‘reality’ at a specific time of the day. 
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Further, television realism was also taking the form of the one-act drama during this 
period of time. According to Dickason, ‘[u]nder the direction of Canadian Sydney Newman, 
ITV’S  Armchair Theatre (1956-68) moved away from productions of established classic 
plays towards contemporary and socially relevant works written specifically for 
television’.16 This impetus to engage with the realities of contemporary society was not 
overlooked when Harold Pinter’s A Night Out (1960) was included in the anthology series.  
The realistic sets and portrayal of the relationship between a working class man and his 
dependent and controlling mother are deemed ‘[a]n exception’ from Pinter’s dramatic output 
by Ronald Knowles because in this play the motivations of characters are ‘generally 
unambiguous’ and to Knowles, the play’s success could be attributed to ‘its adherence to 
“kitchen sink” realism’ which appealed to a general audience.17 Indeed, as a measure of its 
appeal, it is worth highlighting that the play, directed by Philip Saville in 1960, ‘was viewed 
by an audience of 6.4 million, a record for a single television drama and, as the author 
admitted, considerably more than ever saw a Pinter play in a theatre.’18  
Jeremy Sandford’s Cathy Come Home, directed by Ken Loach as part of The 
Wednesday Play series and first broadcast in 1966 on BBC1, is a cross between realist 
drama and documentary. Also initiated by Sydney Newman, the then head of drama, and 
BBC director of television Kenneth Adam, The Wednesday Play developed into a series that 
‘was soon tackling contentious issues head-on, from apartheid and racial prejudice (Fable, 
tx. 27/1/1965), to homosexuality (Horror of Darkness, tx. 10/3/1965) and capital 
punishment (3 Clear Sundays, tx. 7/4/1965)’.19 Cathy Come Home follows the grim life of 
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the titular character Cathy to broach pressing issues of unemployment, overcrowding, 
homelessness and the inadequacies of social services. The teleplay’s discouragement of the 
view that homeless people are lazy and lesser citizens of the country suggests its attempt to 
influence public opinion, and this renders it consciously engaged with the social realities of 
that time.   
Therefore, Pinter and Sandford’s plays were very likely chosen to be shown on 
ITV’s Armchair Theatre and BBC1 respectively in 1960 and 1966 because of the 
abovementioned allusions to elements of realities that affected or could potentially affect the 
audience. The working class protagonist of Pinter’s A Night Out would appeal to the 
working class audience members who made up the majority of those who were tuned to ITV 
on nights when Armchair Theatre was televised, and the downward spiralling plight of 
Cathy from a hopeful working class young woman to a homeless victim of a severely flawed 
social system in Sandford’s Cathy Come Home not only articulated but also brought the 
social issues of the 1960s to the forefront of the audiences’ consciousness.  
In 1938, Bertolt Brecht intimated that the terms ‘popular’ and ‘realism’ are 
inextricable from each other because ‘“Popular” means intelligible to the broad masses’ and 
realism in literature refers to the representation of life as it is known by the masses.
20
 Brecht 
went further to suggest that this however, does not mean that there are ‘realist’ models from 
which one can emulate in order to create a realist work. Brecht asserted that  
One cannot decide if a work is realist or not by finding out whether it 
resembles existing, reputedly realist works which must be counted realist for 
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their time. In each individual case the picture given of life must be compared, 
not with another picture, but with the actual life portrayed.
21
  
Although Brecht defined the concepts of ‘popular’ and ‘realism’ in the milieu of the 
interwar years, post-war British television’s appeal to the working class majority through 
depictions of life as it was known to these audiences evidently situated the spectatorial 
preferences in the mid-twentieth century in the kind of popular realism defined by Brecht, 
that is, comparable with ‘the actual life’. Indeed, from the late 1950s, this specific Brechtian 
influence on British theatre and television drama seemed to be quite significant. Martin 
Esslin pointed out the possibility that ‘future historians of English drama will describe the 
period since 1956 as an era of Brechtian influence’.22 This was the year when The Berliner 
Ensemble first visited London to perform Mother Courage. It is noteworthy that during this 
period of time many established playwrights such as the highly politically engaged Peter 
Shaffer and John Arden were crossing between theatre and television.  
  ‘A realist work’ may therefore be understood in this chapter as that which the home 
viewers can relate to as they compare ‘the picture given of life’ with ‘the actual life 
portrayed’. A realistic representation does not have to be formulaically realistic to appeal to 
the audience’s preference for the ‘familiar’. Fundamentally, a work of realism needs to 
possess a distinct political, social and/or cultural relevance to its audience in order to induce 
and sustain spectatorial engagement. 
As such, it is not difficult to see how Beckett’s television plays inadvertently elicited 
in some viewers the desire to disengage from his works. Unlike the forms of television 
realism discussed above, there is an absence in Beckett’s teleplays of an overt effort at 
creating the illusion of being a representation of the home-viewers’ reality, or of any marked 
interest in the headline events that were transpiring in the viewers’ daily lives. To take as an 
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example, Ghost Trio, which was televised on BBC 2’s Lively Arts programme as a 
collection of three plays entitled Shades on 17 April 1977, opens with a voiceover 
instructing the viewer to ‘Look’ and regard the bare room as ‘The familiar chamber.’23 The 
incongruity here is that the minimalist set would be a stark contrast to an actual living room 
in which the audience would likely be sitting as the play was being broadcast. Ben-Zvi 
observes the voiceover that instructs the viewer to notice the rectangular form of the wall, 
floor and door as reflexively drawing the audience’s attention to the rectangularity of the 
television screen. She adds further that by pointing out to the audience that the rectangular 
frames of these prosaic objects were similar to that of the television, Beckett was creating a 
‘world within world [that was] ever expanding – or receding’.24 Here, the television is 
likened by Ben-Zvi to a window that opens into another world, be it an external or internal 
one.  
By instructing the viewer to compare the objects of the diegetic world with those of 
their immediate reality, Beckett’s play is teaching ‘the viewer how to see’ and his work, to 
Ben-Zvi, is essentially ‘about the act of seeing’.25 To prevent a reductive understanding of 
this inferred pedagogical function, Bignell is careful to highlight that what Beckett’s 
television plays offer to the audience as pedagogy is a space that is open to interpretative 
possibilities.
26
 Nonetheless, Ben-Zvi maintains that Beckett’s media plays are intended to 
‘reveal’ to the audience the ‘fractures and fissures’ of ‘the whole’.27 She asserts that ‘media 
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(film and television) are stripped down as far as possible to reveal the nature of the medium 
and to show what it doesn’t do: provide clarity and wholeness to “the mess” of life or the 
world of the self’.28  
As opposed to the more familiar forms of realist drama examined above, which 
primary objective seems to be to draw the audience into engaging with the extended or 
represented ‘reality’ through the depiction of elements that are familiar or relevant to the 
viewer, implicit in Beckett’s ‘instructive’ television plays, in the light of Ben-Zvi’s 
perspective, is that television audiences need to be made aware of the medium as a site of an 
illusory reality constructed by camera positions, sound and lighting effects. In other words, 
Ben-Zvi is suggesting that Beckett’s plays are aimed at revealing the diegetic reality as a 
constructed illusion to a generally unsuspecting audience. Bignell also points out that ‘the 
group most often thought to need this kind of awareness of medium is the child audience’, 
and referencing 1960s television pedagogy, he draws a connection between Beckett’s 
television plays and ‘the Modernist pedagogical aims to expand the audiences’ intellectual 
horizons with a paedocratic discourse that valued childhood and childlikeness as a mode of 
liberated perception’.29 He suggests that BBC’s scheduling of Beckett’s drama ‘in arts 
programming slots’ in the 1970s gave Beckett’s works a further ‘pedogogic relation to its 
audience.’30  
In this context, contrary to the more familiar realism between the late 1950s and 
1970s which mirrored or overtly reflected contemporary life, I infer from Ben-Zvi and 
Bignell’s views that Beckett’s television plays seem starkly indifferent to the necessity of 
pandering to the audience’s partiality to an onscreen illusion that was consistent with her 
immediate reality because, to teach new ways of seeing meant that his works were not 
intended to mirror what the audience already knew or expected to know. The vital question 
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to ask at this point would be, would a viewer, without prior knowledge of Beckett’s 
supposed Modernist pedagogical leanings, be able to perceive Beckett’s purported intention 
to expose the medium’s nature of ‘fractures and fissures’ as she watched the teleplays? 
Denis McQuail’s work on ‘Uses and Gratifications’ Theory, which began in 1969 and 
continues to be influential in media studies today, may be useful in answering this question. 
In general, when one turns on the television, one expects to be entertained and/or 
informed. In fact, according to McQuail, researches in ‘Uses and Gratifications’ Theory 
suggest that media usage can be compiled into a non-exhaustive list of ‘Media gratifications 
sought and obtained’. For example, media may be employed for (a) ‘Information and 
education’, (b) ‘Identity formation and confirmation’, (c) ‘Social integration’ and (d) 
‘Entertainment’.31 Briefly, according to McQuail, (a) information is sought not only to 
satisfy one’s curiosity and interest, but it also provides a sense of security as the audience 
becomes aware of events that are relevant to the world in which she inhabits.
32
 In terms of 
(b) personal identity, the audience may attempt to gain insight into herself or reinforce 
personal values and beliefs by comparing models of behaviour between her and the people 
or characters presented in the media.
33
 By (c) ‘social integration’ McQuail is referring to 
media’s provision of common topics from which conversations can be started and enable 
one to build relationships based on such social interactions.
34
 In addition, it could also 
highlight acceptable cultural and social norms that would aid the viewer in developing 
appropriate social behaviours.
35
 Lastly, audiences who seek (d) entertainment might use 
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media to attain emotional release, to achieve sexual arousal, or as a way to escape the 
immediate experience of his reality and particularly its associated stressors.
36
  
Although a significant number of viewers would perceive the entertainment value of 
Beckett’s teleplays in its enigmatic appeal, it is quite likely that there would also be viewers 
who found it difficult to appreciate his works simply because the familiar gratifications that 
they were seeking in a television programme could not be immediately obtained from 
Beckett’s television plays. Such perceived lack of appreciation in or intellectual engagement 
with Beckett’s drama is usually cited as just another instance of negative reception that 
implies spectatorial inattentiveness in his early audience and consequently disengaged from 
further examination. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that viewers who were 
instinctively frustrated by their inability to comprehend his works might in fact be 
experiencing the same sense of loss as his more engaged audiences.     
To state plainly, with reference to the spectator’s expectations of the uses of media 
listed above, the rectangularity of the television’s frame pointed out by Ben-Zvi, would be 
of little interest to some viewers and drawing their attention to its form as in Ghost Trio 
would gratify neither their expectation to be entertained nor their desire to be informed. 
Nonetheless, I am not discounting the possibility that this observation might subsequently 
help in a spectator’s social integration: in that it might make for an entertaining conversation 
topic as the viewer attempts to move on from her initial frustration with the teleplay’s 
seeming incomprehensibility to try to figure out the significance of the images presented 
onscreen with her fellow viewers and from there gain further understanding on what the 
teleplay could be suggesting, or that the perceived ‘bizarreness’ of the teleplay could 
become a basis from which a group of viewers establish solidarity in their shared 
disapproval of the work. However, it is noteworthy that these would only occur after the 
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immediate discomfort evoked by the plays and would therefore remain a potentiality that 
might occur after the viewers’ initial expectations are disappointed. What this chapter is 
interested in is that moment of spectatorial discomfort that follows immediately after the 
audience’s general expectations of the teleplays are disappointed. 
For an instance of audience discomfort, we return to the opening instructive voice in 
Ghost Trio. Broadcast in 1977, Voice’s address, performed by Billie Whitelaw, to the 
television audience directly might seem interesting to the viewer at first, but almost 
immediately after the voice’s first few instructions, the audience would experience a sense 
of uncertainty even though the voice had indeed ‘[stated] the obvious’ and the screen had, to 
a large extent, ‘followed’ Voice’s instructions to present the ‘obvious’.37 To demonstrate 
this, close-ups immediately followed Voice’s verbal gestures to the floor, wall and door. The 
audience would notice that Voice’s directions were initially met with the images and 
movements without a hitch, but would still feel that something was amiss because of the 
sequence’s blatant lack of subtlety. F’s fruitless wait for a mystery woman simply referred to 
by Voice as ‘her’ would have exacerbated this sense of uncertainty.  
At first, the act of waiting would seem to be in itself an unquestionable signifier of 
Voice’s prescience that the mystery woman would not show. This foreknowledge could be 
inferred from Voice’s anticipatory line to the viewer, ‘He will now think he hears her’.38 It 
indicated that Voice already knew that F had not heard ‘her’ and what swiftly followed was 
F, played by Ronald Pickup, checking the door and finding no one.
39
 The words and the 
images were initially logically consistent in suggesting Voice’s prescience, but when F 
defied Voice’s anticipation that he would go to the pallet, by looking at himself in the mirror 
instead, Voice’s unsettlingly protracted and questioning ‘Ahhhh?’ which lasted about three 
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seconds would have indicated to the audience that she had not known everything 
beforehand; instead, she had merely been anticipating F’s actions. This moment defied 
Voice’s expectation that F would react according to her predictions and it also would have 
subverted the audiences’ expectation that Voice was their authoritative guide in this piece of 
work. In addition, this significant point in the teleplay would have effectively invoked in the 
audience an impression of unpredictability that would lead her even further away from her 
overall expectation of the medium as a direct source from which the various forms of 
gratifications, as listed above, could be obtained. 
The sense of unease inspired by Beckett’s teleplays endures even in the stage plays 
that were adapted for television and this is evident in their incomplete broadcast in 2001. 
Aleks Sierz observes that, ‘After hailing the project as a unique record of the work of a 
twentieth-century genius, Channel 4 belatedly realized that despite the hype, Beckett’s work 
is not a ratings grabber, and the project was quietly dropped.’40 As a result, only six films 
were televised between March to April 2001 instead of the nineteen that are collected in 
Beckett on Film.
41
  Sierz infers from this that Channel 4’s solution to ‘the tension between 
the widely perceived “difficulty” of Beckett’s work and his fame as a cultural icon’ was to 
‘[abdicate] responsibility to the needs of the market’.42 I understand this to mean that 
audience preference ultimately took precedence over public service broadcasting’s 
obligation to introduce the home-viewer to the works of a ‘twentieth-century genius’.  
Further, Bignell reports that when Channel 4 broadcast the television adaptations of 
Beckett’s theatre plays in 2001, commercials were inserted between the two acts of Happy 
Days and Waiting for Godot.
43
 In the modern age of consumer culture, it is conceivable that 
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the viewer might have felt a sense of relief as she was jolted back to a familiar extradiegesis 
when she viewed the advertisements that were inserted between Beckett’s television plays. 
Also, consider how the shorter plays might blip from one advertisement to another or be 
followed by mainstream television programmes with the flick of a button by the viewer. The 
contrast between the Beckettian landscape and what the regular television viewer was 
familiar with would have been stark and this in turn would have contributed further to the 
sense of unease, which Beckett’s works already evoked. 
Returning to the mid-twentieth century, as indicated in the Radio Times BBC 2 TV 
schedule of 4 July 1966, Eh Joe? was televised at 10.20pm between the documentary 
Leviathan: The story of the giant steamship ‘The Great Eastern’ at 9.50pm and Newsroom at 
10.40pm.
 44
 These programmes were essentially reality rooted in the audience’s immediate 
present. Shades: Three Plays by Samuel Beckett in The Lively Arts series, according to the 
Radio Times BBC 2 TV schedule of 17 April 1977, was broadcast at 9.00pm between News 
on 2: Weather and the feature film Medium Cool at 10.00pm, which was promoted as a 
‘fictional story’ based on the ‘[r]eal Chicago events of 1968’.45 It may be inferred from the 
juxtaposition of mainstream televisual contents that were familiar to the audience, with the 
landscapes of Beckett’s dramatic material, that the glaring incommensurability generated 
could be an important reason his works were unfavourably received by viewers who felt 
confused by and excluded from his unfamiliar images and open-ended narratives. Prompted 
by his international reputation as an enigmatic playwright, a preconceived expectation of his 
teleplays’ incomprehensibility might have also contributed further to the unfavourable 
reception.
 46
 Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the playwright as well as the people behind 
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the adaptation of his stage plays to television had not intended to completely alienate the 
audience.  
Bignell suggests that Beckett did not strictly follow television drama’s convention of 
coding the audience ‘as an unacknowledged observer of the action which takes place in a 
space that is removed from the space of the audience and is not open to the response or 
reaction of the viewing audience or an audience represented within the programme.’47 He 
observes that Beckett sometimes addressed the audience directly or provided stand-ins for 
the audience, thus effectively created a ‘hybrid’ of ‘conventionally cinematic and televisual 
forms of spectatorship.’48 Similarly, Sierz notes that Alan Moloney thought that the Beckett 
on Film collection would increase the ‘accessibility’ of Beckett’s works while Michael 
Colgan felt that the filmed plays could ‘reach a different audience, not necessarily a wider 
one but a different one’.49 Both producers of the collection, in their own way, intended for 
the teleplays to reach out to instead of alienate audiences. Therefore, I think Bignell is right 
about the audience’s hybridity in terms of the possible authorial intention behind the plays’ 
inclusion and exclusion of the viewers at the same time. But to add on to this, I would like to 
suggest that it is therefore not difficult to imagine that such a hybrid Beckettian spectator 
would feel a significantly persistent sense of unease as she unknowingly takes on this 
ambiguous spectatorial position while she is viewing the teleplays.  
John O’Neill’s equation of the television viewing experience to the allegorical 
Plato’s cave in his sociological examination of the television as a mirror to capitalism is 
significant at this juncture as it highlights the ‘condition in which most of us are generally to 
be found’; that is, the condition of being prisoners to the shadows cast by the ‘fire-light on 
the wall of the Cave facing them’.50 Whereas O’Neill’s main focus is on likening the 
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television to the play of shadows on the cave wall, I am interested in the allegory’s depiction 
of the prisoner’s adjustment of his eyes to the glare of the sun when he is first released to the 
surface of the earth and his adjustment to the darkness once he is brought back to the cave. 
Experiencing the glaring contrast, between the familiar televisual content that is usually 
produced with an explicit intention of meeting the audience’s expectations and Beckett’s 
works that are created with little indication of such intention, is akin to the transition 
between darkness and light.  
This does not, however, necessarily mean that Beckettian television drama is 
offering the viewer some kind of clear truth against the constructed reality of television. 
Instead, like Socrates in Plato’s Republic who hesitates to attribute going to the surface of 
the earth as ‘the mind’s ascent to the intelligible realm’, Beckett’s works do not provide any 
indication that it is presenting an interpretation of reality that is truer than the one that the 
audience is already experiencing through the medium.
51
 In other words, his works can be 
regarded as a stark contrast to the shadows on the cave walls, but his plays do not pretend to 
be more real than the shadows and his audiences are not expected to pick a side either. As I 
will elucidate further, later in this chapter, what his teleplays offer to the viewer is simulated 
emotional stimuli, with the firm purpose of inducing the audience to substantially experience 
a sense of loss as they make the transition between darkness and light. Ben-Zvi states 
correctly that Beckett’s oeuvre is ultimately interested in Being, but it is doubtful, in the 
context of this chapter, that the television works were from the outset invested with a 
pedagogical inclination to teach the viewer ‘new ways of seeing’ as part of this exploration 
of Being; rather, what his teleplays seem to effect is an evocation of an intuitive fellow-
feeling that is rooted in the concept of loss. 
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While acknowledging the importance and value of regarding Beckett’s television 
works as having a pedagogical effect, it is also important to be aware that the attribution of 
such functionality to his art could potentially overlook the non-specialised audience’s 
feelings of being excluded from his teleplays. Thus, it might be useful to expand our 
understanding of Beckettian television drama outside of its pedagogical function of 
provoking new ways of seeing, by taking a step back (or inwards) to consider its stimulating 
effect of triggering a mirror mechanism in his viewers. The phrase ‘new ways of seeing’ 
supports the value of his teleplays in so far as it is able to candidly address the intuitive 
effect of his works on these viewers prior to discursively deriving from the teleplays a 
pedagogical effect on an ideal audience.  
To explain my point further, let us consider the following: 
All our appearances seem destined to begin and to end in appearances. This is 
the dilemma to which Plato’s Cave is addressed. If we look behind our 
images we may find no solid reality. Yet, if we surrender ourselves to the 
“hyper-reality” of appearances, we shall lose the ability to discriminate light 
from darkness and thereby lose even our own shadow. We therefore 
desperately need some sort of tele-vision that is not a way of “seeing 
through” the media because of a refusal to be caught looking at them, but a 
way of seeing further, of seeing longer, and of seeing more steadily the risks 
we engage if ever we subordinate our intelligence to sensory modes of sight 
and sound whose own intelligibility has been colonized by agendas that waste 
the body politic.
52
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O’Neill’s observation of the uneasy relationship between Americans and the media 
concluded with a call, not to disavow the media, but for the imperative to be ‘vigilant’.53 
Interpreting Beckett’s television plays as taking part in a paedocratic discourse that exposes 
the constructedness of the televised images is, in my opinion, similar to suggesting that his 
works encourage a “seeing through” of these images, without first addressing the penetrative 
depth that the images of his teleplays are capable of effecting within the spectator. Further, I 
do not endorse a reading of his works as promoting in his viewer a preemptive seeing that is 
‘further’ and ‘longer’ against the ‘risks’ of subordinating their senses to the medium either; 
instead, I posit that the Beckettian teleplays induce the audience to experience within 
themselves a forgotten condition of loss, or, in other words, induce them to experience a 
shared pathos that was forgotten or repressed.  
O’Neill’s idea that ‘If we look behind our images we may find no solid reality’ 
suggests that the ‘opposite’ of the usual way of seeing is the ‘new way’ of seeing, which 
would expose the media as incapable of providing, in Ben-Zvi’s words, ‘clarity and 
wholeness’. To put this in another way, Ben-Zvi and O’Neill seem to view exposure of 
absence to be the only alternative perspective to the usual way of seeing. Consequently, I 
interpret Ben-Zvi’s argument as an assumption that the usual way of seeing is equivalent to 
the audiences’ susceptibility to subscribe to a “hyper-reality” of appearances offered by 
television, and that Beckett’s teleplays through exposure of absence are showing the 
audiences the way out of their perceptual subordination to the dictates of what is presented 
to them onscreen. However, the following paragraphs will be an analysis of how Beckett’s 
works are not about offering an intricately mapped solution out of the audience’s 
subordination, instead the teleplays seem more likely to be succinctly offering the audience 
a way to remember, not what they have lost, but that they have lost.   
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Implicit in the term ‘hyperreality’ coined by sociologist Jean Baudrillard, is the idea 
of the simulated stimuli. According to Baudrillard, ‘To simulate is to feign to have what one 
hasn’t’.54 He elaborated further that ‘to simulate is not simply to feign’, but also to take on 
aspects of the simulated subject so much so that the boundaries between the object (the 
“real”) and its simulation (the “imaginary”) are blurred.55 In addition, Baudrillard 
distinguishes simulation from representation, in that the latter is ‘the reflection of a basic 
reality’ in which ‘the sign and the real are equivalent’ whereas the former ‘envelops the 
whole edifice of representation as itself a [pure] simulacrum’ in which ‘the sign as value’, or 
in other words equivalent to the real, is radically negated.
56
  
To Baudrillard, we are living in ‘the world of simulation’ where everything is 
‘completely catalogued and analysed and then artificially revived as though real’.57 Taking 
Disneyland as an example, he proposed that all of “real” America is contained within this 
amusement park and that Disneyland is constructed to surreptitiously cloak this “reality” 
under its childish appeal. As a result, visitors are convinced that the world outside of this 
‘infantile world’ is therefore the “real” world, when in fact, ‘real childishness is 
everywhere’.58 He went on to describe Los Angeles as ‘nothing more than an immense script 
and a perpetual motion picture [that] needs this old imaginary made up of childhood signals 
and fake phantasms for its sympathetic nervous system’.59 The ‘need’ to feed the 
‘sympathetic nervous system’ suggests to me that there is a human desire for the myth of 
reality to sustain a concatenation of meanings that have been and still are being derived from 
it, in order to render one’s existence logically meaningful. In this sense, if reality is indeed 
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‘an immense script and a perpetual motion picture’, then what lies behind these images is 
possibly the absence of a solid reality, as pointed out in O’Neill’s quotation.60  
Explicit in the statement above is that the world seems to have lost sight of or lost its 
reality. To elaborate this further, Baudrillard’s point that people need Disneyland, to take as 
a hyperbolical example, to convince them that the world outside is “real” further suggests 
our inkling that reality is a myth. Nonetheless, being so deeply entrenched in an intricately 
woven script of images, it could be suggested that most of us are unable or reluctant to see 
that ‘the real’, should it have existed, is irrevocably lost. The Beckettian teleplays, I argue, 
seem to be primarily concerned with this ‘reluctance to see’ as a sort of collective amnesia, 
rather than to rhetorically put into question the existence of ‘the real’ or to fruitlessly teach 
the audience how to see that there is no ‘real’. 
In the final line of O’Neill’s chapter ‘Televideo Ergo Sum’, he states that ‘No one 
knows whether or not TV is real’.61 If we take into account television programmes’ tradition 
of attempting to appeal to the audience’s preference for the types of realism defined earlier 
in this section of the chapter, it is not difficult to see that the distinction between reality and 
the narratives onscreen is often blurred when one is watching a television programme, be it a 
single-act play, a soap drama or the evening news. If Beckett’s plays are offering new ways 
of seeing, it follows that these new ways would to a certain extent aim to clarify the 
boundaries between reality and representation. However, taking this perspective into 
consideration, those who have seen Beckett’s works would agree that his television drama 
raises more questions than it provides answers. To insist that by raising questions, the 
general audience of his television plays would be immediately inspired to see things in a 
more intellectually enriched light is akin to suggesting that Beckett’s works could 
potentially inculcate new habits or criteria of distinguishing reality from representation. In 
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my view, Beckett’s television drama is fundamentally incapable of being pedagogically 
functional in that context; instead, his teleplays are interpreted in this chapter as subscribing 
to an aesthetic of loss, which adopts the simulation effect offered by the medium in order to 
remind and reflect back to the viewers their mass amnesia.  
 With reference to Andreas Huyssen’s work on the “monument” as “a substitute site 
of mourning and remembrance” in the context of the Holocaust, Mark Taylor-Batty has it 
that Sarah Kane’s Blasted and Harold Pinter’s Ashes to Ashes ‘[activate] acts of 
remembrance’ by leading the audience to contemplate ethical issues related to events 
happening around them ‘without overtly relating the action of their plays to contemporary 
political events’.62 In other words, the audience member’s engagement with the 
contemplation of ethical issues is facilitated by theatre rather than directed by it. As such, a 
‘pathetic space’ within the spectator is created to allow her to consider these issues with 
empathy and objectivity.
63
 However, like the reflective screen of the television, I observe 
that Beckett’s monument to loss in relation to his teleplays, mirror the audience’s state of 
amnesiac loss. Unlike Kane and Pinter’s dramatic works’ covert engagement with politics 
through the activation of their audiences’ contemplation of ethics in the ‘impossible events’ 
that are set up in the diegetic worlds, Beckett’s engagement is with the reflection of loss as it 
is, subject-less, save for a residual inkling that it once was.                
This monument to loss therefore does not offer any direction or facilitation as to how 
the audiences could recover from the collective loss of memory in relation to the ability to 
distinguish between representation and ‘the real’. Instead, by persistently thwarting the 
audience’s expectations of the teleplays, Beckett’s television plays induce the spectator to 
consciously experience her amnesiac condition through an embodiment of a sense of 
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uncertainty and futility. Baudrillard’s example of a psychosomatic’s production of disease 
symptoms without being really sick, indicate the human potential to simulate certain 
qualities of the real without being the real. In the next section of this chapter, I posit that 
Beckett’s television plays exploit the medium’s capacity to influence the audience through 
precisely such an enactment of an embodied emotional simulation in order to remind the 
audience of their loss. 
5.2 THE AESTHETIC OF LOSS AND THE AUDIENCE’S COLLECTIVE AMNESIA 
‘Habit is a great deadener’ that leads to the audiences’ amnesiac condition.64 
Episodes of amnesia occur frequently in the fictional worlds of Beckett’s oeuvre, but the 
‘reminder’ as a recurring motif distinctly permeates his television plays. It is important to 
note that the reminder does not only convey nostalgia for the past, it is more often than not a 
decentering jolt that reminds the habits and routines obsessed characters and audiences that 
this nostalgia is for a partially or completely forgotten past. It is precisely through this 
reminder in the form of disembodied voices, futilely repetitive movements and/or worn 
objects, that the often-clueless protagonists and the always-uncertain audience are induced 
to experience a discomforting sense of irretrievable loss.  
Beckett’s interest in tramps and the notion of loss, as evident in his works, might 
have been reinforced by the post-World War II influx of Les Autres into Paris. As pointed 
out by Christopher Heathcote, the displaced drifters were an eclectic bunch, ‘young or old, 
fit-to-work or hobbling-and-crippled, on the streets, underfoot’.65 Tellingly, their war-
wrought displacement from their own communities and their exclusion from the Parisian 
society rendered them an unwanted reminder of a bloody war which most would rather 
forget. As a result, like a scab that reminded one of a wound and how it was inflicted, these 
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people were a nuisance to a society that was not only anxious to move on from the horrors 
of war, but also to overcome the economic and political hardships that inevitably followed 
immediately after the war. In fact, the extent of post-war France’s determination to get back 
on her feet can be gleaned from her swift economic recovery within two years after her 
liberation from the Germans. Despite the ‘wave of strikes’ which began on 10 November 
1947 against the new policies that increased the prices of, just to name a few, gas, 
electricity, railway and subway prices, by 1946 the country was well headed towards Les 
Trente Glorieuses (‘The Glorious Thirty’).66 But in the midst of progress, the displaced were 
pushed to the back of society’s consciousness, which was also the site of forgetting.  
In the next few paragraphs, I attempt to distinguish the shared amnesiac condition of 
loss propounded in this chapter from the ‘social amnesia’ that might have induced the 
perspective that Beckett’s teleplays are pedagogically instructive. Russell Jacoby defines 
‘social amnesia’ as ‘memory driven out of mind by the social and economic dynamic of 
society’ and associates it with the notion of reification in Marxism. He explains that: 
Reification in Marxism refers to an illusion that is objectively manufactured 
by society. This social illusion works to preserve the status quo by presenting 
the human and social relationships of society as natural  and unchangeable 
–– relations between things. What is often ignored in expositions of the 
concept of reification is the psychological dimension: amnesia –– a forgetting 
and repression of the human and social activity that makes and can remake 
society. The social loss of memory is a type of reification –– better: it is the 
primal form of reification. “All reification is a forgetting.”67 
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He goes on to suggest that reification has its roots in capitalism whereby “needs” purported 
by the system of commodity exchange are quickly becoming reified as products offering 
instant gratification to the masses. These commodities once consumed become obsolete and 
are swiftly forgotten to give way to newer products with the same aim to temporarily gratify 
the desires that are constructed by the system.
68
 The television is also included in Jacoby’s 
list of culpable capitalist devices that encourage a conformist psychology by turning people 
away from the individual and towards state and media manufactured illusions of needs that 
can supposedly be satisfied through mass production and consumption. Although Jacoby is 
criticised for his pessimistic perspective of his twentieth-century contemporary women and 
men, as well as for his nostalgic and almost utopian view of the nineteenth century, his 
concept of ‘social amnesia’ highlights the significant assumption of ‘audience passivity’ that 
is shared by late twentieth century media effects studies.
69
 The assumption of media effects 
on the passive audience is referred to as research that is ‘conducted within a “hypodermic 
needle” paradigm’.70 Writing in the year 2012, Jonathan Gray and Amanda D Lotz suggest 
that ‘[t]he style of such work should be familiar to all readers, since it is still going strong to 
this day, and the press has long been fond of reporting on it’.71  
Reports on media effects usually takes the form of ‘such-and-such a university has 
“proven” that television leads to more permissive ideas of sex or violence, for instance, with 
X percent of those studied showing a prominent change in sexual or aggressive behaviour’.72 
Therefore, in the context of the quotation above taken from Jacoby’s work, the ‘social loss 
of memory’ as ‘a type of reification’, could be a reference to the concept that humans have 
lost their capacity to resist objectification as they and their social relationships are being 
reified into commodities by the capitalist system. In the perspective that is based on the 
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‘hypodermic needle’ paradigm, the passive viewer’s subscription to messages of mass 
culture could have induced the forgetting of what it means to possess autonomy and to 
experience non-conformance. Thus, it follows that a sign of social amnesia can be inferred 
from the discomfort that the seemingly passive audiences experience as they watch a 
Beckettian teleplay because it does not conform to the usual televisual contents that they are 
conditioned to be familiar with. One perspective that has been extended from such an 
interpretation is that Beckett’s television plays thus offer a pedagogical opportunity for the 
audience to examine the constructedness of the daily narratives that are being propagated by 
a state and media with their own agendas.  
However, such an assertion neglects the penetrative mirror effect of Beckett’s plays 
that seeks first and foremost to reflect back and consequently remind the audience of their 
mass amnesia; that is, rather than offering an exposé on what is wrong with societies and 
their array of ideologies, Beckett’s works might be a reminder to the hybrid audience of her 
habit-ridden state of amnesia. To reiterate, in the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate 
that Beckett’s teleplays do not seem to be offering a critique of or solution to this amnesia; 
instead, his interest in displaced people whom the amnesiac audience is likely to overlook in 
their daily lives suggests that the teleplays might be implying that the amnesiac spectators 
are as displaced as the Beckettian tramps since what they have in common is a shared 
condition of loss.           
In Eh Joe, the possibility that Voice represents Joe’s guilty conscience would not 
escape the viewer since this is implied in Voice’s haunting reminder to him of his culpability 
in the suicide of a girl. But there is definitely one more factor that would emotionally 
influence the viewer to arrive at a more empathic response to this culpability and these are 
the close-ups on Joe’s facial expressions as he is being derided by Voice for his past 
mistakes. According to Beckett’s specific directions regarding Joe’s facial expressions, the 
actor playing Joe should be  
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Practically motionless throughout, eyes unblinking during paragraphs, 
impassive except in so far as it reflects mounting tension of listening. Brief 
zones of relaxation between paragraphs when perhaps voice has relented for 
the evening and intentness may relax variously till restored by voice 
resuming.
73
    
Together with Joe, played by Jack MacGowran in the 4 July 1966 broadcast of the teleplay 
on BBC 2, the audience might experience the ‘mounting tension of listening’ to Voice (Siân 
Phillips).
74
 The close-ups would have significantly contributed to the viewer’s feelings of 
unease as the disembodied voice continues her bitter description of Joe’s misdeeds. Not 
surprisingly, the importance of the close-up on Joe’s facial expressions did not elude Atom 
Egoyan, the director of Eh Joe at the 2013 Edinburgh International Festival. The television 
play was adapted for theatre and Joe’s face, played by Michael Gambon, was projected onto 
a large screen house-right of Joe and his bed. One audience member commented that ‘When 
you’re watching his tears, when you’re watching the expressions on his face, you can’t help 
but be there with him […]’.75  
In Beckett’s theatrical notes, the lines ‘Out of sight, reach. Fear of dark.’ are 
according to the editorial notes ‘the dramatic spine’ of Eh Joe.76 When Voice sinisterly 
uttered the words, ‘You’re all right now, eh?… No one can see you now …. No one can get 
at you now…. Why don’t you put out that light?... There might be a louse watching you’ in 
the 1966 teleplay directed by Alan Gibson and by Beckett himself (uncredited), the audience 
would be aware that Joe was under the assumption that by being out of sight, he would be 
out of the reach ‘of any potential perceiver, and so be still, at peace’; but Joe was 
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nonetheless confronted by yet another problem as a result of being out of sight, he must face 
his fear of darkness, and it was the vindictive Voice’s taunt that would make this fear 
apparent to the viewer.
77
 As the sound of the voice and Joe’s facial expressions were being 
heard and watched by the viewer, the television audience would be implicated in Joe’s 
experience of guilt and fear. Joe was depicted as caught between the contradictory desire to 
be alone and the fear of being alone in the dark, whereas the audience might be caught 
between the contradictory inability to know for certain the point that the play was trying to 
get at and the, not fear but, discomfort of experiencing an inexplicable sense of empathy for 
the character as the mirror mechanism was triggered in her. In other words, the 1966 
audience would be caught in a contradictory empathic response to a predicament they could 
not completely understand, and I posit that this could be likened to the condition of the 
retrograde amnesiac, who is caught between the frustrating states of knowing and not 
knowing.     
As established in the first section, McQuail's observation that we monitor ourselves 
through television might lead us to see and search for ourselves in representations onscreen. 
Such representations in mainstream television often come in the form of general narratives 
that allow us to compare ourselves with different characters based on their depicted 
circumstances and actions. Lev Kuleshov’s experiment, also known as the Kuleshov effect, 
not only attests to the audience’s propensity to project their own emotions on images, but 
also their suggestibility in the face of a montage sequence composed of one recurring close-
up on an unchanging expression and the juxtaposition of this with close-ups on emotive 
subjects (a child in the coffin and a beautiful woman on a divan) and non-emotive objects (a 
bowl of soup). Applying this understanding of reciprocal projection between the audience 
and filmic sequences to the possible spectatorial experience of viewing Joe’s close-ups, as 
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performed by Jack MacGowran in 1966, it is conceivable that the teleplay’s audience would 
be emotionally influenced by the actor’s expressions of ‘mounting tension’ and relaxation 
just as the 2013 audience member referenced above could not ‘help but be there with [Joe/ 
Michael Gambon]’.  
Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero’s neurophysiological data backed findings 
that ‘[w]hen we observe others, we enact their actions inside ourselves and we share their 
emotions’ supports the idea that humans are endowed with a ‘mirror mechanism’.78 In the 
case of the television viewer, this mirror mechanism could influence her to experience her 
interpretation of how Joe is feeling. The attentive audience member might experience 
‘identification’, which Jonathan Cohen defines in mass communications studies terms as a 
‘mechanism through which audience members experience reception and interpretation of the 
text from the inside, as if the events were happening to them.’79 The term brings to mind 
Sigmund Freud’s concept of ‘libidinal investment’ and Jacques Lacan’s concept of 
‘identification’. Cohen sums up Freud, Richard Wollheim and Bruno Bettelheim’s concepts 
of ‘identification’ as ‘an imaginative experience in which a person surrenders consciousness 
of his or her own identity and experiences the world through someone else’s point of view’ 
and that ‘the varying intensity of identification reflects the extent to which one exchanges 
his or her own perspective for that of another and is able to forget him- or herself.’80 Thus, 
to a certain extent, it might be possible to simplistically interpret Joe’s guilty and fearful 
expressions as capable of evoking similar emotions in the attentive audience and perhaps a 
mild sense of discomfort in the less engaged viewers. Indeed, such an interpretation would 
not neglect to take into account that the intensity of these emotions evoked by Beckett’s 
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works would vary depending on the audience’s intellectual and emotional investment in the 
teleplays.  
However, Bignell points out that television analysis has gradually abandoned 
‘notions of the spectator’s identification with the projection apparatus as a source of vision, 
identification with the camera as perceiving subjectivity, and identification with on-screen 
characters as fantasised and desired subject-positions for the spectator’ because the 
television audience is considered to be ‘a glancing and often inattentive spectator.’81 He 
asserts that Beckett’s drama ‘involves the intense engagement of the addressee with the 
programme as a text, largely detached from the extended social reality of the viewing 
experience and dependent on the viewer’s absorption and concentration on the 
programme.’82 Therefore, identification would not be possible if the spectator is unable to, 
in Cohen’s words, surrender her consciousness in exchange for the characters’.83 
Nonetheless, contrary to Bignell and Cohen’s assertion of a need for an audience to 
surrender her consciousness in exchange for a character’s point of view so as to effect 
identification, I would argue that since the amnesiac condition which the viewers share with 
most of Beckett’s characters is already residing within her, she is not required to give up her 
consciousness of her immediate reality in exchange for the characters’. Instead, her 
amnesiac condition is elicited from its state of repression and brought into her consciousness 
by the teleplay through ‘empathy’ with the characters. The frustration that is normally 
associated with incomprehension could have been induced by the mentally juxtaposed 
discordance between an inexplicably empathic sense of loss evoked by the teleplays and her 
existing state of a habit-driven consciousness. 
Bruce McConachie employs the terms ‘empathy’ and ‘conceptual blending’ to 
describe the audience’s viewing experience. By ‘empathy’, he is referring to how 
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theatregoing spectators ‘put themselves in the shoes of many other people, past and present, 
in order to understand and judge their actions’.84 In addition to the actors, these ‘people’ also 
include the playwright, director and designers. Attributing these terms specifically to the 
theatregoing experience, he elaborates further that ‘[b]y themselves, characters have no 
bodies’ and the spectators do not empathise with them directly; instead, empathy with the 
characters depends on the spectator’s ability to ‘blend’ the ‘flesh-and-blood actor with the 
author’s character’.85 Conceptual blending is therefore a combination of a spectator’s 
‘mental concepts of a specific actor with a specific character to create a blended 
actor/character.’86 Nonetheless, McConachie does not seem to go far enough to suggest that 
conceptual blending and empathy would also allow the audience to concurrently embody the 
actor/character in her mind and her body as she views a play.  
In other words, the blended result is in fact actor/character/spectator. More 
significantly, when confronted with a faceless or fragmented Beckettian actor/character, the 
spectator’s intuitive propensity to subsume this ambiguous Beckettian blend into her mind 
and subsequently attempt to understand the character through the actor’s motor 
significances, further suggests that the Beckettian fragments are capable of luring the 
spectator into physically empathising with the characters as though the subject of her 
empathy is herself. As opposed to identification, empathy does not require the audience to 
efface her consciousness from the spectatorial experience. This will be elaborated further in 
the following paragraphs.  
I agree that it is important to address the possibility that in the experience of the 
Beckettian drama-induced state of uncertainty, the audiences might experience varying 
degrees of empathy with the predicaments of the characters depending on the extent of their 
engagement with the teleplay. However, it is noteworthy that contrary to ‘identification’, 
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‘empathy’ as it is discussed in the context of this chapter is not invoked because the 
characters are seen by the audience as occupying an intellectually surmised ‘desired subject-
position’; rather, empathy is invoked because the audiences are, unbeknownst to them, 
already intuitively occupying the same amnesiac positions as the characters. Taking into 
account the variable intensity of the audience’s investment in each play, one could perhaps 
point out that the erudite audience would experience an intense empathy with the characters, 
whereas the less informed spectator would experience empathy in a lesser degree. 
Nonetheless, if we are too caught up with an elitist or self-defeating perspective, which 
maintains that only the learned are capable of receiving what Beckett’s teleplays have to 
offer, we run the risk of not articulating the audiences’ direct and intuitive experience of a 
shared sense of loss regardless of their level of intellectual engagement with the teleplay.  
More importantly, although this intuitive experience may occur in snatches as the 
home viewer’s attention fluctuates between engagement and disengagement, this does not 
mean that the audience member who experiences a mounting desire to disengage from the 
teleplay is being inattentive. Frustration as an expression of confusion can be a strong 
indication of a failed attempt to know, instead of inattentiveness. The audiences’ inherent 
capacity to simulate or in Baudrillard's words ‘to feign to have what one [thinks one] 
hasn’t’, in order to then experience their amnesia could occur during these oscillations 
between a vague understanding and utter confusion. That is, as an amnesiac who has 
forgotten her amnesia, the viewer may be inclined to empathise with the characters onscreen 
once she slips herself into a Beckettian character’s shoes and experiences the ambiguity of 
that character’s motor significances through the conceptual blending of 
actor/character/spectator. Consequently, having an inexplicable empathy for an ambiguous 
subject results in a frustrating sense of loss, which is understood in this chapter as the kind 
of frustration that is normally associated with an amnesiac’s emotional state.  
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In addition, steep with audience expectations of immediate gratifications, it is 
conceivable that the television might have been a mass medium employed by Beckett for its 
immense potential of triggering the viewer’s mirror mechanism from the immediate outset 
of any television programme. But this mirror mechanism is not maintained by a 
representation of the surficial familiar in Beckett’s teleplays; instead it is reconstituted into 
empathy by way of subversion. As such, it is possible that Beckett might have expected that 
his audience would assume even before the teleplay began that the characters would be 
potentially familiar or pleasure-giving objects. This assumption is then subverted by the play 
in order to push the audience into trying to understand the actor/character’s movements and 
lines by way of conceptual blending. As a result, the spectator is induced to experience their 
forgotten amnesiac condition through the blending of actor/character/audience. The 
spectator’s experience of the amnesiac state will be elaborated more specifically as similar 
to the experience of the prosopagnosic in the later part of this section. 
For now, the important point to bear in mind is that although as a result of the 
blending the audience might begin to register a keener sense of familiarity in the characters’ 
predicaments, Beckett’s teleplays do not offer any certitude. A viewer would remain unable 
to completely bridge the obvious disjunction between the Beckettian characters’ disjointed 
narratives and her relatively coherent state of being. In the next two paragraphs, I explain the 
spectator’s assumption of a personally coherent life narrative by examining the intersection 
between Lacanian Identification and consumer culture. From there, I propose that it is likely 
that Beckett was aware of the television’s important role as a medium that drives a society’s 
metanarrative, and that he exploited its influence, rather than questioned its function, for the 
purpose of evoking a fellow-feeling of loss in his viewers.    
As I have established in Chapter 3, in Lacan’s concept of the identity formation stage 
of the infant, a ‘fictional’ ideal-I that is reflected by the mirror as a total form of a body 
which is contrary to the infant’s actual ‘motor impotence and nursling dependence’, is 
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created.
87
 This illusion of wholeness will then become an important goal to achieve through 
the individual’s social interactions and relations later in his life.88 As I have stated earlier in 
this chapter, the consumerist culture, which is mainly regulated and perpetuated by mass 
media, promises the viewer that the desire for wholeness can be gratified through the 
consumption of commodities. Thus, juxtaposing this notion with Lacan’s concept of 
identification, it is not difficult to infer that consumerism could be reinforcing and sustaining 
the illusion embedded early in our lives that self-cohesion is attainable.
89
 To indicate the 
potential intensity of identification in the context of consumerism even further, Siegfried 
Zepf observes that an “identity of commodities” could form in an individual if he is 
influenced by the commodified figures portrayed in mass media to develop his identity 
through a process that is mediated by commodities instead of through more personal 
means.
90
 In addition, Yannis Stavrakakis’s work on the relationship between consumerism 
and psychoanalysis provides an even clearer picture on how the beginning of consumerist 
culture was supported through an ‘appropriation of psychoanalytic ideas’ to better 
understand consumer behaviour and develop ‘some of the most important pillars of 
contemporary capitalism’.91  
Although the debates regarding the relationship between consumerism and 
psychoanalysis fall outside the scope of this chapter, it is important to point out that this 
climate of doubt against consumer culture and its perpetuation by mass media has persisted 
since at least the mid-twentieth century. Therefore, I suspect that since Beckett’s works were 
written, performed and broadcast against this backdrop of suspicion of the radio and 
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television’s powerful influences, he might have been aware of the potential power of mass 
media to reach out and influence the minds of the viewers. Ulrika Maude also seems to 
support the perspective that Beckett’s interest in television might have been influenced by its 
reach to a larger audience when she points out that Beckett’s first television play Eh Joe was 
not commissioned by BBC and that ‘although relatively pleased with Film, [he] was 
disappointed with its limited distribution, which may in part have triggered the turn to the 
far more popular medium of television, whose potential for close-ups had interested Beckett 
for some time.’92  
Further, in his 1959 RAI Prix Italia prize acceptance speech for his radio play 
Embers, Beckett mentioned that he did not ‘ordinarily write for radio, but [he thought] that it 
is a medium which has not been fully exploited and that there are great possibilities for 
writers in this form of expression.’93 Although the television as a medium was not 
mentioned and he did not write for that medium until 1965, it is conceivable that his 
statement about radio could be transposed to the television as a medium that he would like 
to ‘exploit’ as ‘a form of expression’. As Beryl S. Fletcher et al point out, when Eh Joe was 
first broadcast in 1966 the play initially was not very well received, ‘[s]ince then, however, 
most people have congratulated Beckett on his success, his first attempt, in exploiting the 
medium to the full.’94 Effectively, these perspectives support my assertion that the medium 
might have been of interest to Beckett because it offered the opportunity to be exploited as a 
vehicle of artistic expression, rather than as a politically or socially scandalous instrument 
that was ripe for a dramatic exposé. Thus, in terms of his employment of the television 
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medium, it is possible that instead of trying to go against the grain, he was trying to embrace 
its influential reach so as to lead his audience to intuitively experience a fellow-feeling of 
loss. 
Unlike images in mainstream televisual content which tend to assert a normative 
social influence on the viewer, the Beckettian images are bare with neither social conformity 
as an answer to the viewer’s search for cohesion nor the promise that self-cohesion is even 
possible. Consequently, instead of the fictional image of wholeness that the Lacanian infant 
is seeing in the mirror, the mirror mechanism that is reconstituted in the audience as she is 
watching Beckett’s television plays may set in motion the Beckettian viewer’s recognition 
of her own fragmentation. The attribution of prosopagnosia, or face blindness, to the 
relationship between the audience and the Beckettian characters mentioned in an earlier 
paragraph stems from the idea that it is an incurable condition, which entails the forgetting 
of a very specific aspect of one’s physical being, namely, the face, while leaving everything 
else intact. Its incurability is significant in its association with Beckett’s teleplays because it 
highlights my postulation that his works do not propose a solution or a cure to mass 
amnesia; instead, what his works seem to be articulating to both the engaged audience and 
the audience who edge towards disengagement is an amnesiac loss, as it is. Whereas the 
engaged audience may arguably excavate more meaning from Beckett’s television plays 
than the ones who feel frustratingly excluded, I maintain that this inescapable and intuitive 
sense of loss would influence both sets of audiences.  
Following Peter Fifield, Dustin Anderson also observes the similarity between 
Beckett’s characters and the sufferers of Cotard’s and Capgras’s syndromes, and briefly 
mentioned prosopagnosia in relation to these conditions.
95
 Sufferers of Cotard’s syndrome 
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believe that they are dead, do not exist or had all of their blood and organs removed from the 
body, whereas Capgras’s syndrome refers to the condition whereby patients believe that a 
doppelganger or an imposter has replaced himself or someone close to him. Pointing out that 
both syndromes sometimes entailed prosopagnosia, Anderson goes on to suggest that O in 
Film, the Speaker in A Piece of Monologue and Moran who does not recognise himself as 
Molloy in Molloy, display this ‘dissociation’ like the kind that can be found in the 
abovementioned syndromes.
96
 To Anderson, prosopagnosia in Beckett’s oeuvre can be 
observed in the characters’ inability to recognise the faces of others and/or one’s own face, 
but I would like to point out that the kind of prosopagnosia that metaphorically connects the 
viewers with Beckett’s characters in his teleplays involves the viewers’ inability to 
recognise themselves in the characters.  
Extending this condition to the context of this chapter’s analysis of Beckett’s 
teleplays, face blindness is employed here as a metaphorical condition that occurs between 
the audience as the prosopagnosic and the characters as the unrecognisable self-image. In 
addition, my earlier examination of expectations of televisual content that are entrenched in 
the minds of the viewers indicates that her inclination to see herself in the television 
characters and her inability to completely identify with Beckett’s characters may be 
described as an acquired prosopagnosia. As opposed to congenital or developmental 
prosopagnosia which may or may not involve an impairment in the ability to recognise 
emotions, the audience’s metaphorically acquired inability to completely recognise 
themselves in the Beckettian characters shares an affinity with prosopagnosia research on 
the idea that ‘identity recognition and emotion recognition are performed by separate 
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processes.’97 The audience member empathises with the emotions of the characters, but is 
unable to completely see that the characters are images of themselves in a bare state of 
fragmentation. Intriguingly, the viewers’ contradictory experience of this dissociated 
recognition could be similar to the amnesiac’s frustrating retention of a sense of familiarity 
in experiences that she can no longer remember, like a half-remembered dream. 
5.3 EMPATHY 
In Trish McTighe’s description of Beckett’s portrayal of the imagined hands in the 
right-hand corner of the screen in Nacht und Träume, she points out that Beckett had 
adopted a ‘Chinese box effect, where images exist within images’.98 The ‘dream box’, which 
opens up within the play is also likened by McTighe to a window opening within the 
window of the television screen ‘that emphasises the meta-filmic quality of Beckett’s 
television plays.’99 I agree with her description, but one important question that ought to be 
asked is 'what is the significance of an extended box of images (right hand corner scene) 
within a box of images (the diegetic scene) that is within a box of images (the extradiegetic 
scene of the living room in which the television resides), if it is not to demonstrate that the 
diegetic world is an extension of the audience’s immediate reality?' Just as how towards the 
end of a gyre is a diminished section of the same coil, the arrangement of the Beckettian 
television images allows the viewer to retain a bizarrely nostalgic sense of the familiar 
precisely because it is an extremely diminished form of the familiar. Despite the seeming 
unfamiliarity of the Beckettian universe on the television screen to an audience who had no 
prior exposure to his works, I posit that the dramatic landscape is not an opposite, but a 
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reduced state of the familiar. The type of realism that can typically be found in mainstream 
television from the mid-twentieth century to the present day therefore differs from 
Beckettian works in terms of form, but not necessarily content in its entirety. Hobson points 
out that ‘Two familiar but contradictory statements are often heard about soap operas. 
Apparently "nothing happens" in them, they just crawl along from one banal situation to 
another. Conversely, they are said to thrive on continual crises, leaping from one terrible 
scene of domestic trivia to another.’100  I think something similar but much more pared 
down could be said about Beckett’s television plays.  
Daniel Albright observes that Eh Joe ‘feels like a melodrama performed under 
intense light in a sterile operating room’.101 Although Albright goes on to assert that after 
this play, Beckett’s later teleplays lost the melodramatic quality to become more abstracted, 
I posit that Ghost Trio (1975), …but the clouds… (1976), Quad I & II (1981) and Nacht und 
Träume (1982) arguably retain diminished spectres of melodramatic affects. In Benjamin 
Kohlmann’s examination of the relationship between melodrama and modernist theatre, 
particularly the works of Brecht, W. H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood, he observes that 
following Adorno’s assertion that modernist texts demanded a ‘detached “aesthetic 
experience” (“ästhetische Erfah-rung”)’ which ‘excludes sentimentality and the “simulated 
feelings” of commodified “kitsch”, much scholarship about modernism has bracketed 
questions of affect and emotion.’102 It is an ongoing (or, to some, now deemed unnecessary) 
debate whether Beckett was a modernist, postmodernist, or an artist residing at the cusp 
between the two, but Kohlmann’s observation is significant regardless of one’s scholarly 
persuasion since Beckett criticism has never strayed too far from an understanding that the 
Beckettian universe is tragic. Understated sentimentality and opportunities for audience 
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empathy abound in Beckett’s oeuvre, and, in my perspective, should not be ‘bracketed’ off.  
In his essay Proust, Beckett defined tragedy: 
There is no right and wrong in Proust nor in his world. (Except possibly in 
those passages dealing with the war, when for a space he ceases to be an 
artist and raises his voice with the plebs, mob, rabble, canaille.) Tragedy is 
not concerned with human justice. Tragedy is the statement of an expiation, 
but not the miserable expiation of a codified breach of a local arrangement, 
organised by the knaves for the fools. The tragic figure represents the 
expiation of original sin, of the original and eternal sin of him and all his 
“socii malorum,” the sin of having been born.103 
Beckett rejected the ‘miserable expiation of a codified breach of a local arrangement, 
organised by the knaves for the fools’ because the expiation of ‘the sin of having been born’ 
is more miserable in extent since nobody has a chance to avoid the predetermined ‘breach’ 
of a predestined arrangement. His idea that ‘Tragedy is not concerned with human justice’ 
implies that his notion of tragedy is one that is not partial to specific social or political 
injustices that are plaguing ‘the plebs, mob, rabble, canaille’. It is noteworthy that Beckett’s 
description of Proust as momentarily ceasing to be an artist when he joined the masses in 
articulating his views on ‘the war’, might at first connote a dissociation between artistic 
concerns and the issues that ‘the plebs’ are concerned with. However, to my mind, severing 
the connection between art and the politics of a society could be his way of emphasising the 
non-specificity of our tragedy. That is, if we transpose Beckett’s interpretation of Proust’s 
works to his own plays, tragedy to Beckett seems to lie in the unjustifiable ‘sin’ that haunts 
us all. Effectively, this relation between tragedy and universality further supports my 
hypothesis that Beckett’s plays are not offering an instructive solution to or constructive 
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criticism of any specific audience’s perception of a mediatized reality.  
Without conflating melodrama with tragedy, I assert that spectres of melodramatic 
affects are evoked by the tragic landscape of Beckett’s teleplays in order to appeal to the 
emotions of the mass audience. Kohlmann suggests that Brecht, Kurt Weill and Elisabeth 
Hauptmann’s Happy End was an attempt ‘to incorporate melodrama’s commodified affects 
into the structures of modernist drama’ so as to ‘negate the negativity of bourgeois-capitalist 
false consciousness on its own terms by blowing melodramatic sentimentality out of 
proportion.’104 Brecht’s epic drama may sit more or less comfortably in this description, but 
Beckett’s television drama seems to merely seek to set itself apart from the familiar 
televisual content that forms a part of the audience’s ‘false consciousness’, without overt 
criticism. It does so by appealing to the viewer’s emotions without giving them a defined 
plot from which to infer a clear context for feeling these emotions. In so doing, specificity is 
excluded from his works. Like the Yohaku, which is the undrawn space of the Zen 
monochrome paintings, Beckett’s exclusion of specificity could be aimed at including the 
everyman viewer by excluding overt cultural, societal and political specificity in his works; 
yet, unlike the Yohaku, the blank space in this context is not an invitation to the audience to 
‘partake in [the] shaping of the whole’ image.105 Instead, the absence of a clear context is 
part of the amnesiac condition that the teleplays might be alluding to.   
Ben Singer points out that ‘a common element of melodrama, particularly as it is 
understood in contemporary film studies’ is the ‘presentation of strong pathos (i.e., the 
elicitation of a powerful feeling of pity)’.106 Singer agrees with Eric Bentley that the pity 
that is elicited is mainly the audience’s pity for themselves because pathos is derived ‘from a 
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process of emotional identification or, perhaps more accurately, of association, whereby 
spectators superimpose their own life (melo)dramas onto the ones being represented in the 
narrative.’107 However, Beckett’s television drama hardly has a distinct narrative for the 
audience to associate with, therefore the audience cannot identify with the characters 
through such superimposition. Empathy is the furthest that Beckett’s teleplays would take 
his audience.  
The suffering body of the Beckettian character as it is represented by an actor is 
almost certainly the most distinct aspect of each television play that might perhaps resonate 
with the audience through the actor/character/audience blending established in the previous 
section of this chapter. Martin Esslin’s attribution of ‘absurdity’ to Beckett’s works, though 
it is now widely regarded as an overused term in Beckett criticism, implies further that the 
Beckettian world is, in the first instance, held as a contrast to the audience’s assumedly 
‘logical’ extradiegetic world.108 Therefore, it seems that the most poignant aspect of 
Beckett’s drama that the audience would be able to associate with any certainty as a 
common quality, is the Beckettian character’s embodied capacity to experience suffering. 
However, as I have established in the second section of this chapter, since the amnesiac 
condition which the viewers share with most of Beckett’s characters is already intuitively 
residing within her, she is not required to give up her consciousness in exchange for the 
characters’. Therefore, she cannot and there is no need for her to consciously ‘superimpose’ 
her own life onto the ones being represented in the narrative in order to identify with the 
characters. By virtue of spectatorially embodying the actor/character/audience blend, she is 
empathetically experiencing the play with the actor/character. Therefore, instead of the full-
blown melodramatic affects invoked through a process of identification, Beckett’s viewer 
may experience spectres of poignant affects through empathy.  
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The characters’ experience of bodily suffering through physical deterioration is 
usually brought on by a profound sense of disappointment, which seems to be the 
predominant cause of suffering that is invoked by all of Beckett’s television works. Even in 
the world of Quad I & II, where there is no dialogue and no distinct faces, the mark of 
disappointment is apparent. According to Steven Connor, one ‘story’ has it that when 
Beckett was watching a playback of the original one-part Quad in black and white and in 
slow motion by technicians who were ‘testing the image quality’ of the teleplay, he 
‘suddenly exclaimed: My God, it’s a hundred thousand years later!’109 As a result, he 
decided to add a second part to the play, Quad II, in which the drastic duration that elapsed 
between the two parts is, I observe, expressed by the loss of colour, a slower pace and a 
greater arch in the four actors’ hunch. Most viewers would not be aware of this ‘story’ about 
Beckett’s reaction to the playback, and therefore would not know that the two parts that 
were eventually broadcast represented, for Beckett, the passing of such a colossal amount of 
time. However, it would not be difficult for the audience to notice the stark contrast between 
the two parts, especially since Beckett the viewer was the one who added the second part in 
order to possibly replicate in his audience his experience of the poignant visual contrast 
between the two parts.   
Interestingly, as I was watching Quad I, I was more aware of E, or the ‘danger zone’ 
when all four actors were pacing about on the screen. The demeanour of each actor only 
received my attention before and after the other three had entered and exited the screen to 
leave the lone figure pacing in its consistently anxious yet methodical way. This does not 
mean that they were less anxious when they were pacing together, but individually, the 
anxiety became more pronounced and, even without knowing the context, the strange 
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predicament of the solitary character became more pitiable. Without spoken words, the 
intermittent loss and gain of companionship in this television play reminded me of 
Estragon’s unforgettable line, ‘Don’t touch me! Don’t question me! Don’t speak to me! Stay 
with me!’110  
The four characters in Quad I & II hurry pass one another without any form of 
contact despite being committed to the same routine. The frantic drumbeats of Quad I are no 
longer present in II and only the sound of the shuffling feet of the characters remain. In the 
absence of music and colours, the characters unavailingly persist in their routine. The 
mysterious E to which the characters seem to converge, remains elusively unreachable since 
it is both ‘a danger zone’ in which they might collide and a safe zone that prevents their 
collision. If we interpret these characters as abstract reflections of our state of existence, the 
characters’ futile movements could be regarded as their search for a ‘point’ in life that 
assumedly would eventually bestow respite on the dogged seekers. Nevertheless, 
representing both danger and safety, E seems to be a dangerous goal that repels and compels 
the characters at the same time, rendering their movements self-cancelling and resulting in 
their entrapment within their repetitive movements.  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty had it that ‘to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; 
it is to allow oneself to respond to their call’.111 In the case of Quad I, the ‘call’ is from E 
and it is possible that the drumming represents its call to the characters. Following this 
understanding, ‘a hundred thousand years later’ when the drumming has stopped, the 
movements in Quad II may be interpreted as having become a habitual routine that is 
heeding the call of nothing. The disappointed endeavour is drained of colours, music and 
physical energy as the characters shuffle their feet with their heads bowed even lower, not 
searching anymore, but just simply moving.  
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Merleau-Ponty also distinguished between the habit-body and the body by stating 
that: 
[…] our body comprises as it were two distinct layers, that of the habit-body 
and that of the body at this moment. In the first appear manipulatory 
movements which have disappeared from the second, and the problem how I 
can have the sensation of still possessing a limb which I no longer have 
amounts to finding out how the habitual body can act as guarantee for the 
body at this moment. How can I perceive objects as manipulatable when I 
can no longer manipulate them? The manipulatable must have ceased to be 
what I am now manipulating, and become what one can manipulate; it must 
have ceased to be a thing manipulatable for me and become a thing 
manipulatable in itself. Correspondingly, my body must be apprehended not 
only in an experience which is instantaneous, peculiar to itself and complete 
in itself, but also in some general aspect and in the light of an impersonal 
being.
112
   
The habit-body is a projected body, whereas ‘the body at this moment’ is synonymous with 
the ‘living body’.113 The ‘impersonal being’, which is the habit-body, is a projection from 
‘the living body’ in that the latter acquires a habit through a ‘bodily comprehension of a 
motor significance’ then incorporates the acquired habit into the body by projecting an 
assimilated habit-body.
114
 For example, ‘to learn to type or play an instrument, to become 
accustomed to a vehicle or a cane or a feathered hat, “is to be transplanted into them, or 
conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of the body itself”’.115 This means that the 
                                                                
112
 Ibid., p. 95. 
113
 Ibid., p. 87. 
114
 Monika M. Langer, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), 
p. 47. 
115
 Ibid. 
220 
 
living body is an ‘expressive space’ by which acquired motor knowledge can be 
incorporated into the body through the power of projection.  
According to Colin Smith’s translation, Merleau-Ponty stated that ‘[t]he cultivation 
of habit is indeed the grasping of a motor significance, but it is the motor grasping of a 
motor significance.’116 The emphasis on ‘motor grasping’ suggests that motor significance is 
acquired by the body and not solely by the intellect. The significance of the quotation above 
to Quad I & II lies in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the phantom limb. In the quotation, ‘the 
manipulatory movements’ which ‘the habit body’ could still perceive ‘have disappeared 
from’ the living body. The living body in the quotation is specifically a body that has lost a 
limb and therefore no longer has access to the motor functions relevant to that limb. 
Nonetheless, a subject’s ability to perceive the manipulatory movements between the 
phantom limb and the object despite no longer possessing the necessary manipulatory 
movements suggests that the body subscribes to projection and effectively comprises of two 
layers, the lived body and the projected habit-body.  
In the second part of Quad I & II, the omissions of music and colour may be 
interpreted as the removal of potentially symbolic elements that might shed some light for 
the audience on the characters’ puzzling enterprise. The symbolism is not only potentially 
significant to the audience but may also have a hidden significance for the characters. 
Regardless of what they stand or stood for, their removal from the second part of the play is 
akin to the characters’ as well as the audiences’ loss of potential points of inferences. 
Whereas the loss of colours and physical speed can be likened to the amputation of a limb 
with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s analogy, the loss of music to signify the call of E, in 
particular, may be likened to the removal of the ‘manipulatable object’. Thus, more severe 
than the case of the phantom limb, the Beckettian characters are effectively deprived of both 
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limb and object. As a result, the characters’ tedious persistence in their pursuit of and 
repulsion from the absent E in part II definitively represents to the audience an automatic 
response built up by habit. Intriguingly, if Quad II is indeed a ‘projection’ of Quad I then the 
characters in Quad II may be interpreted as habit-bodies that have lost their lived bodies to 
the, so far, disappointing reach for E. The fact that part II was never written down by 
Beckett to be published alongside part I contributes further to the immateriality of the 
projected habit-body as spectre. Monika M. Langer has it that, to Merleau-Ponty, it is the 
power of bodily projection from the living body to the habit-body ‘which determines one’s 
entire way of being-in-the-world’.117 Conversely, the elimination of the ‘living body’ as 
ground from which to project the exhausted ‘habit-body’ in the Beckettian play renders the 
characters’ ‘way of being-in-the-world’ indeterminately suspended, hence interminably 
disappointing.  
It is important to note that, also referencing Merleau-Ponty, Anna McMullan 
observes in Performing Embodiment in Samuel Beckett’s Drama that ‘Beckett’s drama 
presents embodiment as site and condition of subjectivity, and as performative, constituted 
through an intercorporeal network of perception and interpretation, of interchanges between 
selves and others, including between the stage, screen or radio broadcast and the 
spectator/listener.’118 I understand the ‘intercorporeality’ examined in her work as largely 
grounded on interpretations of corporeal performativity and the corporeal reciprocity 
between Beckett’s characters and between the actors/characters and the audience. This 
seems to lend support to the actor/character/spectator conceptual blending in which 
imagined embodiment can traverse the space between the television screen and the audience. 
To expand this further, I maintain in the following paragraphs that an empathic sense of loss 
is evoked in the trans-corporeality between the characters and the television audience.     
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For the audience, by virtue of our ability to recognise and imagine movements, we 
engage in a bodily recognition of the actors’ weary movements on the screen in our 
imagination. The audience’s discomfort that is caused by the uncertainty of the play’s 
‘point’ could in actuality be triggered by the uncertainty of the motor significances of the 
characters’ movements around the stage. As stated in the previous paragraph, the colours 
and music in the first part of Quad offer at least two features (however vague they are) from 
which the audience could attempt to infer the significance of the characters’ movements as 
well as the function of E. Nonetheless, the deprivation of the second part of these already 
ambiguous elements of the play further indicates the possibility that the playwright could be 
intent on depriving the audience of the opportunity to construct meaning out of those now 
lost elements. Although the contrast of both parts would inevitably continue to allow 
scholars to establish their interpretations of the significance of the colours and the music to 
the characters’ movements, the viewer’s immediate experience of the television play during 
transmission would not allow an in-depth contemplation of these elements. There is no 
playback button. Instead, I posit that the point of transition between the coloured part I and 
the black and white part II could be the main segment of the play that would stand out the 
most to the television audience.  
With this in mind, if Beckett had anticipated that his audience would be struck by the 
visual contrast when he decided to add the second part to the first, it would follow that this 
transition could be the moment of loss that Quad I & II was ultimately put together to 
invoke. In this sense, the moment of loss can therefore be interpreted as residing in the cusp 
between the two parts, and also as the absent incarnate of that colossal ten thousand years 
that, if not for Reinhart Muller-Freienfels, would have been silently (though rather aptly) 
lost to Beckett scholars and irretrievably forgotten.
119
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Moving from the subtle change of posture and pace to indicate the characters’ 
weariness of their interminably disappointing enterprise in Quad I & II, we will now 
examine the audience’s embodied search for motor significance in the seemingly incorporeal 
voices of Beckett’s television plays, with a specific focus on …but the clouds…. McMullan 
has it that in … but the clouds… 
the interplay between visions of the body and the spoken text, between the 
embodied subject and the face of the other, between poetry, drama and 
technology, between male and female gender, subverts the mechanisms of 
cognitive and perceptual control associated with the dominance of “mind 
over eye and body”, maintaining an irreducible margin, whether one terms 
this the space/body of difference, intertextuality, the sublime, or the 
imagination.
120
   
McMullan is right to point out that dualities and the demarcation of the physical from the 
abstract in Beckett’s teleplay is never clear despite the recurrent motif of a subject’s 
divisibility in most of his works. Division through disembodiment of his characters can be 
observed in his portrayal of ghostly voices without bodies, for example, as in the 
disembodied voices in the television plays …but the clouds…, Eh Joe and Ghost Trio as well 
as through the presentation of fragmented bodies, as in the loving pair of hands imagined or 
remembered by the protagonist in Nacht and Träume, the fragmented speaking mouth in the 
theatre piece Not I, and the floating faces of Beckett’s televised What Where (1986). But 
despite these depictions, his works’ subversion of the Cartesian duality indicates an inherent 
inseparability between the mind and the body, and by extension, the physical and the 
abstract. In addition, it is crucial that this subversion of duality is understood as not just 
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about articulating the indivisibility between one’s private mind and body; it could, I posit, 
more specifically be about the intuitive human inclination to ‘embody lack’ or in Gestaltian 
sense, fill in the blanks by incarnating the missing pieces in one’s imagination, that 
contributes to the inseparability between the mind of the spectator and the body of the 
Beckettian actor/character. 
Following this understanding, it is noteworthy that although disembodied voices are 
often regarded as voices in the heads of Beckett’s protagonists, the gendered disembodied 
voices in Beckett’s television plays almost always hint at or point to the speakers’ possible 
identities. In Eh Joe, the vindictive Voice (Philips) could be the voice of one of Joe’s 
(MacGowran) ex-lovers, in Ghost Trio the narrator’s voice (Whitelaw) could be the voice of 
the woman whom the protagonist F  (Pickup) is waiting for, and in …but the clouds… the 
female voice (Whitelaw) that utters the titular line could be the protagonist’s (Pickup) lost 
lover and muse, whose facial features are all that are left in his mind. If we regard these 
women as indeed figments of the protagonists’ imagination or memory, we will notice that 
their voices are nonetheless tied to their bodily identities as, for example, the once 
sexualised then abandoned lover in Eh Joe, the woman whose bodily presence is expected to 
arrive in Ghost Trio, and the woman whose voice, ‘eyes and mouth’ are a sensual 
personification of poetic inspiration in …but the clouds….  
Despite their seeming immateriality, the Beckettian voices are corporeal in the minds 
of his protagonists as much as they are corporeal in the mind’s eye of his television viewers. 
It is possible that the audience is led to mentally visualise and experience the heartbreak and 
death of the girl described by Voice in Eh Joe, the woman who was expected but did not 
arrive in Ghost Trio, and the Woman as an autonomous and infrequent muse who may or 
may not visit M despite him begging ‘to her, to appear’ to him every evening in …but the 
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clouds….121 Compared with the bound bodies of the male protagonists in the three teleplays: 
Joe who is stuck in his cell-like room with his guilt, F who is tied to his appointment with a 
woman who never arrived, and M who is bound to his daily routine which includes begging 
for his muse to appear to him every evening, the disembodied voices are depicted as more 
mobile as they fluidly traverse between a textual image constructed by the spoken text and 
the spectatorially reciprocated corporeal image that is viscerally conjured in the audience’s 
mind.  
Supporting the phenomenon of visual thinking, Rudolf Arnheim borrowed Edward 
B. Titchener’s description of “visual hints” and “flashes” to characterise Impressionist 
paintings as provoking the viewers to respond with ‘a pattern of visual forces’ that 
approximates, for example, a human figure or a tree, rather than offering them a precise 
duplicate of the subject.
122
 The disembodied voices in Beckett’s plays may to a large extent 
be likened to an Impressionist stimulus that invites the viewer to approximate and attribute a 
bodily presence to the voice in their mind’s eye. However, with reference to Arnheim’s 
work, I postulate that the imagined corporeality of these voices is not completely abstract 
and intangible. Although I would argue that the direct perception of a play in a theatre would 
render the imagined corporeality of disembodied voices more tangible by virtue of the 
spectator’s proximity to the live action that is enacted on the stage and/or behind the stage 
by the actors and actresses, the pre-recorded television play can also offer tangibility to the 
imagined corporeality through the concept of synaesthesia. Arnheim had it that even when 
the stimulus is not visual, the mental image conjured as a result of its stimulation could 
‘reflect an almost automatic parallelism among attitudes of the mind and events in the 
physical world [… as] the body produces a physical equivalent of what the mind is 
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doing’.123 Thus, the disembodied voice in a Beckettian teleplay, which is perceived by the 
audience’s sense of hearing, can be translated into an image in the mind’s eye that may be 
embodied by the viewer’s memory of the image’s motor equivalent.  
As we have seen in the above paragraphs, over the course of each teleplay, the 
imagined corporeality of the voices are repeatedly disappointed by the non-arrival of the 
visual whole that would correspond to the spectator’s imagination. Consequently, in stark 
contrast to mainstream televisual contents’ promise of hours of fleeting entertainment as 
well as enriching pre-digested information, Beckett’s peculiarly barren dramatic landscape 
that is littered with unclear motor significances of the disembodied voices’ imagined 
corporeality may be a contributing factor to the frustration of an audience member because 
there is no clear indication as to how she should interpret their roles in the teleplays. 
Nonetheless, although such a television viewer may find the incomprehensible and 
unverifiable motor significances of a conjured image a negative experience, the fact that it 
was empathetically experienced (for example, the viewer would be able to register Voice’s 
tone of contempt for Joe despite not being able to understand her role in the teleplay) 
renders the experience an intuitively significant one in the context of what we have 
examined so far; that is, the frustration of not knowing despite her empathy with the 
characters’ delineated attitudes point to an intuition of loss that seems to be subject-less.  
Having established the viewer’s propensity to attribute motor significances to the 
Beckettian characters, it should be clear by now that the spectator through empathy could 
mentally embody each character, including the disembodied voice, in each Beckettian play. 
In this process, the characters’ motivations and emotions are analysed by the audiences from 
the outset through a set of motor significances that is familiar to them. However, in 
Beckett’s television plays, the audience’s attempts at attributing motor significances are 
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often encouraged through a vivid portrayal of precisely timed movements and repetitive 
physical routines, only to be disappointed by the seeming ineffectuality of these 
painstakingly executed actions. By considering the characters, including the voices, as being 
mentally embodied by the spectator, I am asserting that the viewer is effectively 
experiencing the sense of disappointment that may be inferred from the fruitlessness of the 
characters’ dogged endeavours. That is, I postulate that, in the context of an audience who 
may feel compelled to disengage from Beckett’s teleplay, experiencing the non-arrival of the 
woman in Ghost Trio for instance would be akin to experiencing, by the end of the play, a 
sense of disappointment in the characters’ depicted actions, such as the protagonist’s futile 
wait, the woman’s failure to turn up and, on a more structural level, the play’s overall lack 
of a discernible close-ended sequence of actions.  
In …but the clouds… experiencing the man’s entrapment in his daily routine of 
waiting and supplicating for the arrival of the woman who is referred to only as the pronoun 
‘her’ would produce an expectation of the physical arrival of a woman, for an audience who 
is unaware of the play’s allusion to W. B. Yeats’s poem The Tower and therefore misses the 
idea that the expected ‘she’ could be a personification of the protagonist’s poetic inspiration. 
The subsequent flashes of her eyes and mouth, and her utterance of the titular fragment of a 
line, would do nothing to satisfy the viewers’ uncertainty regarding her role in the play. 
Nonetheless, even if her motor significance remains ambiguous to a viewer who does not 
recognise her mouthed line’s allusion to Yeats’s poem, the audience member would still 
attribute an imagined corporeal presence to the woman in her mind’s eye just as the 
protagonist has personified his poetic inspiration as an elusive female muse. More 
importantly, I would like to point out that such an inclination to attribute corporeality to a 
character is a similar response to that of a television viewer who may be more informed of 
the play’s allusion.  
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To elaborate, towards the end of …but the clouds…, V, which is the protagonist’s 
voice, is able to continue to recite or compose synchronously with W, as she mouths but 
does not utter the concluding lines of Yeats’s poem. To the well-informed audience, 
understanding the man’s closing utterance of ‘…but the clouds of the sky…when the 
horizon fades…or a bird’s sleepy cry…among the deepening shades…’ might occur in two 
phases.  
In the first phase, being aware that these last few lines are the concluding lines of 
Yeats’s The Tower, the viewer might at first infer that M is finally inspired enough to fulfil 
his endeavour to complete the poem with these words. An audience engaged with this 
inference might liken M to Yeats the poet and consider from such an association that the 
play might be about the artist’s determined preoccupation and isolating struggle to create a 
work of art. At this point, the audience who is well acquainted with the poem and Beckett’s 
oeuvre may ascend the second phase to examine the intertextual significance between the 
Yeatsian poem and its role in the Beckettian teleplay. As Katherine Weiss and Daniel Katz 
both point out, M seems to have remembered the poem ‘by rote’ and is depicted in the play 
as trying to recall the poem rather than compose a poem.  
Weiss explains her concept of ‘re-materialisation’ by interpreting M as merely 
repeating after the Woman as he ‘murmur[s], synchronous with lips’ of W instead of 
composing the words himself, so as to ‘bring her back to life’ from being an ‘object of 
remembrance’ by ‘disrupt[ing] [her] dreamlike quality’ through speech.124 The ghostliness 
of Beckett’s characters, which Weiss asserts, is gleaned from M’s failure to materialise his 
mental image of his muse. To Weiss, both M and W remain as spectres despite M’s efforts 
‘to bring her back to “life”’ with speech because M too is an object of the camera and so he 
too is ‘one of the ghostly images he tries to re-materialise through the act of [narrated] 
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reproduction’.125 Significant to the context of what I have postulated thus far are Weiss’ 
intuitive recognition of M’s desire to ‘re-materialise’ the disembodied W, and her intriguing 
assertion that his desire cannot be satisfied because he does not have a bodily presence. 
Weiss’s interpretations are demonstrative of an erudite spectator’s awareness of the human 
inclination to desire to materialise one’s thoughts of a lost Other, just as the disengaging 
audience is inclined to attribute an imagined corporeal form to an unintelligible image of a 
character or voice. Weiss’ overall idea that M’s attempt to ‘re-materialise’ W through 
vocalisation is a failed endeavour, further suggests Weiss’ attribution of imagined 
corporeality to M by seeing the motor significance behind his physical act of vocalisation 
and subsequently interpreting this action as a futile one. Thus, the spectatorial experience of 
embodying Beckett’s characters and voices in one’s mind to experience a sense of futile loss 
may be considered a definitively intuitive effect that the teleplays have on the audience, 
regardless of the extent of one’s intellectual investment.  
Brecht perceptively pointed out 
The intelligibility of a work of literature is not ensured exclusively by its 
being written in exactly the same way as other works which people have 
understood. These other works too were not invariably written just like the 
works before them. Something was done towards their understanding. In the 
same way we must do something for the understanding of the new works. 
Besides being popular there is such a thing as becoming popular.
126
 
Beckett’s works were and continue to be regarded as inaccessible by many. To my mind, his 
television plays articulate a realism that might have been intuitively felt but negated by the 
efforts of public services to place an emphasis on the pedagogical value of his works. By 
emphasising how much of an enigmatic giant the playwright was in the field, the 
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introductory openings by Rosset in 1961 for the television adaptation of Waiting for Godot 
and by Martin Esslin as well as Melvyn Bragg in 1977 for Shades, might have discouraged 
an audience to trust her intuitive experience of the teleplays. Notably, Bragg’s explanation 
that ‘Beckett has become the property of critics, scholars and experts of all sorts, but he’s 
also a playwright whose work is regularly performed by companies amateur and 
professional all over the world’ might have had the effect of confining Beckett’s works to 
the domain of interpretations resulting from specialised analyses. The contrasting clause 
which asserted that amateur companies were also interested in performing Beckett’s works 
would not have improved audience inclusivity as it implied that in addition to specialised 
experts who were drawn to his works, theatre practitioners whether professional or 
unprofessional were also interested. Instead of providing a prelude to ease the audience into 
experiencing what they were about to watch, such introductions might inhibit a non-
specialised and non-practicing audience’s readiness to rely on their intuitive responses to the 
teleplays as a basis for experiencing the fellow-feeling of loss that the teleplays evoke. 
Therefore, applying Brecht’s concept that there is a difference between being popular and 
becoming popular to this context, the fame of Beckett’s works for the stage and the 
reputation of the playwright should not be employed as premises to promote acceptance of 
his teleplays. Perhaps that ‘something’ that has to be ‘done to the understanding’ of 
Beckett’s television drama is entreating the home-viewers to trust and pay attention to their 
intuitions so as to encourage them, from the outset, to regard Beckett’s teleplays as an 
experiential process that is accessible to the everyman.  
In sum, the monument to loss in the context of the television plays is therefore the 
spectators’ mental incarnation of a sense of loss. There is no subject of loss because the 
amnesiac’s inability to retrieve what she has forgotten would render her loss subject-less. A 
reflection of this condition of loss, Beckett’s television plays can be interpreted as seeking to 
appeal to the intuitive emotions of the spectators rather than their intellect by depriving the 
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viewers of a close-ended plot from which to construct an intellectually derived pathos. As a 
greatly reduced state of immediately recognisable mainstream televisual contents, the 
teleplays retain just enough traces of melodramatic affects to evoke within the spectator an 
empathic desire to restore the missing pieces to an assumedly knowable wholeness. 
However, this evocation is established in order to be disappointed. Ultimately, the viewers’ 
embodiment of the Beckettian fragments in their imagination could result in either the 
television audience’s appreciation of having participated with the playwright in the joint 
incarnation of a sense of loss, which is evident in the proliferation of Beckett scholarship 
and performances, or the spectator’s often neglected and unarticulated but equally important 
sentiment of having futilely constructed a monument to an irretrievable loss. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
The main focus of this dissertation is to demonstrate how selected works from Beckett’s 
dramatic oeuvre invoke an intuitive effect in the audience members as they are 
experiencing these plays and film. Having charted the processes of how an audience 
member’s habitual way of understanding could be frustrated by Beckett's radio, film, 
stage and television plays, I have shown the ways by which each medium could have 
been exploited to reconstitute the audience’s ‘pathos’ from directed judgements that are 
led by familiar narratives to an experience of an inherent but often-neglected intuition of 
a seemingly subject-less loss.  
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
When radio plays were first introduced to the public, the listeners’ ‘blindness’ to 
their immediate surroundings by closing their eyes or switching off the lights was 
deemed an ideal condition in which one might enjoy listening to a radio play. By 
examining the radio plays All That Fall (1957), Embers (1959), Words and Music 
(1962), Cascando (1964) and Rough for Radio II (1976), I have shown that this 
condition which was once considered ideal by broadcasting stations is thematically 
appropriated in Beckett’s radio plays as ‘blind faith’ to highlight the audience’s 
entrapment in their habitual framework of understanding, and their habitual 
relinquishment of the possibility of leading a more intuitive existence that could be free 
from the tyranny of a repeatedly extended distortion. More importantly, contrary to 
Steven Connor’s postulation that radio affords Beckett the ‘possibility of writing 
without ground’, I argued that the audience’s mind space is the ground upon which the 
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imaginative spectacle of Beckett’s radio plays is collaboratively composed with the 
listener.
1
  
Further, by explicating the engagement of Beckett’s Film (1964) with Sergei 
Eisenstein’s concept of ‘pathos construction’, I established that Film offers the audience 
an ecstatic perspective that is uniquely Beckettian; that is, it provokes a differentiation 
within the audience member that, by way of the deterritorializing effect, reconstitutes 
her from a habit body to an ecstatic being. With reference to Giles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s concepts of ‘becoming’ and ‘deterritorialization’, I have demonstrated that 
the spectator’s habit body becomes a chained body of perceptual passivity as she gives 
up trying to decipher the film based on her habitual framework of understanding. As a 
result of this submission to bodily passivity, the mind and body of the spectator is 
temporarily deterritorialised from the habitual framework of understanding and 
reconstituted as an ecstatic being who is open to a decentralised intuition that is 
characterised by lateral multiplicity rather than stratified limits. The postulation that a 
reconstitution of the spectator can only ever be temporary is elucidated in the fourth 
chapter on Beckett’s stage plays, where habit is analysed as bound to a successive time 
continuum that governs the diegesis of each play as well as the audience’s extradiegetic 
reality.  
Whereas Beckett criticism seems to remain intrigued by the depiction of time as 
either circular or static in Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre, I have shown that time is portrayed 
as dual in Beckett theatre by mapping out the tension between Immanuel Kant and 
Henri Bergson’s concepts of time in relation to Beckett’s stage plays Waiting for Godot 
(1955), Endgame (1957), Act Without Words II (1957), Happy Days (1961), Footfalls 
(1976), Rockaby (1981) and Catastrophe (1982). More specifically, the Kantian 
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continuum is attributed to the external time that governs the diegetic space of the 
characters, whereas the Bergsonian durée is employed to describe the intuitive 
experience of time within the narrated stories, and between the beginning of the act of 
storytelling and the characters’ emergence from it in order to check whether their 
anticipated end has arrived. That the audience members are implicated in the experience 
of the tension between the two depictions of time is supported by my assertion that the 
spectators’ habitual ‘will to completion’ is destabilised when they ineffectually try to 
make sense of the characters’ stories because there is no discernible temporal order to 
these narrated stories. As a result of this, narrative closure is withheld from the audience. 
The external time continuum which governs the physical stage in which the 
actors/characters reside and the audience’s known reality is tied to this compulsion for 
narrative closure, whereas the internal time, which governs the anachronical story 
fragments is that which invokes the audience’s intuition of subjective time. Further, I 
demonstrated that this anachronical nature of internal time affords the characters 
temporary respite from the incarcerating external time continuum while it deprives the 
audience member of any relief as it destabilises her habitual framework of 
understanding, which expects narrative closure.  
 This destabilised compulsion for narrative closure is also analysed in terms of 
how Beckett’s television plays subvert the television viewer’s expectation to be 
informed or entertained. More specifically, I examined these expectations in relation to 
the domination of realism on television from the late 1950s to the 1970s, and 
established that the primary objective of the more familiar forms of realist drama during 
that period of time seems to be to draw the audience into engaging with the extended or 
represented ‘reality’ through the depiction of elements that are familiar or relevant to 
the viewer. That Beckett’s television plays were not very well received according to 
audience ratings, is analysed in this dissertation as attributable to the possibility that 
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they did not directly satisfy a list of viewers’ expectations that were identified in a non-
exhaustive list of ‘Media gratifications sought and obtained’ in Uses and Gratifications 
Theory. Through this analysis, I discovered that the teleplays are a greatly reduced state 
of the immediately recognisable mainstream televisual contents, and that they retain just 
enough traces of melodramatic affects to evoke within the spectator an empathic desire 
to restore the missing pieces of each play to an assumedly knowable wholeness. 
However, this empathic desire is set up in order to be disappointed. Contrary to the 
pedagogical function of teaching the audience new ways of seeing as suggested by 
Jonathan Bignell, I have shown that these works are not pedagogically functional in that 
context. Instead, by frustrating the viewers’ compulsion for narrative closure, I 
concluded that what the teleplays are offering to the viewer is an intuitive reminder of a 
forgotten sense of loss. The portrayal of this loss as seemingly subject-less in the 
television plays highlights to the viewers that their reliance on their habitual way of 
knowing has rendered them amnesiacs who cannot remember what they have lost, 
except that they have lost. 
 In sum, I have shown how Beckett’s radio plays emphasise the audience’s 
entrapment in their habitual gaze. Following this trajectory, I have also demonstrated 
that Film offers an ecstatic perspective that is both within and outside of the spectator’s 
habitual conceptual frame. Further, I examined the stage plays as depictions of how an 
internal durée and external time continuum characterise intuition and a habitual way of 
knowing, respectively, so as to afford the characters and deprive the audience members 
of temporary respite. Lastly, I have illustrated how the television plays could evoke the 
intuition of a subject-less sense of loss in the viewer instead of merely provoking 
intellectual engagement.  In essence, these findings highlight the processes by which 
Beckett's dramatic works could temporarily reconstitute the audience’s habitual 
framework of understanding to an intuition of loss.  
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6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PLANS  
Throughout the dissertation, I have maintained that regardless of the extent of 
one’s intellectual investment, the audience member would experience an intuitive sense 
of loss when her habitual framework of understanding is frustrated by Beckett drama. 
The Beckett and Brain Science project which explores how the portrayal of subjective 
experiences of mental disorders in Beckett’s oeuvre could provide ‘new narrative 
frameworks to express the experience of chronic and life-limiting conditions’, may be 
helpful in shedding more light on how his works could also challenge or subvert 
established frameworks of understanding the suffering body.
2
 More specifically, this 
project could potentially be fertile ground for developing a more in-depth understanding 
of how Beckett’s dramatic works could evoke an empathic intuition of loss in the 
audience members; by extension, findings from such an exploration may be applied to a 
clinical setting to consider how physicians or caregivers may develop a more empathic 
response to the suffering body. Nevertheless, the Beckett and Brain Science special 
issue of the Journal of Medical Humanities has not been published yet at the time when 
this dissertation was submitted. As such, I do not have the opportunity to engage with 
the results of this project in Beckett studies yet.  
 In addition, although I have listened to the original radio broadcast and watched 
the television plays that were recorded by the British Broadcasting Corporation, the fact 
that I did not experience these works directly based on the cultural codes and 
conventions that are particular to the time in which these plays were broadcast, means 
that my analysis of these works is limited to what I have researched about the time 
period in which they were written and produced. 
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 Further, having viewed the 2001 television adaptation of the stage plays that are 
collectively titled Beckett on Film, I am also keen to analyse each of these cross-
medium adaptations to see the extent by which the evocation of the intuition of loss is 
retained or neglected. For example, Damien Hirst’s television adaptation of Breath 
(2001) seems to have taken a huge liberty with the original play and it would be 
interesting to examine how the replacement of scattered rubbish with medical waste 
impedes the evocation of the intuition of loss by being too specifically themed.  
However, I limited the scope of this dissertation to only the works that Beckett was 
actively involved in producing, so that I could consider in parallel his documented 
editorial participation and authorial decisions, as I attempt to articulate the processes by 
which the original plays could have invoked an intuitive effect in the viewers.  
 Even though these more recent cross-medium adaptations are outside the scope 
of this dissertation, an analysis of how or whether each adaptation in the Beckett on 
Film collection retains the intuitive effect on the audience could be a potential topic for 
my next research project. As a follow up to this dissertation and therefore in relation to 
the intuitive effect that has been established in this thesis, it would be fruitful to 
compare the evolution of these stage plays that Beckett was directly involved in, with 
the 2001 television adaptations of the stage plays by directors such as Atom Egoyan, 
Anthony Minghella and Neil Jordan. The following is a brief example of what I mean 
by the evolution of a stage play in the context of the intuitive effect defined in this 
dissertation.  
 In the German and American television adaptations of What Where, the 
megaphone was abandoned and replaced with a ‘distorted death mask’ of Voice.3 The 
mysterious disembodied voice now issues forth a mask on television instead of a 
                                                                
3
 Quoted in Graley Herren, ‘Beckett on Television’, in A Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. by S.E. 
Gontarski (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), pp. 389-402 (p. 400). 
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mechanical device on the stage. Nonetheless, its narration sustains the mechanical 
nature of Voice by beginning with ‘I switch on’, ending with ‘I switch off’, repeating 
the phrase ‘I start again’ and maintaining a sequential report on the season in which 
each interrogation takes place. This integral mechanical nature of Voice renders the 
diegetic space in which the play is enacted on television and on the stage, a space that 
continues to be governed by a successive linearity of time, although the compressed 
seasons underscores the narration as a summary account of an event that occurred in the 
past.  
 In effect, Voice can be regarded as residing in the diegetic space that is closer to 
that of the audience member whereas his narrated memory of the interrogations 
represents the hypodiegetic space in which the account is enacted.  As I have 
established in Chapter 4, the characters of Beckett’s stage plays are delineated as 
attempting to invoke the internal durée through storytelling by abstracting themselves 
from the incarcerating sequential external time line that extends interminably.  Similarly, 
the narration in What Where clearly abstracts Bam to a hypodiegetic space from his 
diegetic Voice. That is, since every time Voice utters the words ‘In the end I appear, 
reappear’ Bam fades into the screen, the viewers are led to interpret Voice as the voice 
of Bam who is recounting a past in a temporally linear order from Spring to Winter. 
However, a seeming paradox arises when we consider Voice’s subjective existence in 
this point of time like a locked groove of a vinyl record.
4
 Saying the words ‘Time 
passes’, does not necessarily mean that this sequence of repeated time indeed elapse for 
Voice. By revisiting the past when he was once Bam, time for Voice is dual, in that it is 
paradoxically a linear external time continuum and a non-linear internal durée.  By 
                                                                
4
 A locked groove is the continuous loop of music that spans the length of a record's one full rotation. 
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retaining the mechanical quality of Voice in the television adaptation, this dual 
depiction of time is kept intact. 
 In my view, it is possible that the megaphone is no longer necessary on 
television because the television itself is already a mechanical device that transmits the 
voice of Bam. An additional device would overplay the mechanical nature of an organic 
habit that the play might be alluding to, and as a result too clearly demarcates the divide 
between the mechanical nature of habit and its embeddedness in the habit-body. As I 
have stated in Chapter 3, despite our inherent state of fragmentation that results in our 
predisposition to divide within ourselves, there is no clear divide between the habit 
body and the ecstatic being.  
 Moreover, a physical device is more provocative when its presence is 
maintained on the stage rather than on the television screen. That is, the physical device 
(and the physical bodies of the actors) that is designated for the stage would serve as a 
reminder of the external time continuum to the audience, and the disembodied narration 
would imply a hypodiegetic temporal dimension that is out of sync with the external 
time of the diegesis in which the megaphone and the audience reside.  As such, the 
stage play seems to highlight the audience member’s bondage to the stratified organism 
and offers her no respite through the presence of this concrete object. However, as 
established in Chapter 5, given the emphasis of Beckett’s teleplays on a subject-less loss, 
it is plausible that the reduction of the characters/ actors’ bodies to mere heads is a way 
of employing the television medium to shift the focus of the play from a physicality that 
is bound by the habitual framework of understanding, to a more abstract intuition of a 
subject-less loss.  
 More significantly, Voice’s revisitation of the past is depicted as compelled by 
the unanswered titular questions ‘What?’ and ‘Where?’ The unknown subject and place 
that these two questions are meant to elicit are not ‘there’ to be found from the very 
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beginning of the play. The sequence of unavailing interrogation and torture represents a 
habitual way of knowing that is absurdly reduced to Bem’s unaffected exchange with 
Bam in the final part of the play, when he asks Bam the same questions that he had 
asked before he was to interrogate Bim.  As the one who is going to be interrogated and 
tortured next, the repeated questions are reduced to a compulsive act of habit that is 
devoid of any effectual purpose.  In the evolution of What Where, from the stageplay to 
the German and American television plays, Beckett’s increasing minimalism, as can be 
seen most directly in the reduction of the full-bodied stage characters to floating heads 
in the teleplay, is not an increasing abstraction that renders his work even less 
comprehensible to the general audience. Instead, it is an increasing emphasis on the 
audience’s intuitive comprehension of his work as opposed to their intellectual 
comprehension.   
 Indeed, this analysis of the concept of habit in relation to the intuition of loss in 
Beckett’s dramatic works contributes to Beckett studies a new way of understanding the 
discomforting effect that his works have on his audiences. Instead of attributing this 
discomfort to a lack of intellectual engagement on the part of the audience member, I 
have shown that it is fruitful to consider this discomfort as a significant reaction to 
Beckett drama. The intuition, which I have established as a simple feeling that Beckett’s 
audience member experiences, is the most immediate impression that one could have of 
a work of art. Given Beckett’s love of paintings, he could well have been very aware of 
the delicate intuition that is involved in the appreciation of art. As another potential area 
of research, it would be intriguing to examine the relation between the intuitive feelings 
of viewing a painting and the intuition of loss that is invoked by Beckett’s drama within 
the audience member.  
 As it should be apparent by now, this dissertation’s demonstration of the 
processes by which the selected dramatic works invoke the audience’s intuition of loss 
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could form the basis from which future research on Beckett and Intuition develops. To 
date, Uhlmann is the only critic who has written about the intuition in direct relation to a 
Beckett work. However, the ‘intuition image’ that Uhlmann defines in the context of 
Film does not delve into the intricate processes of reconstitution that I have elaborated 
here as the evocation of an intuition of loss by Beckett’s drama as they frustrate the 
audience member’s habitual way of understanding.    
In conclusion, the primary aim of this dissertation has been to demonstrate the 
audience member’s process of reconstitution from a habitual framework of 
understanding to an intuition of loss as she is experiencing a Beckett play or film. As 
such, through my analysis of the intersection between the concept of habit, and the 
philosophical and psychological contexts in which the film and selected plays were 
written and first performed, Time and Loss are presented in this dissertation as the 
motifs that facilitate the reconstitution of the audience members from a sense of pity for 
the characters to an ecstatic empathy as she intuits a loss that coincides with the 
Beckettian characters’ habit-wrought sense of loss. While recognising that more 
research can be done to better understand how the audience member’s intuition might 
be affected in cross-medium adaptations, the processes of reconstitution which I have 
established in this dissertation lay a significant groundwork from which Beckett studies 
may develop further critical directions on the topic of Beckett and the audience’s 
intuitive reception of his drama. 
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